



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

August 13, 1982

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement,
Region III
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301
RESPONSE TO IE INSPECTION REPORT
NOS. 50-266/82-10 AND 50-301/82-09
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, provided herewith is Licensee's response to the item of noncompliance identified in NRC IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-266/82-10 and 50-301/82-09 dated July 16, 1982. As identified in the Appendix to that report, the specific noncompliance was that, contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 15.3.14.E, the fire door between the 4D diesel generator room and the air compressor room was observed by the NRC inspector to be open and that no fire watch was set. The report notes that this incident is a recurrent item of noncompliance.

Although there is an implication that the plant-wide training program to reeducate all personnel in fire protection requirements, with emphasis on fire doors and their control, has been ineffective, this has, in fact, not been the case. Reemphasis of fire door control and access has been a topic at plant safety meetings. This has resulted in a heightened awareness among plant personnel toward fire protection, and a positive attitude toward maintaining proper condition of fire doors.

In this specific incident, the probable cause of the noncompliance was determined to be an improper setting of the door closing mechanism and latch. A minor adjustment to the door closer immediately corrected the problem.

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
In order to avoid further noncompliance of this nature an investigation into the causes for fire doors being left open has been conducted. This investigation identified three causes: personnel error, occasional large differential pressures between rooms, and mechanical binding or failure. In an effort to further reduce and eliminate the personnel error problem, group discussions and plant safety meetings have reiterated the emphasis on fire door security. If required, further action will be taken to reinforce this issue among plant and contractor personnel.

To correct any misunderstanding which may exist on which fire doors are for safe shutdown equipment and which fire doors are for insurance purposes, we have identified those fire doors required for safe shutdown equipment. This improved identification will allow Operations personnel to ensure proper labelling of doors, and also to improve fire door surveillance. Proper labelling and improved surveillance are scheduled to be completed by October 1, 1982. The improved surveillance will consist of more frequent checks on fire doors for nuclear safe shutdown equipment and their associated closers and latches which are not presently monitored by the electronic security system.

To alleviate the problem of certain fire doors not always closing properly, a modification request and engineering evaluation has been initiated to study the door closure and latching devices. This evaluation is expected to be completed by September 1, 1982. If indicated, closure and latching modifications will then be accomplished on the fire doors. A modification request for improvements in electronic surveillance techniques of fire doors is also being initiated and the feasibility of placing fire doors for safe shutdown equipment on the present security monitoring system will be evaluated.

We believe that the corrective action being taken and the studies for further improvements underway are reasonable and responsible actions to ensure proper closing of fire doors.

Very truly yours,



Assistant Vice President

C. W. Fay

Copy to NRC Resident Inspector