ACRS-1455
PDR 8/30/82

DATE ISSUED: 8-13-82
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MINUTES OF THE ACRS HUMAN FACTORS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MAY 5, 1982

The ACRS Human Factors Subcommittee met on May 5, 1982 in Rooms 1167 and 1130, 1717 H St. NW., Washington, D.C. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the document SECY 82-111, "Requirements for Emergency Response Capability." The Subcommittee and consultants heard presentations from participating members of the NRC Staff, the Human Factors Society, INPO, AIF, KMC (Knuth-McEwen Consultants) and Lund Consulting. Notice of this meeting was published in the Federal Register on April 20, 1982. There were no oral or written statements from the public. The entire meeting was open to the public. Mr. David Fischer was the Designated Federal Employee. A copy of all slides is filed at the ACRS offices. A list of attendees is included as Attachment A, Attachment B is the Federal Register notice and Attachment C is the meeting schedule. Attachment D lists reference documents for the meeting as well as information provided to the subcommittee during the course of the meeting.

Opening Remarks

Mr. Ward asked participating ACRS Members and Consultants to formulate preliminary advice regarding the subject document based on the discussions heard at the meeting.

NRC Staff Presentation

Mr. V. Stello, Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations and Generic Requirements, summarized the proposal to the Commission regarding the requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities. Mr. Stello, as Chairman of the

Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR), has recommended that the Commission approve the proposed set of reuirements in SECY 82-111. The The proposal involves a new method of implementing requirements. The new proposals are:

1. develop specific requirements on a plant-by-plant case as a result of negotiations with each licensee
2. develop viable schedules in negotiation with each licensee
3. make the negotiated requirements and schedule legally binding, and
4. implement the requirements under the guidance of the NRR Project Managers.

Mr. Ward noted that this proposal places a substantial amount of diversified responsibility on the NRR Project Managers. Mr. Stello replied that the other NRC offices involved would assist the Project Manager. The Project Manager would be responsible for integrating the various inputs from other offices.

Mr. Stello addressed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The concept of an SPDS was formulated as a result of the accident at TMI-2. The SPDS displays information, such as pressure and temperature as a function of time or other critical parameters, so that the operator can understand the events occurring in the nuclear systems. The NRC Staff wants licensees to install the SPDS as soon as possible.

According to SECY 82-111 the SPDS need not meet the requirements of the single-failure criteria and it need not be qualified to meet Class IE requirements (which includes seismic qualifications). Mr. Ward asked the Staff what cost/benefit is associated with requiring or not requiring an SPDS to be safety grade, Class IE, or seismically qualified. Mr. Stello indicated that the Staff did not have an answer to this question. He said that imposing such requirements would significantly increase the SPDS's cost and would unnecessarily delay SPDS implementation/installation.

Mr. Stello next described the Control Room Design Review (CRDR). The purpose of the CRDR is to locate man-machine interface problems in the present control rooms, if there are any. This review requires a multi-disciplinary review team. The NRC Staff intends to attempt to integrate the CRDR with the SPDS installation, the new symptom-oriented procedures, and Reg. Guide 1.97. However, it is important to note that the Staff does not require the CRDR to be completed prior to the installation of the SPDS. Mr. Stello stated that he does not expect the CRDR to call for the replacement of the SPDS.

The next topic discussed was the emergency operating procedures guidelines. The NRC expects that all NSSS vendors will have submitted their proposed guidelines by this summer. The actual procedures and the required operator training will be derived by the utilities from the vendor guidelines. The procedures will be integrated with the other SECY 82-111 requirements and audited by the NRC Staff.

Mr. Stello continued his presentation with a discussion of Emergency Response Facilities. The general requirements address the location, size, radiation protection records and communications staffing. The concensus among the Staff is to design the facilities according to uniform building code practices and radiation protection requirements. The Staff has also decided to require these facilities to be within the protected area of the nuclear plant. The radiation protection requirements for the Emergency Response Facilities are expected to be less restrictive than for the Control Room.

Mr. Stello urged the Committee's support for the implementation plan. He stated again the need to devise a procedure for producing reliable implementation schedules and issuing requirements by priority. Finally, he recommended that these requirements should not come about by the issuance of NUREGs or Reg. Guides. He feels the existing related documents of these types should provide guidance only.

Mr. Hugh Thompson, Director of the Division of Human Factors Safety (D/DHFS) of the NRR, discussed how SECY 82-111 affects major areas of his division's responsibility. D/DHFS is partially responsible for the Detailed Control Room Design Review, the Emergency Operating Procedure upgrade, and the SPDS installation. He emphasized that part of their review plan was not to compromise the human factors area. Mr. Ward questioned Mr. Thompson as to

the amount of input his division would supply to the Project Managers regarding human factors. Mr. Thompson replied that his division is working on an integration package which is still under review.

CRDRs were addressed next. CRDRs are item I.D.1 of NUREG-0737 in the Task Action Plan. Guidance for the basic requirements of the CRDR were derived from NUREGs-0700 and -0801. Plant-specific schedules will be developed to implement the basic requirements instead of imposing a mandated schedule on the industry as a whole. Mr. Thompson stated that the plant-specific schedules will allow for better use of his division's resources. D/DHFS plans to review licensee program plans for the CRDR and then select certain plants for in progress, on site audits. The licensee would then be able to start its control room reviews. Mr. Ward inquired whether the auditing selection would choose licensees with anticipated problems regarding the CRDR. Mr. Thompson replied by stating that there would be follow-up audits to determine whether or not pre- or post-implementation reviews are necessary. Mr. Siess asked what process would determine physical changes in the control room. Mr. Thompson answered by stating that the physical changes would be made based on the utility's review. The NRC Staff will get involved with the decision making process if significant problems are identified with the utility's proposal for control room modifications. The NRC Staff will use NUREG-0700 for guidance. The most important part of the CRDR is the Licensee's summary report of the completed review. The summary report identifies human engineering deficiencies (HEDs) and the utility's plan of action related to the HEDs. The NRC Staff will review the summary report and advise the licensee if

an NRC pre-implementation audit is necessary. The Staff will issue its review in the form of a SSER within two months after receiving the licensee's summary report. The licensee will make major modifications after the Staff issues the SSER. Significant modifications are expected to be implemented during scheduled outages.

Mr. Kerr questioned whether the pre-implementation audit is really an audit. Various members of the NRC Staff replied to the question. The Staff can review, if necessary, the licensee's records of the complete detailed control room review on site. Furthermore, the licensee will construct a cardboard replica of the significant control room changes which will also be available for NRC Staff review. Control room audits of owner's groups or multi-unit control rooms will be audited only once to avoid redundancy.

Mr. Thompson next discussed the SPDS. His presentation covered the same material presented by Mr. Stello. Mr. Ward questioned the Staff's decision to implement and install the SPDS prior to the CRDR or implementation of any of the other SECY 82-111 upgrades. Various representatives of the NRC Staff took turns trying to answer this question. Mr. R. Mattson, NRR Director of the Division of Systems Integration, provided the best response. Mr. Mattson stated that there was a strong desire during the first year after TMI-2 to equip control rooms with an aid to the operator for the purposes of interpreting the reactor condition correctly. The Staff conducted meetings with utilities and

other industry organizations and conceptualized the SPDS. Three years later, the CRGR reviewed the SPDS and noted that little progress had been made toward implementation and installation. Therefore, the decision to press forward was made.

Mr. Kerr asked if the SPDS was required by the tech-specs to be operational during reactor start-up. Mr. Mattson indicated that the Staff is not yet in agreement on how technical specifications related to the SPDS should be worded. Rather than insisting that the SPDS be redundant and safety grade, some people on the Staff would rather have the SPDS install sooner without these features. Dr. Mattson said that "what you want, is it operating most of the time with some enforcement capability for keeping it operational." He indicated that since the SPDS is an operator aid, its operational status should not preclude a unit from starting up. Mr. Ward asked if the large number of SPDS designs presented a problem. Mr. Thompson stated that the large number of SPDS designs allow the utillity freedom in its selection of an SPDS. He added that the Staff would support any industry-identified design specifications providing standardization. Mr. Siess inquired as to the difference between the terms "verify" and "validate," which the Staff uses in evaluating the design of an SPDS. Various members of the Staff replied by stating that verification evaluatess all of the design steps whereas validation described the activites that ensure development of the final product as to the original intent of the design. Mr. Mattson added that he would like to see an independent assessment performed, as opposed to the NRC performing either verification or validation.

Mr. Debons, ACRS Consultant, pursued this question by asking if any experimental data was used in the verification or validation process. Mr. J. Kramer, NRR Deputy Director of Human Factors Safety, responded by stating that experimental data would be developed based upon operator performance but acquiring experimental data is beyond the intent of SECY 82-111. Mr. Debons expressed the thought that the design of the SPDS will never be based on concrete quantitative data by pursuing this path. Mr. Mattson agreed, stating that the Staff's criterion is based on whether or not the implementation is an improvement.

Mr. Kerr raised the question of whether or not the SPDS would prevent another TMI-2 or a new accident from occurring. Mr. Thompson answered that the Staff believes the integration of upgraded procedures, improved control rooms, the SPDS, and increased operator training with the SPDS will enable operators to better handle the next unexpected problem. Mr. Pearson, ACRS Consultant, asked if the SPDS should be in the TSC or EOF. Mr. Mattson replied that the information from the SPDS has to be in the TSC but that it does not have to be displayed on an SPDS. Mr. Thompson added that if the utility's' analysis requires an SPDS in the TSC or EOF, then an SPDS should be installed there.

Mr. Thompson discussed emergency operating procedures. The upgraded emergency procedures are consistent with the reanalysis of the transients and accidents identified in NUREG-0737 and are to be based on a guide being developed by the industry. The NRC will require that a procedure generation package be submitted three months prior to beginning formal operator training.

The package includes the writer's guide, a description of the validation of the procedures, and a description of the training program. Mr. Ward asked if there would be any guidance in the procedures to enable the operator to deal with ambiguous information between the SPDS and the main control panels. Mr. Mattson and Mr. Thompson responded that the operators would be instructed to rely on safety-grade instrumentation in the event of an earthquake or other phenomena.

Mr. Mattson stated that Reg. Guide 1.97.was issued to define the minimum minimum complement of instrumentation needed to follow the course of an CRGR recognized th environmental qualification of this equipment was not finalized. The Staff will forward a generic letter to the licensees with a table of instruments needed to follow the course of an accident. The licensee will then advise the NRC as to the instrumentation they have and their corresponding qualifications. The licensee will have to describe exceptions to the NRC for review. The NRC Staff would only review the exceptions. Dr. Siess asked if these qualifications would include notifying the operator of instrument failure. Mr. J. Rosenthal, NRR Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, said that within the context of the SPDS review, the Staff is recommending that information to the operator be validated so that instrument failures are identifiable.

Mr. B. Grimes, I&E Director of the Division of Emergency Preparedness, followed with a brief presentation on Emergency Response facilities. Mr. Grimes emphasized that licensees would not be discouraged from obtaining an integrated data acquisition system in their Emergency Response Facilities. The one area of disagreement with the CRGR proposal remains with the habitability of the TSC. Mr. Grimes believes that the radiological protection of the TSC and the control room should be equivalent, although the habitability systems need not be redundant in the TSC. The reason for this equivalent protection is that the TSC has developed into a significant facility. Furthermore, it is an integral part of emergency operations. Mr. Grimes believes that to rapidly relocate people from the TSC to the control room is undesirable when significant radiation releases are possible. Mr. Moeller, asked if continuous off-site dose monitors would be recommended in SECY 82-111. Mr. Grimes replied that his division had not completed a feasibility study of off-site dose monitors. He added that a ring of monitors close to the plant might be effective. Mr. Moeller also asked if state and local authorities would be prescribing the protective actions to be taken based on dose assessments from the EOF. Mr. Grimes replied that the utility would make the initial recommendations for protective action based on plant parameters. The state and local authorities would then make the final decisions on the actions which should be taken.

Human Factors Society Presentation

Mr. Hopkins presented the Human Factors Society's (HFS) comments regarding SECY 82-111. Mr. Hopkins comments have not been approved by Executive Council of the HFS. He is technical director of a seven member study group for the

HFS. His group strongly supports the integration and systematic approach to the various areas of human factors - the CRDR, upgrade of emergency procedures and additional work on normal operating procedures. Their overall impression of SECY 82-111 is that it generally downgrades the importance of human factors. They question the basis for the SPDS implementation as a basic human factors item. The requirement for the SPDS was essentially an executive decision and was not based on any thorough analysis. Mr. Hopkins stated that a analysis would be an essential first step. He believes that the SPDS is being unduly emphasized and the need for and SPDS might or might not, be found necessary after the CRDR. Mr. Ward asked the NRC Staff to comment on this. Mr. Kramer remarked that a task analysis would be performed and relevant SPDS information would be used for possible modifications. The Staff feels that the SPDS implementation should proceed before the task analysis is completed. Mr. Rosenthal added that the newer plants may need only minimal modification to their control room to meet the SPDS requirement. He further stated that the older, SEP plants will need the SPDS.

Mr. Ward asked Mr. Kramer if he could estimate the SPDS installation date and when the CRDR would be completed. Mr. Kramer said that the Staff had envisioned the CRDR as a front end analysis, integrated with the procedures. The SPDS would occur first though. He said that this front end analysis would take about one year from the time any given plant started the analysis. Mr. Beltracchi indicated that it would be about three years before most plant's SPDSs are delivered. Mr. Kramer noted that some plants, that are applying for their operating license, already have their SPDS. Mr. Ward said that it was important to know when a plant can have its SPDS installed and operating as compared to when the plant can complete its CRDR. He said that knowing these dates, one could better determine a strategy as to whether to install an SPDS without the benefit of a detailed CRDR or not.

Mr. Rosenthal stated that because plant specific schedules will be developed, a utility may decide to perform the front end analysis first to determine whether an SPDS is needed.

Mr. Debons commented that he has not seen a comprehensive task analysis of the entire system. He agrees with Mr. Hopkin's point that performing the task analysis and CRDR need to be accomplished prior to making a decision on installing an SPDS. Mr. Siess commented that he had the impression that the SPDS is separate from the control room. Mr. Beltracchi, NRR Human Factors Engineering Branch, stated that the Staff does not consider the SPDS to be separate from the control room. It is a display to assess the status of the plant, which was not there before. Mr. Beltracchi does not expect the SPDS to be a final solution. He said it is a "bandaid" to be applied as soon as possible. Mr. Siess asked if the Staff could assure that the SPDS would not be unduly emphasized, as noted by Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Kramer replied that the overall review will be more comprehensive and shed additional information related to the SPDS. He further added that the installation of the SPDS would delay other control room improvements, but that was acceptable to get early benefit of the SPDS.

Mr. Hopkins continued his presentation.by noting that there was no basis in selecting the information needed on the SPDS. Mr. Pearson stated that additional operator training could preclude possible problems.with the multi-asked plicity of SPDS designs. Mr. Salvendy asked whether or not the SPDS would be continuously monitored and if the SPDS would be a visual display. Mr. Kramer stated that it would be primarily visual with auditory signals or annunciators. Mr. Hopkins believes that each utility's plans for conducting the CRDR should be reviewed and approved by the staff prior to implementation.

AIF and INPO Presentations

Messr's Coley from AIF, and Counsel from INPO followed with their respective presentations. Mr. Coley is Manager of Engineering Services for the Steam

Production Department of Duke Power Company and also Chairman of the AIF Subcommittee on Emergency Response Facilities and Control Rooms. He is additionally chairing the utility effort supported by INPO for SPDS integration and chaired the task group at Myrtle Beach in the IEEE Standards Workshop.

Mr. Counsel is Senior Vice President for Nuclear Engineering and Operations at Northeast Utilities. He is also Chairman of the Industry Review Group for the Analysis and Engineering Division of INPO.

Mr. Coley stated that the AIF Subcommittee he chairs is very supportive of SECY 82-111. He feels that there is no one solution to this problem due to its complex nature. The solution, he believes, lies in an integrated approach of operator, control room, improved control room procedures and other aids that make these areas respond as a system. Secondly, he feels that allowing the licensee to choose the parameters for the SPDS is excellent. Third, he feels a task analysis cannot be performed that would define an SPDS. He believes the industry has a firm idea of the function of the SPDS. The SPDS could be designed based on the critical safety functions identified in the Emergency Operating Procedures. Mr. Kerr asked when the ultimate goal of the SPDS would be achieved. Mr. Coley, speaking for Duke Power Company, noted that their goal for the SPDS would be established by clear indication of the six critical functions, whether or not the six functions are being maintained, and if the device effectively interfaces with the human operator. Mr. Coley added

that the SPDS is not a predictive system and now is the time to take action on SECY-82-111. Mr. Ward asked if the industry had a clear understanding of the SECY-82-111 requirements. Mr. Coley replied that the requirements are not totally clear. However, he feels that the NRC is at a plateau where the requirements can be interpreted and decisions can be discussed.

The INPO group is preparing a generic document which defines the role and mission of the basic SPDS; the functional, operational and design requirements for the SPDS; and the guidelines for an effective SPDS implementation program and criteria for the SPDS integration.

Mr. Counsel also chairs the Nuclear Utility Backfit and Regulatory Reform Group, which endorsed SECY 82-111. He, like Mr. Coley, feels that it should be put into action now and modified if necessary later. Mr. Counsel said that France is installing 40 SPDS systems this year. He indicated that industry is using information from both the French and the Germans in developing its SPDSs. Mr. Kerr asked if the SPDS would increase plant safety. Mr. Counsel said that he thought it will.

KMC and Lund Consulting Presentation

Mr. Howard made a presentation representing KMC. KMC represents about 30 utilities which have been identified as a Coordinating Group for Emergency Preparedness (CGEP). There were various members of CGEP attending the meeting. CGEP was formed in September 1979 with the purpose of working collectively with the various NRC Staff elements in defining the regulatory requirements and in the development and implementation of the evolving criteria. The CGEP supports the CRGR endorsements and encourages ACRS approval of the CRGR's proposal to the Commission. Mr. Howard expressed satisfaction that many of the requirements in SECY 82-111 are nego

Ms. L. Lund, President of Lund Consulting, followed with comments on SECY 82-111. Ms. Lund noted that the present version of SECY 82-111 addresses many more of the human factor concerns which were absent in earlier drafts. Furthermore, she is concerned that the document speaks of the need to integrate programs but suggests certain programs such as the SPDS can be performed earlier. She also commented that the human factor reviews need to be performed by qualified people. The NRC, she feels, needs to give more specific guidance on the regulation of these programs.

Mr. Kerr asked if a task analysis should be performed. Ms. Lund replied that a task analysis would be useful as a tool but not necessarily as a means to an end. Mr. Ward questioned if SECY 82-111 will yield a coordinated approach toward getting better control rooms and better overall systems. Ms. Lund answered that SECY 82-111 may have the elements to perform the program in an integrated fashion but we are missing how the parts work together. Mr. Kerr asked if the operating crews were being required to perform too many tasks. Ms. Lund responded that she did not feel they were.

Mr. Debons raised the issue of guarding against operator overload. She replied that the human factors perspective can help the operator and designer by identifying possible areas of failure in the man-machine interface and procedures. She added that to extrapolate a solution to worker overload or cognitive thinking

would be wrong. Human factors offers a systems approach to human behavior and equipment design. Ms. Lund could not specify exact numbers for research investment but noted that the research in human factors was growing astronomically.

Concluding Comments

Mr. Ward asked participating ACRS Members and Consultants for advice regarding SECY 82-111.

Mr. Salvendy was inclined to agree with the document in its present form. He believes, however, that a task analysis should be performed as a prerequisite to the SPDS. Secondly, he feels operator alertness during task performance should be examined. Thirdly, the SPDS should be equipped with a special type of auditory alarm to alert operators. Fourth and finally, he feels that critical human factor components affecting the safety of nuclear power plants should be identified and resolved.

Mr. Debons feels that a comprehensive systems analysis should be undertaken to determine the data flow. Secondly, the entire sociological mix of the control room environment should be reviewed to determine if it is a viable system. Third, a feedback mechanism for all literature and experience would enable a better assessment of the problem. Fourth, he asked if research is being performed that is related to these issues. Mr. Debons would not take a position on whether SECY 82-111 should be recommended by the Committee for approval or disapproval to the Commissioners.

Mr. Pearson emphasized the need for a task analysis to determine the need for an SPDS. Mr. Pearson does not endorse SECY 82-111.

Mr. Moeller recommended that the Subcommittee comment on BWR instruments for inadequate core cooling, the basic purpose of the SPDS and whether or not the SPDS should be safety grade equipment. He also added that he would like SECY 82-111 to be written in better English.

Mr. Kerr recommended an endorsement with some reservations. He feels the ACRS should indicate agreement in identifying key parameters but that more flexibility is needed in SECY 82-111 in evaluating SPDS designs. He added that some form of task analysis should be encouraged in connection with the control system information design generally.

The meeting was adjourned at 4:18 p.m.

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NOTE: A complete transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H St. NW., Washington, D.C. or can be obtained from Alderson Reporters, 300 7th St. SW, Washington, D.C. 20 2-554-2345.

MEETING DATE: May 5, 1982

ATTACHMENT A

SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING: HUMAN FACTORS

LOCATION: 1717 H St. NW, Washington, D.C., Room 1167

ATTENDANCE LIST

PLEASE PRINT

	NAME	AFFILIATION
1.	MR D WARD	ACRS MEMBER
2.	DR C SIESS	"
3.	DR W KERR	"
4.	DR D MOELLER	"
5.	DR R PEARSON	ACRS CONSULTANT
6.	DR G. SALMONY	"
7.	DR A DEBONS	"
8.	DAVID C FISCHER	DESIGNATED FEDERAL EMPLOYEE
9.	V STELLO	NRC/EDO
10.	T MURLEY	NRC/EDO
11.	SH Weiss	NRC/DHFS
12.	P D Hall	Sys. Development Corp
13.	MJ MESHANE	System Development Corp
14.	[illegible]	[illegible]
15.	[illegible]	NRC/DHFS
16.	Monte P. Phillips	NRC/RIII/DEPOS
17.	Joyce M Nelson	Quadrex
18.	N G Chapman	Bechtel
19.	J Costello	EBASCO
20.	JOHN GALLAGHER	W
21.	[illegible]	NRC/DFS/DE/HFEB
22.	Paul E. Dietz	INPO
23.	Arden Steen-Larsen	Public Service Indiana
24.	WILBUR-C. MIDDLETON	NRC/HFS/PTRB

MEETING DATE: May 5, 1982

SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING: HUMAN FACTORS

LOCATION: 1717 H St. NW, Washington, D.C., Room 1167

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ATTENDANCE LIST

NAME	AFFILIATION
1. Phil Overholt	HONEYWELL, INC.
2. Donald Knuth	KMC
3. Morris Howard	KMC
4. [illegible]	[illegible]
5. Ted J Myers	Toledo Edison
6. Judith [illegible]	Toledo Edison Co.
7. JAN PRESTON	LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LAB
8. WILLIAM A COLEY	AIF / DUKE POWER CO.
9. WILLIAM G COUNSIL	INPO / NORTHEAST UTILITIES
10. PAUL M BEACH	NORTHEAST UTILITIES
11. Howard Johnson	Fla. Power + Light Co.
12. K.K. [illegible]	FPL
13. R.L. Kershner	ARD Corp.
14. Voss A. Moore	NRC
15. CHARLES O. HOPKINS	HFS
16. Joel J. Kramer	NRC/DHFS
17. ROBERT E. HOWARD	Commonwealth Edison Co.
18. H.D. THORNBURG	ARGS
19. J.E. Rosenthal	NRC/ICSB
20. L. D. WECHSLER	BECHTEL POWER CORP
21. Jane Moser	ESSEX CORP.
22. W.E. Burns	GA. Power Co
23. Edward F. Williams Jr	NRC/IE/DEP
24. M. C. Brickey	TVA

MEETING DATE: May 5, 1982

SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING: HUMAN FACTORS

LOCATION: 1717 H St. NW, Washington, D.C., Room 1167

ATTENDANCE LIST

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	NAME	AFFILIATION
1.	RAY G SMITH	SCANDPOWER
2.	J. M. MILLER	(W) Nucl. Safety
3.	G BUTTERWORTH	(W) Nuclear Safety
4.	B.G LORD	INPO
5.	DAVID CAIN	EPRI/NSAC
6.	R.P. White	Nuclear Projects, Inc.
7.	Charles Brinkley	C.E.
8.	Ray Dave	C.E.
9.	J.H RILEY	SNUPPS
10.	DJ KLEIN	SNUPPS
11.	A C BURNS	AIF
12.	FA HECKMAN	PA POWER & LIGHT
13.	L O LUND	LUND CONSULTING
14.	CLAY A LITTLE	DUKE POWER CO
15.	[illegible]	D/DHFS - NRC
16.		
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MEETING ROOM: 1167

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS MEETING
ON
HUMAN FACTORS

May 5, 1982

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ATTENDEES PLEASE SIGN BELOW

	NAME	BADGE NO.	AFFILIATION
1.	CLAY A LITTLE		DUKE POWER CO.
2.	Kenneth Mallory		Allen Corp.
3.	Susan Tramunz		NUS Corp
4.	Robert H Cunningham		Boston Edison Co
5.	Fred W Chandler		TVA
6.	JACK BERGA		EPRI
7.	C D Faulkner		WESTINGHOUSE
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of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated March 23, 1979, (2) Amendment No. 44 to License No. NPF-3, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the William Carlson Library, University of Toledo, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 12th day of April 1982.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John F. Stolz,

Chief, Operating Reactors Branch No. 4, Division of Licensing.

[FR Doc. 82-10713 Filed 4-19-82; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on Human Factors; Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on Human Factors will hold a meeting on May 5, 1982, Room 1167, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC. The Subcommittee will meet with the NRC regulatory staff and experts from outside NRC to discuss SECY-82-111, "Requirements for Emergency Response Capability."

In accordance with the procedures outlined in the Federal Register on September 30, 1981 (46 FR 47903), oral or written statements may be presented by members of the public, recording will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the Designated Federal Employee as far in advance as practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made to allow the necessary time during the meeting for such statement.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.

The agenda for subject meeting shall be as follows:

Wednesday, May 5, 1982—8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of business

During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be present, will exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff, their consultants, and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time all allotted thereto can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant Designated Federal Employee, Mr. David Fischer (telephone 202/634-1413 between 8:15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M., EST.

Dated: April 14, 1982.

John C. Hoyle,

Advisory Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 82-10805 Filed 4-19-82; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Office of Federal Procurement Policy

Proposed Revision to Circular No. A-119, "Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards; Invitation for Public Comment

April 13, 1982.

AGENCY: Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), Office of Management and Budget.

ACTION: Request for comments on proposedd revision to OMB Circular No. A-119, "Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards."

SUMMARY: OMB Circular No. A-119 was issued on January 17, 1980, following several years of development. Its principal purposes were to promote Federal agency use of voluntary (or industry) in procurement, encourage Federal agency participation in voluntary standards-developing bodies and to increase the coordination of Federal efforts in standards development. The Circular provided, in addition, that Federal participation would be limited to those voluntary standards bodies which certified to the Secretary of Commerce that they adhere to certain "due process" criteria contained in the Circular. The Circular also provided that the Secretary of Commerce was to maintain a listing of such organizations, issued implementing procedures for agency use and establish a voluntary dispute resolution service to assist in resolving procedural complaints involving voluntary standards-development bodies.

On August 12, 1981, the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief identified the Circular as a candidate for review to assure that it did not impose unnecessary burdensome or counterproductive requirements on the public or private sectors. We have completed an examination of the Circular in the light of this Administration's regulatory reform program and, also, in view of the many public and private sector comments received during the last several months. On the basis of that analysis a substantial revision of the Circular has been prepared for your review and comment.

The draft Circular contains four major revisions, in addition to numerous clarifications and corrections. The major changes include:

- Elimination of the "due process" criteria and the requirement that voluntary standards bodies adhere to those criteria as a prerequisite to Federal participation;
- Expansion of the scope of the Circular to encourage Federal use of voluntary standards for regulatory and other purposes—not just procurement usage;
- Elimination of the provisions relating to establishment of a voluntary dispute resolution service; and
- Elimination of requirements that called upon the Secretary of Commerce to maintain a list of certifying voluntary standards bodies and to issue implementing procedures for agency use.

The effect of the proposed revision is to remove the unnecessary strictures and burdens which the Circular had imposed on both agencies and the private sector. The Circular is no longer a major rule as defined in Executive Order 12291 since it will not have a $1 million (or greater) effect on the economy, will not result in major increases in price or cost and will not have adverse effects on employment, investment, productivity, innovation or competition.

DATE: Comments must be received on or before June 21, 1982.

ATTACHMENT C

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: D. Ward, Chairman, ACRS Subcommittee on Human Factors

FROM: D. C. Fischer, Staff Engineer D C Fischer

SUBJECT: TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON HUMAN FACTORS - MAY 5, 1982 - WASHINGTON, D. C.

Attached is a tentative schedule for the subject meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss SECY-82-111, "Requirements for Emergency Response Capability."

The meeting will begin at 8:30 a.m. and will be held in Room 1167 at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. Attendance by the following ACRS Members and Consultants is anticipated and hotel reservations have been made for the night(s) and hotels indicated below. If you are unable to make the meeting, please call us or the hotel and cancel your reservations so that we are not billed.

D. Ward		
W. Kerr	Park Central	May 4, 5, 6, 7
H. Lewis	Hyatt, Arlington	May 5, 6, 7
W. Mathis	Army-Navy Club	May 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
D. Moeller	Army-Navy Club	May 4, 5, 6, 7
C. Siess	Park Central	May 4, 5, 6, 7
J. Arnold		
I. Catton	Park Central	May 4, 5
G. Salvendy		

By copy of this memo, members of the NRC Staff and other participants who will be making presentations to the Subcommittee are reminded of the Subcommittee's need for twenty hard copies of all slides, training aids, and papers presented to the Subcommittee.

Attachment:
Tentative Schedule

cc: ACRS Members
R. Fraley, ACRS
M. Gaske, ACRS
M. Libarkin, ACRS
T. McCreless, ACRS
J. McKinley, ACRS
G. Quittschreiber, ACRS
B. White, ACRS
M. Vanderholt, ACRS
H. Denton, NRR
E. Case, NRR
V. Stello, EDO
T. Murley, ERDO
H. Thompson, D/DHFS
R. Mattson, D/DSI
B. Grimes, D/DEP
J. Kramer, DHFS
V. Moore, DHFS
J. Rosenthal, DSI
E. Blackwood, EDO
W. Coley, AIF
M. Glover, AIF
W. Owens, AIF
D. Cain, EPRI-NSAC
A. Long, EPRI
C. Hopkins, HF Society
S. Price, HF Society
H. Snyder, HF Society
B. Cohn, INPO
E. Zebroski, INPO
M. Howard, KMC, Inc.
L. Lund, Lund Consulting, Inc.
W. Counsel, Northeast Utilities
J. Miller, Westinghouse

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR
THE MAY 5, 1982
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON HUMAN FACTORS
ROOM 1167, 1717 H ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.

APPROXIMATE TIME	ITEM	SPEAKER
8:30 a.m.	I. Chairman's Opening Statement	D. Ward
	A. Discussion of Schedule	
	B. Meeting Goals	
8:45 a.m.	II. Briefing on SECY-82-111, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability	T. Murley
	A. Background	
	B. Scope	
	C. Proposed Basic Requirements -	
	1. Integration of Activities	
	2. Safety Parameter Display System	
	3. Control Room Design Review	
10:00 a.m.	BREAK	
10:10 a.m.	4. Reg. Guide 1.97	
	5. Emergency Operating Procedures	
	6. Emergency Response Facilities	
	D. Commission Decisions Recommended and Proposed Implementation Plan	
	E. Staff Use of NUREGs and REG GUIDES	

Attachment

11:00 a.m.	III. Division of Human Factors Safety (DHFS) Comments	H. Thompson
	A. How SECY-82-111 affects major areas of DHFS responsibility	
	B. How the current CRGR proposal modifies previous proposals	
	C. Issues of controversy relating to proposed basic requirements	
	D. Responsiveness of SECY-82-111 to DHFS concerns	
	E. Differing staff viewpoints within DHFS	
11:30 a.m.	IV. Division of Systems Integration (DSI) Comments	R. Mattson/ J. Rosenthal
11:45 a.m.	V. Division of Emergency Preparedness Comments	B. Grimes
12:00 Noon	LUNCH	
1:00 p.m.	VI. Human Factor Society Comments on SECY SECY-82-111	C. Hopkins
1:30 p.m.	VII. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Comments	A. Long/D. Cain
	A. The need for an orderly SPDS implementation plan	
1:50 p.m.	VIII. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Industry Review Group Comments	W. Counsel (Dan Wilkinson/ D. Cain)
	A. Efforts to integrate emergency response within the control room	
	1. Procedures	
	2. Displays	
	3. Training	

2:35 p.m.	IX. Atomic Industrial Forum Comments	B. Coley
	A. Industry Activities on Emergency Response	
	1. SPDS	
	2. Control Room Design Reviews	
	B. Industry Recommendations	
2:55 p.m.	X. KMC, Inc. Comments	E. (Morris) Howard
	A. Coordinated Group on Emergency Preparedness	
	1. Utilities represented	
	2. Efforts	
	B. Effects of arbitrarily established dates and requirements on utility emergency response capabilities	
	C. Inappropriate use of guidance documents	
	D. Concepts and Techniques proposed in SECY-82-111	
3:25 p.m.	XI. Lund Consulting, Inc. Comments	L. Lund
3:35 p.m.	XII. Executive Session (Open)	D. Ward
	A. Comments by Members and Consultants	
	B. Plans for review of SECY-82-111 by the Full ACRS	
	C. Other Human Factors Subcommittee activities planned	
4:00 p.m.	ADJOURN	

ATTACHMENT D

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS LIST

1. Memo from D. Fischer, ACRS Staff, to D. Ward, ACRS Human Factors Subcommittee Chairman, transmitting status report for the subject meeting, (April 27, 1982).

2. Memo from D. Fischer to D. Ward transmitting SECY 82-111, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability, (March 16, 1982)

3. Memo from R. Major, ACRS Staff, to ACRS Human Factors File transmitting the Human Factors Subcommittee's review of NUREG-0700, NUREG-0801, and NUREG-0835, (January 29, 1982).

4. Memo from F. Remick, OPE, to the NRC Commissioners transmitting OPE's evaluation of SECY 82-111, (March 26, 1982).

5. Letter from C. Hopkins, Technical Director of HFS, to V. Stello, NRC DEDROGR, transmitting the HFS's evaluation of SECY 82-111, (March 29, 1982).

6. Letter from L. Lund, Lund Constulting, to Chairman Palladino transmitting Lund Consulting's evaluation of the December 29, 1981 CRGR letter regarding SECY 82-111, (January 4, 1982)

MEETING HANDOUT LISTS

1. Mr. Stello's presentation - 12 slides - Emergency Response Capability

2. Mr. Thompson's presentation - 14 slides - Human Factors

3. AIF presentation - 3 slides - SECY 82-111 Highlights

4. INPO presentation - 3 slides - SPDS Integration Program

5. KMC presentation - Handout on TSC Requirements and EOF Requirements Bar Chart