



- I. LER NUMBER: 82-061/03L-0
- II. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: UNIT 1
- III. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373
- IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Technical Specification 3.5.1 Action F. states that "with an ECCS header delta P instrumentation channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or determine ECCS header delta P locally at least once per 12 hours; otherwise declare the ECCS inoperable." On 7-20-82 at 1200, with Unit 1 in the startup mode, the RHR B/C Integrity Monitor Alarm came up during heatup. A check was made of the instrument root valves to verify they were in the correct position, and found to be satisfactory. It was suspected that air was in the instrument lines causing a pressure differential at the instrument. Since the required setpoint of the RHR B/C Integrity Monitor dP switch is  $\pm 1.0$  PSID, a small amount of air in the instrument lines could affect the instrument readings. The instrument was subsequently removed from service to backfill the instrument lines and to check the calibration.

V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

At the time of the occurrence the unit was undergoing heatup in the startup for startup testing. Although the differential pressure sensed by the instrument exceeded the alarm setpoint, there was no reason to suspect that an ECCS line had broken, since initial startup of the unit had just begun. The pressure indications of the RHR Integrity Monitor Alarm dP switches were monitored by operating personnel, to note any changes during various operating conditions. Safe operation of the unit was maintained at all times.

VI. CAUSE:

The instrument lines of the RHR B/C Integrity Monitor dP switch and of the other ECCS Integrity Monitor dP switches were back filled to ensure that air was not in the lines. Spurious alarms were later received by the RHR B/C and the LPCS/RHR A Integrity Monitor Alarms following the backfill and recalibrations. Pressure indication of the switches has been monitored for several days following the event to determine the cause of the differential pressure changes. No cause has yet been determined.

VII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Following the event, the Integrity Monitor dP switches were recalibrated and found to be within the required  $\pm 1.0$  PSID setpoint. The instruments were returned to service and declared operable in that the switches were properly sensing the required parameters. Further monitoring of the pressure indications has been continued to determine the cause of the pressure changes. No additional Integrity Monitor Alarms have been noted since 8-4-82.