CONTROL BLOCK:    1   1
CONT  O 1  REPORT L SOLUENCE 13 15 LICENSETYPE 30 37 CAT 33  CONT  O 1  REPORT L SOLUENCE 13 15 DOCKET NUMBER 35 45 EVENT DATE 30 37 CAT 35  EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10  O 2 On June 22, 1982, while Keowee Unit 1 was being tested to verify operability,  The unit would not close into the system grid via the Keowee to 230 KV Switch—  O 4 yard Tie Breaker (ACB-1). During the period of inoperability of Keowee Unit 1,  O 5 Keowee Unit 2 was operable and could have provided emergency power, after automatic or manual transfer to the available onsite power path; thus, the health  O 7 and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.  O 8  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 2 6 9 7 0 6 2 2 8 2 8 0 8 2 0 8 2 0 8 2 9 0 2 9 0 8 2 9 0 2 9
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (1)  O 2 On June 22, 1982, while Keowee Unit 1 was being tested to verify operability,  the unit would not close into the system grid via the Keowee to 230 KV Switch—  yard Tie Breaker (ACB-1). During the period of inoperability of Keowee Unit 1,  Keowee Unit 2 was operable and could have provided emergency power, after auto—  matic or manual transfer to the available onsite power path; thus, the health  and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
the unit would not close into the system grid via the Keowee to 230 KV Switch—  yard Tie Breaker (ACB-1). During the period of inoperability of Keowee Unit 1,  Keowee Unit 2 was operable and could have provided emergency power, after automatic or manual transfer to the available onsite power path; thus, the health  and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.
Keowee Unit 2 was operable and could have provided emergency power, after automatic or manual transfer to the available onsite power path; thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
matic or manual transfer to the available onsite power path; thus, the health  and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
matic or manual transfer to the available onsite power path; thus, the health  and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 9 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix}$ $\begin{bmatrix} E & E \\ 10 \end{bmatrix}$ $\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 12 \end{bmatrix}$ $\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\$
SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT NO.  17 REPORT NO.  18 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 L 0
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS (22) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
B B Z 9 Z 20 Z 21 O O O O Y 23 N 24 L 25 W 2 8 8
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  The apparent cause of this incident was a leaking float valve in the turbine
governor control system. The valve was repaired and the unit tested satisfac-
torily. The Keowee Unit 2 governor control float valve was inspected for the
same problem and was found to be satisfactory.
14
FACILITY STATUS OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 14 45 46  ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASE OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)  1 6   Z   (33)   Z   (34) NA   NA
7 8 2 10 11 44 45 B
NA  NUMBER 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA  1 7 9 11 12 13
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)  1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
1 9 Z 2 NA
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NA
J. F. Kutzer PHONE (704) 373-7139