(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | A L B R F 1 (2) LICENSEE CODE | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) LICENSE NUMBER | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) LICENSE TYPE | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 (7) DOCKET NUMBER | 0 7 2 9 8 2 (8) EVENT DATE | 0 8 2 7 8 2 (9) REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During normal operation, while conducting SI 4.11.C.1 (Heat and Smoke Detection
03 Operability Check) the control power switches for the CO_2 systems protecting
04 diesel rooms A, B, C and D (these diesels are common to units 1 and 2) were
05 found in the off position, thus disabling the automatic initiation logic
06 (T.S. 3.1..B.1.c) and the heat detector operability (T.S. 3.11.C.1) for these areas.
07 There was no effect on the health or safety of the public. No redundant systems
08 exist.

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
09	A B (11)	A (12)	X (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 2	—	0 5 2	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	G (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Control power switches had been placed in the off position. Power was immediately
11 restored and other systems checked to ensure that power was on. Signs will be
12 posted to indicate that power should remain on. Monthly inspection, SI 4.11.D.4
13 will be revised to include verification of control power. Alarm devices which
14 can be heard over the operating diesels will be installed.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
15	E (28)	0 8 6 (29)	NA	B (31)	Surveillance test

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
16	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
17	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
18	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
19	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
20	N (44)	NA	

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Tennessee Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17
BF 15.2
2/12/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 82052 Technical Specification Involved 3.11.B.1 & 3.11.C.1

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2)* Date Due NRC 08/28/82

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 86-percent power, unit 2 at 64-percent power, and unit 3 at 86-percent power. While conducting Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.11.C.1 (Heat and Smoke Detection Operability Check), the control power switches for the CO_2 systems protecting diesel rooms A, B, C, and D (diesels are common to units 1 and 2) were found in the "off" position thus disabling the automatic initiation logic (T.S. 3.11.C.1) for these areas. There was no effect on the health and safety of the public. No redundant systems exist.

S.I. 4.11.B.1.a (CO_2 System-Simulated Automatic and Manual Operation) was conducted for diesel rooms A, B, C, and D on February 24, 1982. Performance of this SI requires the control power switches be left in the "on" position. This is the last documented work performed on this system. The control power switches were apparently placed in the "off" position between the completion of the SI and prior to discovery on July 29, 1982 (a 4-month period). Personnel error was involved; however, the exact person(s) or classification of personnel involved cannot be determined. Misleading signs and/or concerns for personnel safety may have caused this action. Operational placards exist which state, "In case of fire,...turn the toggle switch on..." These placards may have led someone to believe that the switches should be normally in the "off" position. While the diesels are running, the constant tone predischarge evacuation alarm is difficult to hear. Personnel performing work in the diesel rooms may have placed the control power switches in the "off" position because of a concern for their safety and failed to return the switches to their normal position.

* Previous Similar Events:

NONE

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
BFRO-50-259/82052

Control power was restored upon discovery and all other automatically-activated CO_2 systems were checked to ensure that control power was on. The misleading operational placards will be removed and SI 4.11.D.4 (Fire Protection System Inspection) will be revised to include a verification of the position of the control power switches on a monthly basis. The existing alarm horns will be replaced with horns having a varying pitch which can be heard over the operating diesel. Similar horns are presently in service on unit 3.