

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

36675

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1 M 2 D 3 C 4 C 5 I 6 I 7 2 8 0 9 0 10 0 11 - 12 0 13 0 14 0 15 0 16 0 17 0 18 0 19 - 20 0 21 0 22 3 23 4 24 1 25 1 26 1 27 1 28 1 29 1 30 4 31 1 32 1 33 4 34 8 35 1 36 5

1 REPORT SOURCE 2 L 3 5 4 0 5 5 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 10 3 11 1 12 8 13 7 14 0 15 3 16 1 17 7 18 8 19 1 20 8 21 0 22 4 23 1 24 4 25 8 26 1 27 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

1 During normal power operation at 0835, experienced a loss of power to a
 2 Motor-Operated Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (2-MOV-4517) when its
 3 circuit breaker ground sensor was tripped. (T.S. 3.3.2.1). Power was
 4 restored at 0945. This event had no impact on the public health nor
 5 safety. This is a non-repetitive event.
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1 SYSTEM CODE 2 S 3 H 4 A 5 F 6 C 7 K 8 T 9 B 10 R 11 I 12 K 13 E 14 Z 15 L 16 0
 17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 18 8 19 1 20 0 21 1 22 6 23 0 24 3 25 L 26 0
 27 X 28 Z 29 Z 30 Z 31 0 32 0 33 0 34 0 35 Y 36 N 37 A 38 I 39 0 40 0 41 0 42 5

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 The apparent cause was an inadvertent trip of the breaker ground
 2 sensing device by personnel working in the area. Meader checks of
 3 the motor and cable revealed no fault. No trips have occurred since
 4 resetting the ground sensor. Metal guard was placed over the ground
 5 sensor switch lever to prevent recurrence of the event.
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1 FACILITY STATUS 2 E 3 0 4 5 5 0 6 N/A 7 A 8 Operator Observation 9

1 ACTIVITY CONTNT RELEASED OF RF. EASE 2 Z 3 Z 4 N/A 5 N/A 6

1 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 Z 6 N/A 7

1 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 N/A 6

1 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 2 Z 3 N/A 4

1 PUBLICITY ISSUED 2 N 3 8209010048 810331 4 PDR ADOCK 05000317 5 S 6 PDR

LER NO. 81-16/3L
DOCKET NO. 50-318
LICENSE NO. DPR-69
EVENT DATE 03-17-81
REPORT DATE 04-14-81
ATTACHMENT

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT'D)

The circuit breaker for 2-MOV-4517 was found to be tripped due to its ground sensor having been tripped. No electrical faults were present. Scaffolding was being erected in the immediate vicinity of the circuit breaker. It is surmised that a workman brushed against the breaker front, tripping the ground sensor by actuating its control switch.

The switch had no protective metal guard, as is standard on these 480 VAC motor contro. center breakers. Investigation revealed 3 additional safety related 480 VAC breakers, one in Unit 1 and two more in Unit 2 which were missing guards.

The lack of switch guards is believed to be the result of the use of spare breaker positions by the AE during initial plant construction. Breaker locations provided as spares were not initially supplied with the optional ground sensors. Therefore, when changes to the facility required use of several spare locations and installation of ground sensor devices, switch guards were apparently overlooked as essential to these installations.

All such safety-related breakers have been provided guards taken from installed spare breakers. Similar breakers in the balance of the plant are being surveyed for the absence of switch guards, which will be provided as required for all operational breakers.