U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: 1 H 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 E I 0 LICENSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE CON'T 801811 REPORT (7)0 0 8 17 0 1 L(6)[0]10 0 18 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) While the unit was at hot standby, the RWCU primary containment outboard 0 2 isolation valve, was opened in violation of En LCO (See LER 50-321/1982-03 (063). Since the RWCU inboard primary containment isolation valve was 0 4 open and inoperable, this event is contrary to Tech Spec 3.7.A.2.c. The 0 5 |redundant RWCU outboard isolation valve was operable during the event 0 6 Plant operation was not affected. The health and safety of the public 0 was not affected. This event was non-repetitive. 8 80 CAUSE SYSTEM CAUSE COMP VALVE COMPONENT CODE CODE SUBCODE A (13) A (12 E (15 1 (16) G 0 9 V D REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPORT EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE 10 LER/RO REPORT 0 0 6 4 NUMBER COMPONENT NPRD-4 FORM SUB PRIME COMP ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED ACTION FUTURE EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN HOURS (22) SUPPLIER 25 6 6 H (18) Z (19 Z (20) Z (21 0 0 N (24) 5 (26) 0 A 0 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27 The cause of this event was personnel error. An outstanding LCO was not 1.0 [cleared before opening the RWCU outboard isolation valve. To satisfy the ILCO the valve was immediately closed. The inboard isolation valve was repaired and the LCO was cleared. The responsible personnel are now familiar with the accepted interpretation of TS 3.7.A.2.c. and D.1 4 METHOD OF DISCOVERY FACILITY (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER OTHER STATUS A (31) Operator G (28) 010101 Observation NA 4.0 80 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 NA Z (34) NA 6 45 80 44 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE 10 10 0 Z (38) (37) NA 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 NA 0 (40) 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION Z (42) NA B20B300174 PDR ADOCK 80 820810 PUBLICITY 05000321 PDR NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45 UED N (44) NA RA 80 (912)367-7851 S. B. Tipps PHONE: NAME OF PREPARER.

LER #: 50-321/1982-064 Licensee: Georgia Power Company Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch Docket No.: 50-321

Narrative Report for LER 50-321/1982-064

On the 18th of July 1982, with Unit One at hot standby, the Reactor Water Clean Up System (RWCU) primary containment outboard isolation valve was opened in violation of an outstanding limiting condition of operation (LCO). This LCO (note DR 1-82-132) is based on Technical Specification 3.7.D.2 which states, that, in the event of any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7-1 (which includes the RWCU isolation valves) becomes inoperable, reactor power operation may continue providing at least one isolation valve in every line having an inoperable valve is in the mode corresponding to the isolated condition. Since the RWCU inboard primary containment isolation valve was open and inoperable and the conditions for the LCO were not being met, this event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.c. Tech Spec 3.7.A.2.c requires all automatic containment isolation valves to be operable or deactivated in the isolated position whenever reactor water temperature is above 212°F and the fuel is in the reactor vessel. Note that the RWCU primary containment outboard isolation valve was still available for automatic or remote manual operation if the need had arisen. Plant operation was not affected as a result of this event. The health and safety of the public was not affected. This event was non-repetitive.

The cause of this event was personnel error. An outstanding LCO was not cleared before opening the outboard isolation valve. Assuming the removal of the unit from power operations satisfied Technical Specification 3.7.D.2, the applicability of Tech Spec 3.7.A.2.c. was not understood.

The immediate corrective action was to close the outboard valve and isolate its motor operator electrically. Later the same day, the inboard isolation valve was repaired and tested satisfactorily thereby satisfying the LCO. Both isolation valves were returned to normal operation. The responsible personnel are now familiar with the accepted interpretation of Technical Specifications 3.7.A.2.c and 3.7.D.2.