

*Southern California Edison Company*

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
P.O. BOX 128  
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

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REGULATORY

H. B. RAY  
STATION MANAGER

August 20, 1982

TELEPHONE  
(714) 492-7700

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region V  
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 82-045  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

This submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 6.9.1.13b of Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-10. It describes a reportable condition involving Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.3.1 associated with Onsite Power Distribution Systems. A completed copy of LER 82-045 is enclosed.

While in Mode 4, at 1610 on July 23, 1982, 120 VAC Vital Bus 2Y01 was accidentally de-energized from its associated inverter and LCO 3.8.3.1 Action Statement b was initiated.

This Action Statement requires the de-energized bus to be:  
(1) re-energized within 2 hours or be in at least Mode 3 within the next 6 hours and in Mode 5 within the following 30 hours; and (2) re-energized from its associated inverter within 24 hours or be in at least Mode 3 within the next 6 hours and in Mode 5 within the following 30 hours.

The bus was re-energized to its alternate power supply, Train A Bus 2B04 within 10 minutes. The bus was re-energized from its associated inverter at 2200 on July 23, 1982, thus fulfilling the requirements of the associated Action Statement.

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The accidental de-energization of the bus is attributed to grounding of the bus caused by disconnection of a jumper which was placed across three fuses on feeder lines to Channel A Plant Protection panel 2L091. Jumpers had been placed to avoid de-energization of the bus during replacement of fuses. Fuse replacement was necessitated by discrepancies between vendor and architect-engineer drawings. An engineering evaluation is currently being undertaken to determine why the discrepancies existed in the drawings.

This event was an isolated occurrence and further corrective action is not deemed necessary.

Normal offsite power was available throughout the event, hence there was no impact on health and safety of plant personnel or the public.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely,

*Brian Katz*  
for HB Ray

Enclosure: LER 82-072

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector San Onofre, Unit 2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Management Information and Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations