

**GPU Nuclear**  
P.O. Box 388  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731  
609-693-6000  
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

August 16, 1982


Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator  
Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-42/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-42/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

  
Peter B. Fiedler  
Vice President and Director  
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse  
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)  
Office of Management Information and  
Program Control  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, NJ 08731

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PDR ADOCK 05000219  
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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-42/03L

Report Date

August 16, 1982

Occurrence Date

July 16, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing, a relay timer failure prevented automatic actuation of Containment Spray System II. In addition, on a separate occasion, a different relay timer failed during surveillance testing, preventing automatic start of Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump 52C in Containment Spray System II. These events constitute operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation as specified in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 3.4.C.3 and 3.4.C.4, respectively.

These events constitute a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The major plant parameters at the time of the occurrence were:

Power:	Reactor Power	-	1440 MWt
	Generator Output	-	450 MWe

Description of Occurrence

On July 16, 1982 at approximately 1855 hours, while performing the Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test, the system II "C" containment spray pump failed to "auto" start. Electricians were sent to investigate the problem. The electricians found no problem with the pump breaker or motor. Instrument technicians found that the timing function of relay 16K14B failed. The relay was replaced and tested and the Containment Spray System Auto Actuation Test was completed satisfactorily.

On July 17, 1982 at approximately 2010 hours, while performing the Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water Pump Operability Test, an ESW pump failure alarm was received in the control room prior to pump "52C" start. The instrument technician found the timing function of relay 16K11B failed. The relay timer was replaced, tested, and the Containment Spray and ESW System II was tested satisfactorily.

### Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause of the occurrence was instrument drift. Relay 16K14B timed out at 32 seconds instead of 57 +/-3 seconds. Relay 16K11B timed out at 43 seconds instead of 65 +/-3 seconds. The relays were inspected and it was verified that the drift was too wide and would require relay replacement rather than to attempt to retune the relays.

### Analysis of Occurrence

The Containment Spray System is used along with the Emergency Service Water System to remove energy released to the primary containment in the event of a loss of coolant accident. There are two independent loops which can accomplish this, each of which utilizes two ESW pumps, two containment spray pumps, two heat exchangers, two drywell spray heaters, and all the necessary piping, instrumentation and valves. There is one automatically started containment spray pump and emergency service water pump in each of the two systems. Should any of the automatic pumps fail to start, the control room operator can start the manually operated pump in parallel with the failed pump.

The effect of the failed relays, 16K14B and 16K11B, rendered Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System II inoperable for automatic operation. The relays will prevent auto-start of pumps 51C and 52C, respectively, if they fail to start within the preset time. However, it should be noted that the system is designed so that one ESW pump, one heat exchanger and one containment spray pump can provide the necessary cooling. Since Containment Spray and ESW System I was operable and the manually operated pumps in System II were operable, the safety significance of the event is considered minimal.

### Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to manually start alternate System II pumps 51D and 52D. Containment spray pump 51C was also started manually. Containment Spray and ESW System I were also tested and found operable. The cause of the failure of the pumps to start was investigated. Relay 16K11B was replaced with a new relay. A new time delay section was installed on relay 16K14B. Both relays were timed and tested per plant procedures. The System II containment spray and ESW pumps were tested and returned to service. In an attempt to determine the cause of the excessive setpoint drift, the relay was tested and disassembled; no obvious cause of failure was found.

Failure Data

Manufacturer data pertinent to the failures are as follows:

General Electric  
Relay No. 16K11B  
CR2820B413AA41  
115V/125V DC

General Electric  
Relay No. 16K14B  
CR2820B414AA41  
115V/125V DC