

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | 1 | L | Q | A | D | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 | On July 29, 1982, at 3:15 a.m., the 2-1001-65B RHRS Service Water Pump was removed
03 | from service to adjust the inboard and outboard booster pump seal packing, in order
04 | to stop minor leakage. Excessive seal leakage has in the past led to bearing oil
05 | dilution with seal water and subsequent bearing damage. Both loops of RHRS could
06 | always have been cooled by RHR Service Water since each loop has two 100 percent
07 | RHRS Service Water Pumps. Thus, there was no significant affect on safety
08 | associated with this occurrence.

09 | SYSTEM CODE | C | F | 11 | CAUSE CODE | B | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | B | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | P | U | M | P | X | X | 14 | COMP SUBCODE | B | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | LER NO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 1 | 6 | 24 | 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 | 29 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32
ACTION TAKEN | E | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB | Y | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | N | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | 1 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 | The leakage was a result of seal packing wear. This may have been accelerated by
11 | abrasives found in the river water used to cool the seals. The seal packing was
12 | adjusted and the leakage stopped. The pump was tested operable at 1835 hours on
13 | July 30, 1982. The feasibility of using mechanical seals on RHR Service Water
14 | Pumps is currently under investigation.

15 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 7 | 9 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator Observation | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41
7 8 9 11 12 80

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43
7 8 9 10 80

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 80

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PDR ADOCK 05000265
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NRC USE ONLY

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- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 82-16/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On July 29, 1982, at 3:15 a.m., the 2-1001-65B Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) Service Water Pump was removed from service for preventative maintenance. All appropriate surveillances of the Containment Cooling Mode of the RHRS had been successfully completed as required by Technical Specification 4.5.B.2., prior to removing the pump from service.

The reason for performing preventative maintenance was to adjust both the inboard and outboard booster pump seal packings to stop minor leakage.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The packing in the pump was not sufficiently worn to cause any excess leakage from the pump seals. There was, however, a possibility that long term operation of the pump may have resulted in additional wear of the packing and subsequent excessive leakage. Large leaks in the past have resulted in bearing oil dilution with seal leakage water and subsequent bearing damage.

The Containment Cooling Mode of RHRS consists of two loops; each loop having two 100 percent capacity service water pumps. Therefore, loss of the "B" RHRS Service Water pump would not have prevented either loop of the Containment Cooling Mode of RHRS from performing its designed function. There was no affect on the safe operation of the unit as a result of this occurrence.

Technical Specification 3.5.B.2 allows Reactor operation if the affected pump is made operable within 30 days, provided that the active components of the Containment Cooling Mode of RHRS remain operable.

VII. CAUSE:

The water flowing through the RHRS Service Water pumps is river water. River water contains abrasive particles and can cause packing to fail before their design lifetime.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action consisted of adjusting the packing on the inboard and outboard stuffing boxes of the booster pump. The 2B RHRS Service Water pump was returned to service and successfully tested at 1835 hours, on July 30, 1982. The pump was manufactured by Ingersol Rand, Model 8GT. The packing was manufactured by John Crane, Sytle 1625GF. Special Test 1-58 has been initiated to install mechanical seals on one of the RHR Service Water pumps. Pending results of this test, mechanical seals could prove to be a long term solution.