

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

ON JULY 24, 1982, WHILE SHUTDOWN FOR REFUELING A NEW TYPE OF CONTAINMENT AIR GASEOUS AND PARTICULATE MONITORS WERE INSTALLED. APPROXIMATELY 37 HOURS LATER ON JULY 26, DURING A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE DESIGN CHANGE COORDINATOR AND OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ALARM/TRIP SETPOINT VALUE WHICH HAD BEEN SET IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX "B" T.S. 2.1.3 WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX "A" T.S. 3.3.3.1. AT THIS TIME THE ACTION OF 3.9.9 WAS CARRIED OUT.

DURING THIS PERIOD THE REACTOR HEAD WAS IN PLACE AND NO CORE ALTERATIONS TOOK PLACE. NO APPENDIX "B" RELEASE LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED. THIS WAS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE AND NO PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES RESULTED.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEILLANCE OF THE ALARM/TRIP SETPOINT COULD NOT DETERMINE THE PROPER SETPOINT USING THE NORMAL CHANNEL READING BECAUSE IT WAS A NEGATIVE VALUE. THIS RESULTED FROM A BACKGROUND SUBTRACT FEATURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW INSTRUMENTATION. THEY WERE LAX IN REPORTING THEIR DIFFICULTY WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE TO THE PROPER PERSONNEL.

THE BACKGROUND SUBTRACT WAS DISABLED, THE ALARM SETPOINT SET AT $\leq 2x$ BACKGROUND AND THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE REVISED. THE OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT MET WITH PERSONS INVOLVED TO DISCUSS MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS OVER FUTURE RELATED DESIGN CHANGE INSTALLATIONS. A FOLLOWUP REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED CONCERNING ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.