

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

January 27, 1994

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. 93-701
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Docket Nos. 50-338
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License Nos. NPF-4
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
Gentlemen:

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
COMMENTS ON NRC IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES FROM NRC
EXAMINATION REPORT NOS. 50-338/93-300 AND 50-339/93-300

NRC Examination Report Nos. 50-338/93-300 and 50-339/93-300, dated October 21, 1993, documented the results of NRC administered operator licensing requalification examinations to five Reactor Operators (RO) and six Senior Reactor Operators (SRO). During the administration of the examination, two weaknesses were identified by the NRC examiners. Although not required, we have elected to comment on the NRC-identified weaknesses because our view of the concerns differs from that of the NRC examiners. Our comments on each of the NRC-identified weaknesses are attached.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



W. L. Stewart
Senior Vice President - Nuclear

Attachment

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cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ATTACHMENT

COMMENTS ON NRC IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES FROM NRC EXAMINATION REPORT NOS. 50-338/93-300 AND 50-339/93-300

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NRC-IDENTIFIED WEAKNESS

Question 588 was developed by the NRC. Three of the five ROs and two of the six SROs missed this question. This part "A" question tested the operators knowledge of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) response to a loss of one Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). All five candidates who missed this question chose distracter "c" which stated incorrectly that the indicated flow in the affected loop would drop to zero and stay at zero. This indicated a weakness in the Operators knowledge of transient and accident analysis. Actual indication on the control board would reflect a significant amount of reverse flow through the loop with the secured RCP.

COMMENTS

The five operators that missed this question chose distracter "c". This distracter was essentially identical to the correct answer with the exception of slightly increasing indicated flow versus indicated flow at zero. This reveals that the operators understand the dynamics of increased flow through the operating loops, and therefore back flow through the idle loop. The fact that very little differentiation between the distracters existed (decreased to zero then increased slightly versus decrease to zero and stay at zero) led to difficulties with this question. This shows that the operators actually had good knowledge of the reverse flow concept even though they answered the question incorrectly. Therefore, we do not feel that there is a weakness in the area of transient and accident analysis.

NRC-IDENTIFIED WEAKNESS

Four of five ROs missed question 572 which tested the operators knowledge of how the electrical system will respond to a fault on the 1B station service bus. All four operators chose distracter "a", which stated incorrectly that the 1B and 1H busses would remain energized. This indicated a weakness in the operators knowledge of the electrical distribution system and ability to determine what actions should automatically occur during off normal conditions.

COMMENTS

The operators that missed this question may have been misled. The question was interpreted to mean that there was a fault on the breaker instead of a fault on the bus. As a result, the operators missed the question. To enhance future examinations, the question will be reworded to emphasize a fault on the bus rather than a fault on the breaker.

In addition to question 572, there were three other questions which related to the Electrical Distribution System on the "B/C" Shift NRC administered examination and the "B" Shift Non-NRC administered examination. Also, the "E" Shift NRC administered examination and "E" Shift Non-NRC administered examination contained three questions which related to the Electrical Distribution System. The question numbers and correct responses were as follows:

<u>Question Number</u>	<u>Correct Responses</u>
RA-0573	9/9
RA-0575	17/17
RA-0583	17/17
RA-0156	9/9
RA-0173	5/5
RA-0169	10/10

Based on the correct responses of all the questions relating to the Electrical Distribution System (71 of 75 or 94% correct) no weakness is indicated.