

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
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August 20, 1982


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/82-11. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. Letter of Mr. William O. Parker, Jr. dated July 22, 1982 addressed the delay in preparation of this report.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

JFK/php
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. Philip C. Wagner
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Report Number: RO-269/82-11

Report Date: August 20, 1982

Occurrence Date: June 22, 1982

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Keowee Hydro Unit 1 inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1 - 100% FP
Oconee 2 - 59% FP
Oconee 3 - Cold Shutdown

Description of Occurrence: On June 22, 1982, while Keowee Unit 1 was being tested to verify operability, the unit would not close into the system grid via the Keowee to 230KV Switchyard Tie Breaker (.CB-1).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this occurrence was a leak in a float valve in the governor oil pressure tank for the Turbine Governor System. The faulty float valve prevented automatic governor control of the turbine wicker gates. As a result, the turbine was unable to attain sufficient speed to parallel to the system grid.

Analysis of Occurrence: The Keowee Hydro Generators are required to provide emergency power to Oconee Nuclear Station in the event of the loss of offsite electric power. During the period of inoperability of Keowee Unit 1, Keowee Unit 2 was operable and could have provided emergency power. The Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) System is designed to select and transfer to the available onsite power path. The EPSL system was operable during this incident. Additionally, the operator could manually transfer to the redundant source. Hence, it is considered that the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by this incident. Investigation of this incident has identified a need for additional evaluation of the EPSL system which is currently in progress.

Corrective Action: Keowee Unit 2 was verified to be operable. The defective float valve on the Keowee Unit 1 governor was repaired and the unit was verified to be operable. The governor float valve on Keowee Unit 2 was inspected and found in satisfactory condition. Based on discussions with Woodward Governor Company it has been determined that the float valve failure is an isolated occurrence.