

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 70-25/79-01 (IE-V-278)

Docket No. 70-25 License No. SNM-21 Safeguards Group I

Licensee: Energy Systems Group

Rockwell International

8900 DeSoto Avenue, Canoga Park, California 91304

Facility Name: DeSoto Facility

Inspection at: Canoga Park, California

Inspection conducted: January 22-24, 1979

Inspectors: M D Schuster 2/13/79
M. D. Schuster, Physical Protection Inspector Date Signed

Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: L. R. Norderhaug 2/13/79
L. R. Norderhaug, Chief, Safeguards Branch Date Signed

Summary:

Routine, Unannounced Inspection on January 22-24, 1979
(Report No. 70-25/79-01)(IE-V-278)

Areas Inspected: Access controls; detection aids; central alarm station and communications; SNM protection; reports of incidents; and followup on previous items of noncompliance. The inspection involved 20 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the six areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in five areas; two apparent items of non-compliance were identified in one area (Infraction - failure to conduct adequate searches for a protected area, Paragraph 4; Deficiency - failure to conduct adequate exit searches, Paragraph 4).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

- *R. Jones, Vice President and Controller
- *R. Barto, Manager, Industrial Security
- *T. Christy, Captain, Protective Services, DeSoto
- J. Fairris, Senior Industrial Engineer
- D. Kline, Senior Facilities Engineer
- M. Helbrecht, Senior Facilities Engineer
- E. Smith, Sgt. Protective Services, Central Alarm Station
- *V. Schaubert, Manager, NMM
- *R. Tuttle, Manager, Criticality Control

The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of protective services, technical and engineering staffs.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Noncompliance (70-25/78-05): Failure to conduct adequate searches of personnel upon entrance into the protected area.

(Open) Noncompliance (70-25/78-05): Failure to conduct adequate searches of personnel upon exit from a material access area. The individual security officer responsible for these two inspection findings was reprimanded and reinstructed in the proper methods of conducting adequate searches. Additional training was conducted by supervisors for all protective service personnel on the proper methods of conducting searches. (See details Paragraph 4.)

(Closed) Noncompliance (70-25/78-05): Failure to report changes in the security plan. The licensee reported all required changes in a revised security plan dated October 13, 1978.

(Open) Noncompliance (70-25/78-05): Failure to have tamper switches on certain alarm equipment. Alarm modifications are in process and scheduled for completion by March 15, 1979.

(Closed) Noncompliance (70-25/78-06): Guards were not picture badged. All guards are now picture badged.

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(Open) Noncompliance (70-25/78-06): Inadequate physical barriers of a material access area. Modifications to the physical barriers for the material access area are in process and scheduled for completion by March 23, 1979.

3. Security Organization

During the inspection the licensee reported that an additional supervisory position had been added to the security organization. This additional supervisor has been assigned to the swing shift, Monday through Friday, and will be responsible for the DeSoto and Rocketdyne facilities. The other supervisor will be responsible for the Santa Susana facility. All other supervisory positions remain as previously reported.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Access Controls

The inspector examined the licensee's program and procedures for the control of personnel, vehicles and packages entering and exiting the protected, vital and material access areas. The examination covered access lists; identification; badging; escorting; searches and search equipment.

On January 24, 1979, the inspector observed access controls associated with the shipment of eight drums of scrap consigned to DOE. 10 CFR 73.60(b) requires each individual shall be searched for concealed special nuclear material before exiting from a material access area. The licensee's security procedure, subject "Compliance with Special Nuclear Material Monitor Search by Protective Services Personnel, Post #3, DeSoto," dated August 3, 1976, requires protective services personnel who have entered the fuel fabrication area to be searched for special nuclear material at Post #3 prior to exiting the area. The inspector determined by direct observation that two guards had entered the fuel fabrication area through Post #3, but departed the protected area via Gate #5 and were not searched for special nuclear material. This was identified as a deficiency and a repeated item of noncompliance.

During the period January 22-24, 1979, the inspector observed that armed members of the protective services organization were not being searched when entering the protected area as required by 10 CFR 73.50 (c)(1). This was identified as an infraction and a repeated item of noncompliance.

Both previous findings (Report No. 70-25/78-05) pertaining to inadequate searches are still considered open because of the above findings.

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5. Detection Aids

The inspector examined the licensee's utilization of detection aids (CCTV; perimeter and interior intrusion alarms; and motion detectors) during the inspection. The licensee was in the process of installing eight additional infrared alarms within the vault (Advance Devices Lab. Model 6550). These infrared units with the present ultrasonic will give additional protection to the vault. *✓ complete*

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Central Alarm and Communications Systems

The inspector examined the licensee's arrangements for the continuously manned central alarm stations and communications systems within the security organization and with the local law enforcement authorities. It was determined that the licensee's program is being conducted in accordance with the approved security plan.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. SNM Protection (see also access controls)

The inspector examined the licensee's program for the protection of SNM against theft and diversion and the adequacy of physical protection afforded SNM in process. This examination included surveillance equipment and MAA vault access procedures. It was determined that the licensee's program is being conducted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73 and the approved security plan.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Reports of Incidents

The inspector determined that the licensee had no incidents involving unaccounted for shipments, attempted or suspected thefts, and/or unlawful diversion or industrial sabotage requiring a report to the NRC.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 24, 1979. The inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings. The licensee made no commitments with regard to the findings, but indicated they would study the various courses of action and report at a later date their corrective action.

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