

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



The Connecticut Light And Power Company  
Western Massachusetts Electric Company  
Holyoke Water Power Company  
Northeast Utilities Service Company  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices-Seiden Street, Berlin Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270  
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270  
(203)665-5000

January 28, 1994  
MP-94-71

DONALD B. MILLER, Jr.  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT - MILLSTONE

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-21  
Docket No. 50-245  
Licensee Event Report 94-002-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 94-002-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Donald B. Miller, Jr.  
Senior Vice President - Millstone Station

DBM/TT:ljs

Attachment: LER 94-002-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator  
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3  
J. W. Andersen, NRC Acting Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1

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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNEB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000245	PAGE (3) 1 OF 02
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TITLE (4)  
Closure of Turbine Building Railroad Access Door

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	30	93	94	002	00	01	28	94		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9) Run	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 100	20.402(d)			20.405(e)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(f)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(g)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(h)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)			(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)			X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)			
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Drexel N. Harris, Site Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) (203) 437-5903
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO						

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On December 30, 1993, at 0920 hours with the plant at 100% power, a Plant Equipment Operator found the Turbine Building railroad access door in the closed position. This door is administratively controlled in the open position under the station protective tagging program. This door is required to be open during power operation to ensure operability of Switchgear equipment during a postulated Turbine Building High Energy Line Break.

Upon discovery, the door was immediately opened. Investigation revealed a Millstone employee assigned work in the Turbine Building railroad access area closed the door approximately 2 hours earlier due to the inclement weather and freezing temperatures. No safety consequences resulted from this event.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 90.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0601, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (5150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  05000245	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)  02 OF 02
		YEAR  94	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER  002	REVISION NUMBER  00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On December 30, 1993, at 0920 hours with the plant at 100% power, a Plant Equipment Operator found the Turbine Building railroad access door in the closed position. This door is administratively controlled in the open position under the station protective tagging program. This door is required to be open during power operation to ensure operability of Switchgear equipment during a postulated Turbine Building High Energy Line Break (HELB).

Upon discovery, the door was immediately opened. Investigation revealed a Millstone employee assigned work in the Turbine Building railroad access area closed the door approximately 2 hours earlier due to the inclement weather and freezing temperatures.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of the event has been attributed to personnel error. An individual working the day shift in the Turbine Building railroad access area failed to notice the red "DO NOT OPERATE" tag hanging on the door control switch, and subsequently operated the red tagged control switch to close the door.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(A)(2)(ii)(b), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant. In 1992, opening deficiencies were discovered in HELB barriers that protect the Switchgear room from a postulated Turbine Building HELB environment (LER 92-17). A Technical Assessment was performed to evaluate the steam flow through the openings, and its impact on Switchgear equipment operability. The Technical Assessment conservatively assumed that it was possible to pressurize the Turbine Building to greater than 0.5 psig, resulting in a potentially harsh environment in the Switchgear area. The Technical Assessment also determined that operating with the Turbine Building railroad access door in the open position would provide assurance that the Turbine Building could not be pressurized to greater than 0.5 psig, therefore the Switchgear area would remain a mild environment. The door was then opened and its electric control switch and manual pull chain were tagged with a red "DO NOT OPERATE" station tag to preclude closure.

The Millstone One HELB program is scheduled to develop pressure profiles for the limiting Turbine Building HELBs. Should pressures build to levels that would force steam into the Switchgear room, as conservatively assumed in the 1992 Technical Assessment, blowout panels will be designed into the Turbine Building structure. Following this modification, the Turbine Building railroad access door vent path will no longer be credited for Switchgear operability.

IV. Corrective Action

The individual responsible for closing the door was reminded of the importance of attention to detail when working in plant areas. The individual was also counseled regarding the station protective tagging program, which specifically addresses the operational restrictions of a red "DO NOT OPERATE" tag placed on equipment.

This incident is considered an isolated event. Management continually emphasizes the importance of attention to detail through periodic issuance of memos and meetings on managements' expectations. Additionally, all personnel working at Millstone Station receive initial and annual training on the station protective tagging program, which includes training on the strict requirement that operation of red safety tagged equipment is prohibited.

V. Additional Information

None