U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/82-07(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45

Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative
2615 East Avenue - South
LaCrosse, WI 54601

Facility Name: LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor

Inspection At: LaCrosse Site, Genoa, WI

Inspection Conducted: April 22 and June 1- 30, 1982

Inspector: M. W. Branch 8-11-82

Approved By: L. Reyes, Chief 8/11/82
Projects Section 2C

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 22 and June 1 - 30, 1982 (Report No. 50-409/82-07(DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Operational Safety Verification; Monthly Maintenance Observation; Monthly Surveillance Observation; Inspection and Enforcement Circular Followup; Regional Request Followup; Physical Barriers-Vital Area and Followup on Open Inspection Items. The inspection involved a total of 48 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including five inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.
Results: Of the seven items inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in five of the areas. Three items of noncompliance were identified in two areas. (Changing operational mode with high alpha activity in the primary coolant - Paragraph 3; Removing both High Pressure and Low Pressure Coolant Injection systems from service - Paragraph 3; Unlocked door in vital area - Paragraph 8).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
*J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
*G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor
*L. Goodman, Operations Engineer
*S. Rafferty, Reactor Engineer
M. Polsean, Shift Supervisor
W. Nowicki, Supervisor, Instrument & Electric
R. Wery, QA Supervisor
*G. Joseph, Security Director
*L. Kelley, Assistant Operations Supervisor
*P. Shafer, Radiation Protection Engineer
*B. Zibung, Health & Safety Supervisor
*R. Brimer, Electrical Engineer
D. Rybarik, Mechanical Engineer

*Denotes those present at exit interview.

2. Followup on Open Inspection Items

(Open) Open Item (409/78-01-02): CRD Roller Nuts. The inspector reviewed the status of the project to modify the design of the CRD Roller Nuts. The inspector had discussions with several members of the plant staff and was assured that the safey significance of operating without the modification had been reviewed by the Plant's Safety Review Committee (SRC). The SRC's conclusion was that the modification is necessary to improve operation and safety, but the failure to make the modification does not reduce the margin of safety assured for control rod operation.

(Open) Unresolved Item (409/81-02-02): Shelf life control of "O" rings. The inspector reviewed the licensee's progress on establishing a formal program to ensure proper tagging and issuing of "O" ring material that has an established shelf life. The licensee has made progress in the resolution of the problems noted especially in the area of ensuring shelf life expiration date is (cure date & shelf life) and not (purchase date & shelf life). The inspector also had discussions with the person who issues this material and was assured that no material is issued after its expiration date. The licensee has not established a formal written policy to control shelf life items, but it is their intent to do so whenever sufficient personnel or time exists.

(Open) Unresolved Item (409/81-06-02): TMI Task Item I. C. 1 Items 2b and 3b of NUREG 0737. Per discussions with the Project Manager, NRR has not completed their review of the revised safety analysis for Inadequate Core Cooling or Transient and Accidents. This revision of emergency procedures will not be accomplished until NRR has completed this review.

(Open) Unresolved Item (409/81-06-04): TMI Task Item II. F. 1, Additional Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Per latest status from the Project Manager, NRR has not completed their review of the licensee submittal.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of June 1982. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of June, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Alternate Core Spray & Electric Plant Battery systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

The inspector's review of Operational Occurrence No. 82-14 concerning high alpha activity in the primary coolant revealed that on June 3, 1982, after sample results indicated that alpha activity exceeded Technical Specification 4.2.2.22 limits, the licensee changed the plant status from Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) to Mode 2 (Startup). This action violated Technical Specification 3.0.4 which prohibits entry into an operation condition unless the limiting conditions for operation are satisfied without reliance on an action statement.

This is considered to be an item of noncompliance. (409/82-07-01).

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on June 16, 1982, the Resident Inspector noted during his tour of the control room that both High Pressure Core Spray Pumps (HPCS) were in "Pull Out" and the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Automatic Valve was closed and in "Pull Out". This condition violated Technical Specification 4.2.2.15 which requires the Low Pressure Core Spray to be operable when both High Pressure Core Spray Pumps are disabled. This is considered to be an item of noncompliance (409/82-07-02).

After discovery by the Resident Inspector, plant personnel restored the Low Pressure Core Spray system to operable status at 9:08 a.m. and restored both High Pressure Core Spray Pumps to operable status at 9:15 a.m. Review of operating logs indicated that the violation occurred at 8:08 a.m. on the same date when both HPCS pumps were put in "Pull Out" and the automatic valve was closed and in "Pull Out" as precautionary measures for isolating Channel No. 2 water level detector for replacement.

No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

a. Installation of seismic restraints on generator plant batteries (FC 74-81-9).

b. Installation of additional stage to the No. 1A Alternate Core Spray (ACS) High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) Diesel Pump (FC-38-81-1)

Following completion of maintenance on the 1A ACS/HPSW Diesel Pump, the inspector verified that this system had been returned to service properly.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on Safety System Channels No. 2 and 3 and verified that testing

was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circular listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.

(Closed) IE Circular 81-12 (Inadequate Periodic Test Procedures of PWR Protection System): The Instrument & Electrical Supervisor reviewed the applicability of this circular to the LACBWR design. The licensee's review indicates there is no problem in this area. This review and conclusion were addressed in a memo dated August 28, 1981 from W. R. Nowicki to R. E. Shimshak.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Regional Request Followup

The inspector was requested to conduct a Post-Implementation review of a Dairyland Power Cooperative modification that was accomplished in response to IE Bulletin 79-27. This request was generated by the June 22, 1982, memorandum from D. Eisenhut to the Regional Administrators. The inspector verified that the installation of the control room annunciator for loss of power to inverter bus 1C was installed. This verification included a review of Facility Change (FC) 78-80-1 and a review of annunciator response to Alarm F4/6 (1C Static Inverter Voltage Low) contained in Volume I of the LACBWR Operating Manual.

The Resident Inspector was requested by Region III to determine the manufacturer of installed fire doors, including those that are designed bullet resistant, and determine if the licensee had documentation specifically confirming that the doors had been tested and approved for fire resistance by a nationally recognized laboratory. It was determined that the majority of the doors were manufactored by CECO Steel Corporation, but there were also doors manufactured by American Welding Manufacturing and Trussbilt Corporation. The licensee had documentation provided by the manufacturer that specifically confirmed the doors, as supplied, had been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory (Underwriter's Laboratory).

There is one CECO door which was modified to make it bullet resistant. The licensee has documentation that this modification did not reduce the fire rating of the door. The licensee indicated that the documentation exists and he is in the process of obtaining the documentation from their insurer. This is considered an open item (409/82-07-03) pending receipt of the document.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Physical Barriers - Vital Areas

This is Safeguards information and is discussed in Attachment A.

9. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.