

FEB - 2 1994

*official*

Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324  
License Nos.: DPR-71, DPR-62

Carolina Power and Light Company  
ATTN: Mr. R. A. Anderson  
Vice President  
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant  
P. O. Box 10429  
Southport, NC 28461

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY - BRUNSWICK

This refers to the management meeting conducted in the Region II Office on January 24, 1994. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Brunswick Unit 2 refueling outage and recent refueling floor activities. It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial in that it provided a good understanding of your planned outage and contamination event. A list of attendees, and a copy of your slides are enclosed.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely,



Ellis W. Merschoff, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees
2. Licensee Slides

cc w/encls:

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FEB - 2 1994

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2

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FEB - 2 1994

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3

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Mayor

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Mayor

City of Southport

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NRC Resident Inspector

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RII:DRP

HChristensen

02/1/94

RII:DRP

DVerrelli

02/1/94

ENCLOSURE 1

List of Attendees

Licensee Attendees:

R. Anderson, Vice President, Brunswick Site  
C. Warren, Acting Director, Site Operations - Brunswick  
B. Poteate, Acting Plant Manager, Unit 2 - Brunswick  
J. Titrington, Manager, Plant Operations - Unit 2  
G. Homml, Manager, Licensing

Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

S. D. Ebner, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)  
L. A. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII  
A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII  
J. R. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII  
D. M. Verrelli, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, DRP, RII  
H. O. Christensen, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A, DRP, RII  
R. L. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector - Brunswick, DRP, RII

ENCLOSURE 2

# **Carolina Power & Light Brunswick Nuclear Plant**

**Presented to the  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
January 24, 1994**

# **Brunswick Unit 2 Outage Management**

■ UNIT 2 PLANT MANAGER

CLAY WARREN

■ UNIT 2 OUTAGE MANAGER

BLAIR POTEATE

■ UNIT 2 OPERATIONS MANAGER

JOHN TITRINGTON



# Agenda

- Outage Philosophy and Control Clay Warren
- Outage Overview Blair Poteate
- Shutdown Risk Assessment John Titrington
- RHR Chemical Decon John Titrington

# Outage Philosophy

- Outages are Controlled by the Plant Manager
- Outage Scope and Schedule Has Been Developed by an Interdisciplinary Group
- Shift Outage Managers are Currently Licensed SRO's
- Plant Ownership of Projects and Activities
- Control of Contractors
- Assessment of Readiness to Startup
- Controlled Startup Plan



# Pre-Outage Preparation

▪ System Walkdowns	Complete
▪ Interdisciplinary Scope Reviews	Complete
▪ Outage Scope Frozen	Complete
▪ Outage Schedule	
▸ Initial	Complete
▸ Final	02/25/94
▪ Shutdown Risk Assessment	
▸ Initial	Complete
▸ Final	02/18/94
▪ Maintenance Planning Completion	Complete
▪ Modification Planning Completion	01/28/94
▪ Clearances Approved	02/11/94
▪ All Material On Site	03/04/94
▪ Site Training on Schedule	03/04/94 (Start)
▪ Unit 2 Outage	03/25/94 (75 Days)

# Outage Goals

<u>Category</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Industrial Safety	Lost Time Accidents	0
	Permit Violations	0
	Tag Violations	0
ALARA Quality	Radiation Exposure	≤312 Rem
	No Forced Cooldown Due to Outage Activities	100 Day Run
	LER's Due to Personnel Error	0
	Level 1 ACR's Due to Personnel Error	<2
Financial Production	Budget	Within Budget
	Scope Management	<25% Growth
	Outage Duration	<75 Days
	Completion of Original Work	≥ 95%

# Outage Scope


- Corrective and Preventive Maintenance
  - 1400 Corrective Maintenance Tasks - Outage Required
  - 1800 Preventive Maintenance Tasks
- In-Service Inspection Program
- Major Projects and Modifications
  - Reactor Feedwater Digital Control Replacement
  - Core Shroud Inspection
  - Core Shroud Head Bolt Replacement
  - Service Water System Inspection
  - Circulating Water Betterment

# Outage Scope


- Major Projects and Modifications (Continued)
  - Torus Coating Refurbishment
  - RHR Valve Replacements
  - Structural Steel Upgrades
  - NUMAC Steam Detection Upgrade
  - RPV Level Reference Leg Modification
  - SAT Transformer "Y" Winding Bus Duct Replacement
  - Diesel Generator Service Water Piping Replacement
  - Reactor Feedpump Turbine Overhaul
  - Turbine Generator Overhaul
  - VOTES Testing
  - Jet Pump Hold-Down Beam Replacement



# Unit 2 Outage Organization




# Outage Management Organization





BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT  
UNIT 2 1994 REFUELING OUTAGE  
CRITICAL PATH

# Preliminary



Project:  
Date: 1/18/94

Critical



Progress



Summary



Noncritical



Milestone



Rolled Up



# Shutdown Risk Assessment

- Process Consistent With NUMARC Guidelines
- Defense in Depth for Key Safety Functions
- Schedule Review by Multi-Disciplinary Team
- Review and Approval Process
  - Initial Review Complete
  - Subsequent Review February, 1994
  - PNSC Review and Approval Early March, 1994
- Risk Assessment of Emergent Work and Activity Changes

# **Shutdown Risk Interface Control**

- Formal Training for Operations
- Daily Scorecards on System Availability
- Management Review of Emergent Work
- Communication

## Preliminary

			1994															
ACTIVITIES	START	FINISH	MAR				APR				MAY				JUN			
			7	14	21	28	7	14	21	28	7	14	21	28	7	14	21	28
DECAY HEAT REMOVAL																		
RHR A WORK WINDOW	11-APR-94	4-MAY-94																
RHR B WORK WINDOW	11-APR-94	4-MAY-94																
RHR A AVAILABLE WINDOW	25-MAR-94	11-APR-94			X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X
RHR B AVAILABLE WORK WINDOW	4-MAY-94	8-JUN-94			X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X
FUEL POOL COOLING WORK																		
FUEL POOL COOLING AVAILABLE	11-APR-94	4-MAY-94												X	X	X	X	X
SSFPC AVAILABLE	11-APR-94	4-MAY-94												X	X	X	X	X
MAKEUP (FLOODING)																		
CORE SPRAY A WORK	24-APR-94	5-MAY-94																
CORE SPRAY B WORK	11-APR-94	24-APR-94																
CORE SPRAY A AVAILABLE	25-MAR-94	24-APR-94			X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X
CORE SPRAY B AVAILABLE	24-APR-94	8-JUN-94												X	X	X	X	X
ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION																		
UAT WORK	9-MAY-94	19-MAY-94																
SAT WORK	28-MAR-94	10-APR-94																
DG 3 WORK	11-APR-94	18-APR-94																
	25-APR-94	2-MAY-94																
DG 4 WORK	18-APR-94	25-APR-94																
	2-MAY-94	9-MAY-94																
UAT IN SERVICE	25-MAR-94	9-MAY-94			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	20-MAY-94	4-JUN-94																
SAT IN SERVICE	10-APR-94	4-JUN-94			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
DG 1 AVAILABLE	25-MAR-94	8-JUN-94			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
DG 2 AVAILABLE	25-MAR-94	8-JUN-94			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
DG 3 AVAILABLE	25-MAR-94	11-APR-94			X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X
	18-APR-94	25-APR-94												X	X	X	X	X
	2-MAY-94	8-JUN-94												X	X	X	X	X
DG 4 AVAILABLE	25-MAR-94	18-APR-94			X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X
	25-APR-94	2-MAY-94												X	X	X	X	X
	9-MAY-94	8-JUN-94												X	X	X	X	X

# **RHR System Chemical Decon Overview**

## ■ SCOPE

- Both Loops
- Pump Casings
- Pump Suction and Discharge Piping

## ■ BENEFIT

- 286 Manrem / 5 years
- DF - 8 general area - 20 contact

## ■ DURATION

- 1 Step - 3.5 days
- 3 Step - 5.5 days

## ■ METHOD

- Citrox - 3 Step
- Citrox - AP - Citrox



# **RHR System Decon Preferred Method**

- Perform Decon On-Line
  - Perform One Loop at a Time - 7 Day LCO
  - Renders Loop Inop, But Can be Restored Within 2 Hours
  - Loop Unavailability Time - 5.5 days max.
  
- Advantages
  - Low Effect on Nuclear Safety
  - ALARA
    - Maximum Exposure Reduction
    - Minimum Exposure to Perform Decon



# **RHR System Decon Evaluation of Alternatives**

- Perform Decon After Shutdown Prior to Core Offload
  - Disadvantage
    - Greater Safety Risk Than Preferred Method
    - ALARA - More Exposure Than Preferred Method
  
- Perform Decon After Shutdown After Core Offload
  - Disadvantage
    - ALARA - More Exposure Than Preferred Method
    - Higher Rad Levels


# **RHR Chemical Decon Management Controls**

- Dedicated Operators
- Operator Training
- System Recovery Procedure
- Contingency Planning
- Work Restrictions on Redundant Equipment

# RHR Decon Schedule

■ PRA Preliminary Review	Complete
■ PRA Final Review	02/07/94
■ Safety Review	02/09/94
■ Procedure Approval	02/16/94
■ PNSC Review	02/17/94
■ Training on Project	02/24/94
■ RHR A-Loop Decon	02/26/94
■ RHR B-Loop Decon	03/05/94

# A - RHR SYSTEM



# **Carolina Power & Light**

**Presented To The  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
January 24, 1994**



# Agenda

- Sequence Of Events
- Results Of Occurrence
- Analysis Of Occurrence
- Corrective Actions



# Sequence Of Events

- 1/4 - 13/94
  - Three meetings to discuss cavity decon occurred
- 1/19/94 - 1900
  - Night Shift turnover occurred
- 2015
  - GE pre-job briefing with craft
    - Plan called for two separate evolutions
    - First, remove flange protectors, clean flange with scotch brite and rags, and remove old O-Ring
    - Second, GE inspect for cleanliness
- 2050
  - HP pre-job briefing with GE completed
    - HP not aware of abrasive tools being taken into cavity for cleaning use

## Sequence Of Events (Continued)

- 2100 - 2130
  - Evolution begins
  - Flange protectors removed (3 of 5 raised to refuel floor without wrapping)
  - Commenced cleaning of flange face
  - Shoe contamination found on a number of individuals (3 HP Techs and 1 GE Tech working on overhead crane)
- 2135
  - Began characterization and control of contamination
    - Gross Masslin performed with contamination found in front of step off pad
    - Began air sample in clean area

## Sequence Of Events (Continued)

- 2154
  - Restricted access to refueling floor
- 2200
  - 117' work stopped and personnel removed
- 2210
  - Identified contamination on 117, 98, 80 East and West, and 20 foot elevations
  - Identified 7 shoe contaminations and 2 skin contaminations
- 1/20/94
  - Decontamination Effort Proceeded
  - CP&L Site Incident Investigation Team Authorized
  - HP Investigation found no internal contaminations

# Results Of Occurrence

- Minimal Contamination Of Areas
  - Elevations 117, 98, 80 East and West, 20
- Minor Contamination Of Personnel
  - 9 of 57 With Minimal External Contamination
  - No Internal Contaminations Occurred
- Conclusion
  - Minimal Radiological Consequence



# Analysis Of Occurrence

- Management Expectations
  - PLP-17 Not Used
  - HP Desk Top Guide
  - Procedure Not Followed

# Corrective Actions

- Stressed Importance Of Pre-Job Expectations
- Development Of Pre-Job Briefing Procedure For HP
- Site Investigation Team Formed
  - Further Corrective Actions Will Be Reviewed