## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1	V   A   S   P   S   2   3   0   0   -   0   0   0   0   -   0   0
TACD 1	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 7 2 8 8 2 0 8 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2	With the unit at full power, the service water valve pit for MOV-SW-202A, was found
0 3	flooded with the valve open and the motor grounded. This is reportable per T.S.
0 4	6.6.2.b.(2). An operator was assigned administrative control of the valve until
0 5	it was returned to service, therefore the health and safety of the public were not
0 16	Laffected.
0 7	
018	80
09	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE
	17 REPORT NUMBER   8   2
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRO-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SUPPLIER SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER P 3 4 0 26
1101	The service water valve pit was flooded while draining the condenser waterboxes
111	during cleaning. The failure of the operations staff to turnover the need to
1 2	pump the pit and the inspection of the wrong pit led to the grounding of MOV-SW-
1 3	202A. The valve and pit were dried and returned to service. Dikes are being
114	built around the service water pits for both units.
7 8	FACILITY STATUS  THER STATUS  OTHER STATUS  OSCOVERY DISCOVERY DIS
	SCTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 44 45 46 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 N/A N/A
7 8	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39
1 7 8	0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A
1 8	NUMBER   DESCRIPTION (41)   N/A   80
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION N/A
7 8	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  N/A  N/A
7 8	VAME OF RESPLEES J. L. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184
820 PDR S	9020199 820824 ADDCK 05000280 PDR

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO:

50-281

REPORT NO:

82-039/03L-0

EVENT DATE:

07-28-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Service Water Valve Pit for MOV-SW-202A Flooded

# 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

On July 25, with the unit at full power, the flood control level alarm was activated for the MOV-SW-202A valve pit. During this shift, waterboxes A and D were drained to the turbine building floor drains for cleaning. The drain near D waterbox is also close to the MOV-SW-202A and B valve pits. Some water was found in the A pit, however, this discovery was not made until late in the shift and a sump pump could not be found during the remainder of the shift.

During mid shift, the B and C waterboxes were cleaned and drained. At the beginning of the day shift on the 26th, the flood control alarm was observed and an operator was sent to investigate. The operator looked in the wrong pit, and seeing no significant water, informed the control room operator that the problem was with the level switch. A maintenance request was submitted on the switch in the 202A pit.

The electricians went to correct the flood control level switch on the 28th and found the pit flooded with the motor partially submerged and grounded. Since the valve was inoperable, and open, this event is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b(2).

## 2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

Service water valves MOV-SW-202A and B are designed to close to conserve intake water level when that level drops to 18 feet or when a blackout occurs coincident with a Consequence Limiting Safeguards signal.

An operator was assigned administrative control of the valve and it was returned to service in 4 hrs. 41 minutes, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

#### 3. CAUSE:

The service water valve pit was flooded while draining the condenser inlet waterboxes during cleaning. The cause for the grounding of MOV-SW-202A was the failure to turnover the need for pumping the pit from one shift to the next. The operator that inspected the wrong pit allowed water to remain in contact with the motor casing for two additional days, therefore this also contributed to the operability of MOV-SW-202A.

# 4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

When water was discovered in the valve pit on the 28th, an operator was assigned administrative control of the valve and the water pumped out.

## 5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The electricians dried out the motor, cleaned the limit switch contacts and replaced the torque switch. The motor was then bridged and meggered and returned to service per PT-25.1.

## 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The service water valve pits for both units have been scheduled to have dikes and handrails constructed around them.

The heavy solid deck plate covering the pits will be replaced with grating to facilitate inspections. The operating staff have been instructed to inspect the affected pit once per shift anytime a flood control alarm is in or is suspected of being inoperable.

### 7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

Service water valve pit flooding has been a recurring problem. The steps listed in 6 above are already in progress and should prevent a repeat of this event.