Gerald R. Rainey
Vice President
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

PECO ENERGY

PECO Energy Company
RD 1, Box 208
Delta, PA 17314-9739
717 456 7014

February 18, 1994

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Docket Nos. 50-277 & 50-278

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Units 2 and 3

This LER concerns a Technical Specification violation when a firewatch was not performed in the Diesel Generator Building Cardox area.

Reference:	Docket Nos.	50-277 & 50-278
Report Number:	2-94-001	
Revision Number:	00	
Event Date:	01/19/94	
Report Date:	02/18/94	
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314	

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely,

G R Rainey

GRR/GAJ:gaj

enclosure

cc: R.A.Burricelli, Public Service Electric & Gas
W. P. Dornsife, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
INPO Records Center
T. T. Martin, US NRC, Administrator, Region I
R. I. McLean, State of Maryland
W. L. Schmidt, US NRC, Resident Inspector
C. D. Schaefer, DelMarVa Power
H. C. Schwemm, VP - Atlantic Electric

CCN 94-14019

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NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Units 2 & 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 7	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) Technical Specification Violation due to a missed firewatch

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 1	1 9	9 4	9 4	- 0 0	- 0 0	0 2	1 8	9 4	Peach Bottom Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 8
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Anthony J. Wasong, Manager, Experience Assessment	AREA CODE 7 1 7 4 5 6 - 1 7 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 01/19/94, a fire supervisory alarm annunciated in the Control Room. The Shift Engineer identified that the alarm was from the alarm loop serving the four Diesel Generator Bays and the Cardox Room. The Shift Supervisor (SSV) determined that an hourly firewatch would be appropriate for the four Diesel Generator Bays and the one Cardox Room. Security was contacted to establish a firewatch in these areas. At approximately 0900 hours, Fire Protection personnel identified that a breaker must have opened or had been opened which made the Cardox Room fire detection inoperable. Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 3.14.C.2 requires that an hourly firewatch be performed when fire detection instrumentation becomes inoperable for a given area. In addition, it was discovered by Fire Protection personnel that the firewatch was not in place for the Cardox Room from 0500 to 0900 hours. Therefore, since no firewatch was established, a Tech Spec violation occurred. The breaker was then closed and the instrumentation was restored to an operable condition. The cause of the event was having the fire detection system breaker open with no hourly firewatch in the Diesel Generator Cardox Room. The firewatch was not established due to miscommunication between the SSV and the Security Individual. The cause of the open breaker could not be determined. The event has been discussed with the involved individuals and pertinent information will be provided to the appropriate personnel. No previous similar events have been identified.

Requirements for the Report

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) due to a violation of Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 3.14.C.2 concerning a missed firewatch in the Diesel Generator Building Cardox Room.

Unit Conditions at the time of the Event

Units 2 and 3 were in the "RUN" mode at approximately 100% power. There were no inoperable structures, systems or components that contributed to this event.

Description of the Event

On 01/19/94 a fire supervisory alarm, which may indicate an open alarm circuit, annunciated in the Main Control Room and could not be reset or cleared. The Shift Engineer (Utility : Non-Licensed) performed troubleshooting in accordance with procedure AO-37A.7.A "TROUBLESHOOTING FIRE ALARM LOSS OF SUPERVISORY CIRCUIT OR CONTINUOUS ALARM HORN SOUNDING" and identified that the supervisory alarm was from the alarm loop serving the four Diesel Generator Bays and the Cardox Room. Therefore, the fire detection equipment supervisory logic located in the Diesel Generator Bays and Cardox Room was isolated to allow the supervisory alarm, which is needed for other areas of the plant, to be reset at 0500 hours. At approximately 0530 hours, the Shift Supervisor (Utility : Licensed) determined that an hourly firewatch would be appropriate for the four Diesel Generator Bays and the one Cardox Room until troubleshooting, to determine if equipment was operable, was completed. Security was contacted to establish a firewatch in these areas. On 01/19/94 at approximately 0900 hours, Fire Protection personnel identified that a breaker must have opened or had been opened earlier that day. This made the Diesel Generator Building Cardox Room fire detection instrumentation inoperable and prevented the reset of the supervisory alarm in the Main Control Room. Tech Spec 3.14.C.2 requires that an hourly firewatch be performed when all fire detection instrumentation becomes inoperable for a given area. In addition, it was discovered by Fire Protection personnel that the firewatch was not in place for the Diesel Generator Building Cardox Room from approximately 0500 hours to 0900 hours. Therefore, since no firewatch was established in the Diesel Generator Building Cardox Room, a Tech Spec violation occurred. Following discovery of the open breaker, the breaker was closed and the fire detection instrumentation was restored to an operable condition.

Cause of the Event

The cause of the event was having the fire detection system breaker open with no hourly firewatch in the Diesel Generator Building Cardox Room. The firewatch was not

established due to miscommunication between the Shift Supervisor (SSV) (Utility : Licensed) and the Security Individual (Utility : Non Licensed) following discovery of the event. Operations records indicate that the SSV notified the Security Individual that a firewatch would be required in all five areas. However, the Security records indicate that a firewatch would only be required in the four Diesel Generator Bays, not the Cardox Room. Therefore, the Cardox Room firewatch was not established. Communication which is not clearly understood by all individuals does not meet the expectation of Management. In addition, searches of access records to the Diesel Generator areas and the Cardox Room could not identify activities performed within the panel which contains the breaker. Therefore, the cause of the open breaker could not be determined.

Analysis of the Event

There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event.

No fires occurred in this area during the period of non-compliance. The probability of not detecting a fire in this area during the period of non-compliance was extremely low due to the fact that firewatches were being performed in adjacent fire areas. Had a fire occurred in the area of concern, firewatches in adjacent fire areas were in effect to alert fire brigade personnel to promptly extinguish the fire. There was no entry of transient combustibles into the affected fire area during the period of non compliance. The Cardox Room is a separate fire area separated from the Diesel Generators by a three hour fire barrier. In addition, during the time that the fire detection instrumentation in the Cardox Room were inoperable, the carbon dioxide fire suppression system was operable to inject into the four Diesel Generator Bays. However, the alarm would not have functioned to notify the Main Control Room personnel of a fire.

Corrective Actions

Following discovery of the open breaker, the breaker was closed and the fire detection instrumentation was restored to an operable condition.

The event has been discussed with the involved individuals. The pertinent information from the event will be provided to the appropriate Security and Operations personnel to re-emphasize the importance of clear communication.

Previous Similar Events

No previous similar events have been identified which involve communication issues between Shift Operations and the Security personnel.