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Robert A. Fenech
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

January 18, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77
- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 SPECIAL REPORT 93-24

The enclosed special report provides details concerning five fire barriers that were nonfunctional for a period of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 93-24

I. PENETRATION MARK NOS. 1603, 1731, 60A and 860

Description of Condition

On December 18, 1993, at 0940 Eastern standard time (EST), with Unit 1 in Mode 5 coming out of a refueling outage (Unit 1 Cycle 6), the following four penetrations that served as fire barriers were intentionally breached to facilitate the installation of a design modification. The penetrations have been nonfunctional as fire barriers in excess of the seven days allowed by Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

1. Penetration Mark No. 1603 (in wall A1 at the T line, Elevation 721.5)
2. Penetration Mark No. 1731 (in wall A3 and between the S and T lines, Elevation 719.0)
3. Penetration Mark No. 60A (in wall A1 at the Q line, Elevation 701.0)
4. Penetration Mark No. 860 (in the floor south of A2 and west of the T line, Elevation 714.0)

The modification is for the installation of the secondary boric acid injection system. This system will tie into the existing secondary chemical feed system (hydrazine system No. 36).

Corrective Action

These conditions are being reported in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of each of the penetrations were verified operable and roving fire watches were established. The fire watches will be maintained until the breaches are removed and the fire barriers are restored to a functional status.

II. FIRE DOOR A-126

Description of Condition

On December 9, 1993, at 0745 EST, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 coming out of a refueling outage (Unit 1 Cycle 6), Fire Door A-126 was breached to permit the routing of the cables necessary for the Unit 1 containment integrated leak rate test instrumentation. The fire barrier was nonfunctional in excess of the seven days allowed by LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable; a roving fire watch was established. The fire watch was maintained until the breach was removed on December 20, 1993, at 1203 EST, and the fire door was reestablished as a functional fire barrier.