



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report No.: 70-1113/93-12

Licensee: General Electric Company
P. O. Box 780
Wilmington, NC 28402

Docket No.: 70-1113

License No.: SNM-1097

Facility Name: General Electric Company

Inspection Conducted: December 28-30, 1994

Inspector:

C. H. Bassett
C. H. Bassett

1/19/94
Date Signed

Approved by:

E. J. McAlpine
E. J. McAlpine, Chief
Radiation Safety Projects Section
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

1/19/94
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This reactive, announced inspection involved onsite review of an incident in which approximately 32 kilograms of uranium and lubricant accumulated in the sump of the 7B rotary pellet press. During the inspection, selected criticality safety analyses, facility change requests, and procedures were reviewed and various operations in the Fabrication Area of the facility were observed. The inspection also included a review of the licensee's investigation of this incident and the actions taken to correct the problem.

Results:

The licensee had responded to the incident by shutting down the rotary presses and forming a team to investigate the problem and make recommendations for corrective actions. At the time of the inspection, some of the corrective actions that the team had recommended had been taken including: 1) drilling holes in the cover plate of the 4B press sump, 2) removing the sump cover plate from the 7B press, and 3) implementing formal, documented requirements for inspection and cleanout of the sumps on a weekly and quarterly basis. These corrective actions appeared to be adequate for the two presses. Other actions were planned for the 3B press. The licensee also conducted training sessions for the fabrication operators and maintenance personnel to discuss the incident, the results of the investigation, and the corrective actions taken.

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Following the investigation of the incident, the team issued a report which concluded that the administrative criticality safety control for the presses, i.e., cleaning out the sump areas by the operators, had been lost. Through a review of licensee documentation and the investigation report of this incident, the inspector determined that appropriate criticality safety controls had not been implemented prior to the incident.

Two apparent violations were identified: 1) initiating changed activities related to the use of the rotary pellet presses without verifying that installation was in accordance with the nuclear safety analyses, and 2) failure to take adequate corrective actions following an audit (Paragraph 2.b).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees

- *R. Armstrong, Senior Engineer, Fuel Quality Control
- *G. Bowman, Senior Program Manager, Compliance-Improvement
- *J. Bradberry, Regulatory Team, Fuel Manufacturing Operation
- *J. Bragg, Team Member, Fuel Fabrication Process & Product Team
- *R. Bruce, Acting Manager, Emergency Preparedness, Security, Material Control and Accounting
- *M. Chilton, Manager, Chemical Product Line
- *J. Gallerani, Acting General Manager, GE Nuclear Energy Production
- *J. Huffer, Engineer, Nuclear Safety
- *B. Kaiser, Manager, Fuel Fabrication Product Line
- *R. Keenan, Program Manager, Compliance Auditing
- *R. Lewis, Radiation Safety Coordinator
- *D. McCaughey, Engineer, Regulatory Team
- *S. Murray, Acting Manager, Regulatory & Environmental, Health & Safety
- R. Patterson, Team Leader, Fuel Fabrication Production Team
- *J. Piercc, Team Member, Fuel Fabrication Process & Product Team
- *B. Roughton, FMO Maintenance Support
- J. Taylor, Principal Engineer, Nuclear Safety
- *F. Welfare, Manager, Criticality Safety Engineering

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, operators, security force members and administrative personnel.

*Attended the Exit Interview on December 30, 1993 (Paragraph 3).

2. Incident Review (88005, 88010, 88015, 88020)

a. Background

At about 10:30 a.m. on December 21, 1993, a press setup operator discovered a buildup of sludge in the lubricant sump of the "7B" rotary pellet press in the fabrication portion of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) building. The sludge was a mixture of lubricant and uranium powder (UO_2). The geometry of the sludge was $12 \times 20 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$ inches with about $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches of lubricant on the top of the sludge. Following discovery of the buildup, management and safety personnel were notified and the operation of the rotary presses was halted. Approximately thirty-two (32) kilograms (kgs) of sludge and lubricant were removed from the 7B pellet press sump. Later, approximately eighteen (18) kgs of sludge and lubricant were removed from the 3B pellet press sump. Only about one inch of lubricant and sludge was found in the 4B press sump. The licensee determined that the total amount of uranium involved in the 7B sump area was slightly more than a safe batch (45% of the minimum critical mass) for material with an enrichment of five percent (5%), the maximum enrichment authorized to be processed in the system.

The licensee formed a team to investigate the incident and determine what actions would be necessary to correct the problem. Following completion of the investigation by the team, an Unusual Incident Report (UIR) was written detailing the investigation, the team's findings, and their recommendations.

b. Results of the Licensee's Investigation

(1) Equipment Operation

The licensee has three rotary pellet presses and various hydromat pellet presses. The team initially examined the hydromat pellet presses and determined that the design of these presses prevented a problem with buildup of material in any inaccessible or unplanned location. These presses were not enclosed on the bottom and, therefore, any lubricant or other leakage would drain directly to the drip pan under the press. As a result, these presses were not required to be shutdown.

The operation of the rotary presses was then reviewed. Although the licensee had purchased the presses from the same manufacturer, they had acquired three different models. The oldest model uses a die lubrication system which is a die spraying design that results in the majority of the lubricant accumulating in the sump in the bottom of the press. (The lubricant is then recirculated through filters and pumped back to and re-used in the die lubrication process.) At the time of the incident, this oldest model press, currently designated as 4B, had a standpipe or overflow pipe mounted in the sump. With the standpipe in the vertical position, lubricant could accumulate to a maximum depth of 5½ inches in the 4B sump.

The die lubrication system of the other two presses is an enclosed pressurized system. The system feeds lubricant to each die location separately. O-rings and pressure fittings prevent excessive loss of lubricant and manual control valves control the flow of lubricant to each of the 16 dies. However, some leakage or seepage of lubricant to the sump is expected.

The investigation team reviewed the maintenance work orders for the presses to determine if problems had occurred which would result in excessive leaks of lubricant or powder. None were found. The team had the lubrication systems tested for evidence of unusual leakage but none was found. Also, examination of the presses and the associated drawings indicated that the design of the presses prevented large leaks of powder into the sump portion of the press unless one or more dies and lower shanks were removed before operating the press. No such problems were found and the team determined that the presses were operating as designed.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of their equipment review and selected drawings, and inspected the presses. The inspector concluded that the licensee's determination about the presses appeared to be correct and that they had been operating as designed. No other problems were identified.

(2) Procedures

The investigation team reviewed the operating procedures (entitled Process Requirements and Operator Documents [PRODs]), associated with the presses. No reference was found that directed the operators or maintenance personnel to inspect or to clean out the sump areas of the presses on any periodic basis.

The team also interviewed the current press operators and determined that the lower casing areas/sumps of the presses were only cleaned out during shutdown periods. However, no evidence could be found that the 7B press sump had been cleaned out during the last shutdown in August 1993. Interviews with former press operators revealed that the sumps had been cleaned out more frequently in the past but no one could remember a set frequency.

The inspector reviewed the PRODs associated with operation of the rotary pellet presses and found no requirements for any type of inspection or clean out of the lower portion/sump area.

(3) Criticality Safety Analyses

The investigation team reviewed the original criticality safety analysis performed for the installation of the first rotary pellet press. The team determined that the analysis, which was performed in 1977, appeared to approve the sump based on safe geometry of a 4-inch slab height. (The first rotary press, currently the 4B press, was the one that used the lubricant recirculation for lubricating the dies.) Subsequent approvals of the other two presses (7B which was installed in 1980 and 3B which was installed in 1990) were based on the original criticality safety analysis. Since the sump area was not affected in the new installations, the portions analyzed in detail in these subsequent criticality safety analyses were items such as a new pellet takeoff system or controls installed to prevent the excessive accumulation of pellets when an operator was not present.

In reviewing the analysis for the last rotary press to be installed, the team determined that engineering and nuclear safety personnel had discussed the sump. These individuals were aware of the design features of the presses that prevented excessive leakage of lubricant and powder into the sump area

and that lubricant and powder could accumulate in this area. They also understood that the operators, at that time, were performing frequent inspections and cleanouts of the sumps. Therefore, they concluded that no excessive accumulations of material would occur in that area.

The team also reviewed various criticality safety analyses that were prepared for the High Enriched (HiE) Project (a project to document the approval of the process for the production of 5.00% enriched material). In these analyses, the 3B rotary press was modeled with a 2-inch high catch or drip pan, on the floor under the press, full of heterogeneous UO_2 pellets and a 3-inch slab of optimally moderated homogeneous UO_2 powder on top of the catch pan representing the sumps. The team noted that there were no controls on the height of the material in the sumps specified in these analyses. Also, no criticality safety analyses could be found that addressed an accumulation of material in the sumps at a height greater than 3 inches.

The inspector also reviewed the various criticality safety analyses. The criticality safety analysis associated with the installation of the first rotary press did apparently consider a buildup of uranium powder in the lubricant sump and was annotated to provide a 1-inch hole in the side of the sump at a height of 4 inches from the bottom of the sump. This would have provided an engineered control for the geometry of the sump. Although there was no evidence that this control (drilling a hole) was ever implemented, the licensee believes that an overflow pipe or standpipe was installed as an alternate method to meet this requirement. When the other presses were later installed, however, the overflow was not included as a part of the criticality controls for those presses.

(4) Nuclear Safety Audits

Condition S-1 of Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-1097 authorizes use in accordance with the statements, representations and conditions of Part I of the license application dated October 23, 1987 and the supplements thereto.

Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.8.1, Criticality Safety & Radiation Protection Internal Audits, requires, in part, that violations of licensed conditions identified during quarterly audits shall be communicated to the Area Manager. Written notification of such violations shall be provided to the Area Manager. Corrective actions shall be documented in writing and approved by the Area Manager.

The investigation team also reviewed nuclear safety audits performed in the pellet press area. One routine Nuclear Safety

Engineering (NSE) quarterly audit in 1989 had addressed a problem concerning accumulation of material in the 4B sump and the height of the overflow pipe installed in the sump. During the audit of the fabrication area on June 19, 1989, a mixture of lubricant and uranium powder was noted in the sump area of the 4B pellet press. Also, the overflow pipe or standpipe, which was necessary so that material could not accumulate to a depth exceeding 4 inches, was found to be too long. The sump was subsequently cleaned out and between 1 and 2 inches of sludge were removed.

A meeting was held on June 21, 1989, to discuss the problem of sludge buildup in the sump and the possible corrective actions to be taken. In attendance were personnel from management, the fabrication operation, manufacturing engineering, and NSE. It was decided to cut off the over flow pipe or standpipe that was attached to the sump to a level that would maintain a 4-inch safe slab height. A second corrective action was to request the press operators to record filter changes (of the lubricating system) and sump cleanout to determine if cutting off the fill pipe adversely affected the press operation.

As a result of this audit, corrective actions were apparently taken including cutting off the overflow pipe or standpipe and establishing an inspection routine for the standpipe. (At the time of the December 21, 1993 incident, this standpipe was 5½ inches in length.) The Nuclear Safety Release/ Requirements (NSR/Rs), however, which are part of the PROD and stipulate the criticality and radiological safety requirements for an area or operation, were not updated to include that engineered control. Also, no procedural requirement was implemented to control or inspect the sump area. Nor were actions taken with respect to the 7B pellet press to add an engineered control to prevent accumulation of material in the sump area of that press to a height of greater than 4 inches.

The inspector informed the licensee that failure to take corrective actions, following the audit in June of 1989, to provide the 7B pellet press with a criticality safety control to prevent accumulation of material in the sump area to a height of greater than 4 inches after doing so for the 4B pellet press was an apparent violation of License Condition S-1.

(5) Conclusions

Condition S-1 of Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-1097 authorizes use in accordance with the statements, representations and conditions of Part I of the license application dated October 23, 1987 and the supplements thereto.

Part I, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1 of the license application states that the preferred method for assuring nuclear criticality safety in production quantities of fissile materials is by the use of safe geometry.

Part I, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.4 of the license application states in part that criticality safety analyses shall take into consideration the possible buildup of fissile material in inaccessible or unplanned locations.

Part I, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.11 of the license application states that engineered controls must be capable of performing the criticality safety purpose for which they are specified, and must be verified as being properly installed prior to the first use with fissile material.

Part I, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.12 of the license application states that procedural controls require human intervention in detecting an undesired condition and/or implementing corrective action. Procedural controls must be implemented by formal written procedures.

Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.7 of the license application states that licensed material processing is conducted in accordance with properly issued procedures or instructions.

Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.7.3 of the license application requires that changed activities not be initiated until the nuclear safety analysis demonstrating safety of the activity has been completed, a preoperational inspection has been conducted to verify that the installation is in accordance with the nuclear safety analysis, and appropriate procedures and/or instructions are in place.

The team concluded that the presses were operating as designed and that some seepage of lubricants and powder to the sump area was expected. Assumptions were made by engineering and nuclear safety personnel that accumulations of lubricant and powder would be routinely cleaned out as had been the practice in the past. Requirements to perform the cleanouts were not documented. The team concluded that the root cause of the problem was a lack of documentation in the analysis packages and in operating procedures (PRODs and NSR/Rs) which resulted in the loss of an administrative control.

The inspector concluded that the "practice" of cleaning out the sumps, which would have been an administrative control, was not documented or made a requirement in any procedure. The engineered control of drilling a hole to provide for geometry control of material accumulating in the sump was apparently never implemented. Therefore, neither engineered nor administrative criticality safety controls were implemented for

the sumps of the rotary presses with the exception of the standpipe that was apparently added to the 4B press in 1977. If the standpipe was cut off to the required length following the NSE audit in 1989, as required by the documented corrective action, it was subsequently modified and its height was increased.

The inspector informed the licensee that initiating changed activities related to the use of the rotary pellet presses without verifying that installation was in accordance with the nuclear safety analyses was an apparent violation of License Condition S-1.

c. Corrective Actions

Following the conclusion of the investigation, the team made various recommendations concerning what actions needed to be taken to correct the problem. These were divided into immediate and future actions.

(1) Immediate Corrective Action Recommendations

- Physically modify the 7B and 3B sumps to prevent significant accumulations of lubricant or powder in an unanalyzed location.
- Physically modify the 4B press to limit the height of the sump liquids to less than the analyzed 3-inch height.
- Implement a routine and thorough cleanout of powder in the upper hood in order to further minimize leakage to the lower casing/sump area.
- Implement and document a routine, weekly inspection and cleanout of the lower casing area.
- Implement and document a quarterly inspection and cleanout of the lower casing area to include removal of the back of the press housing.
- Hold roundtable meetings with fabrication operators and maintenance personnel to discuss the incident, the results of the investigation, and the corrective actions.
- Have the operators and maintenance personnel identify similar potential locations of gradual accumulations that are not routinely inspected and cleaned.

Although not completed during the period of the inspection, the licensee also planned to drill two holes along the bottom portion of the side of the 3B press and remove the drain plug

as part of the immediate corrective actions. This would allow drainage of lubricant and other material from the sump area. The licensee planned to drill two other holes 3 inches up from the bottom of the sump of the 3B press to preclude a problem if the bottom holes were to become plugged. The lubricant, because it would accumulate on top of the powder/sludge, would still flow out the top holes into the drip pan and alert the operator that there was a problem.

(2) Future Corrective Action Recommendations

- Have Chemical and Fabrication personnel inspect equipment in their areas to determine if there are locations where uranium could accumulate that have not been analyzed or that are not routinely inspected and cleaned out.
- Have the independent Compliance Auditing group re-evaluate the criticality safety analyses of the various areas as they are routinely audited and determine whether or not the controls established are adequate and are in place.
- Have Criticality Safety Engineering and Technical Resource personnel review the investigation report in order to sensitize themselves to the concerns and the issues presented.

During the period of the inspection, the inspector reviewed the recommended corrective actions and observed the presses to determine what had been done to prevent recurrence of the accumulation problem. The inspector noted that three holes were drilled in the 4B press sump cover plate so that lubricant would overflow into the drip pan under the press if too much material were to build up in the sump. This would give the operator an indication that there was a problem. The sump cover plate was completely removed from the 7B press to allow free drainage of material to the drip pan.

The licensee also implemented a set of Temporary Operating Instructions (TOI) which stipulated that the lower portion of each press be cleaned and inspected once per week (not to exceed seven working days). This was to be documented in the production log. If the operators noticed an accumulation of powder greater than 1-inch thick, they were to notify their coordinator immediately. The applicable NSR/Rs were also revised to require an extensive quarterly cleanout and inspection of the sump areas of each press. This was to include removal of the back of the press (which would allow better visibility and facilitate cleanout).

Following modification of the 4B and 7B presses and review, approval, and implementation of the TOI, the licensee conducted training for the fabrication operators and maintenance personnel. The training was given by the Team Leader of Fuel Fabrication Production. He reviewed and discussed the incident, the results of

the investigation of the incident, and the corrective actions taken and to be taken. The modifications to the presses were reviewed and the TOI was read and discussed. All personnel were also asked to inspect equipment in their areas to determine whether or not other locations existed where uranium could accumulate without being readily detected.

The inspector observed the physical modifications that the licensee had made to presses 4B and 7B and reviewed the TOI and the revised NSR/Rs. It appeared that the modifications that had been made (and those planned for the 3B press) and the inspections and cleanouts that had been formally documented would preclude a buildup of material in the sump area of the presses. The inspector also attended one of the training sessions for the operators and maintenance personnel. The training appeared to be adequate.

Two apparent violations were noted as discussed in 2.b above.

3. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 30, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results and observations. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. Although proprietary material was reviewed and discussed during the inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. The inspector noted that the licensee had responded to the incident by shutting down the rotary presses and forming a team to investigate the problem and make recommendations for corrective actions. At the time of the inspection, some of the corrective actions that the team had developed had been taken including: 1) drilling holes in the sump area of the 4B press, 2) removing the sump cover plate from the 7B press, and 3) implementing formal, documented requirements for inspection and cleanout of the sumps on a weekly and quarterly basis. These corrective actions appeared to be adequate for the two presses. Other actions were planned for the 3B press. The licensee also conducted training for the fabrication operators and maintenance personnel to discuss the incident, the results of the investigation, and the corrective actions taken.

Two apparent violations were identified: 1) initiating changed activities related to the use of the rotary pellet presses without verifying that installation was in accordance with the nuclear safety analyses, and 2) failure to take adequate corrective actions following an audit.

in prior reviews for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The plant was licensed before the requirement for issuance of a Final Environmental Statement.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's request and did not consult other agencies or persons.

Finding of No Significant Impact

The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed exemption. Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, we conclude that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for exemption dated May 22, 1992, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the local public document room at Greenfield Community College, 1 College Drive, Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2d day of July 1992.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Richard F. Dudley, Jr.,

*Acting Director, Non-Power Reactors,
Decommissioning and Environmental Project
Directorate, Division of Reactor Projects—
III/IV/V, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 92-16232 Filed 7-9-92; 9:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7540-01-M

Regulatory Guides; Issuance, Availability

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a revision to a guide in its Regulatory Guide Series. This series has been developed to describe and make available to the public such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the staff in its review of applications for permits and licenses.

Regulatory Guide 8.7, Revision 1, "Instructions for Recording and Reporting Occupational Radiation Exposure Data," describes an acceptable program for the preparation, retention, and reporting of records of occupational radiation exposures. It includes copies of NRC Forms 4 and 5 and detailed instructions on completing them.

Comments and suggestions in connection with items for inclusion in

guides currently being developed or improvements in all published guides are encouraged at any time. Written comments may be submitted to the Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Regulatory guides are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC. Copies of issued guides may be purchased from the Government Printing Office at the current GPO price. Information on current GPO prices may be obtained by contacting the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post Office Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082, telephone (202) 512-2249 or (202) 512-2171. Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552(a).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of June 1992.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Eric S. Beckjord, Director,

*Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research,
[FR Doc. 92-16224 Filed 7-9-92; 8:45 am]*

BILLING CODE 7540-01-M

Two-Year Trial Program for Conducting Open Enforcement Conferences; Policy Statement

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Policy statement.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this policy statement on the implementation of a two-year trial program to allow selected enforcement conferences to be open to attendance by all members of the general public. This policy statement describes the two-year trial program and informs the public of how to get information on upcoming open enforcement conferences.

DATES: This trial program is effective on July 10, 1992, while comments on the program are being received. Submit comments on or before the completion of the trial program scheduled for July 11, 1992. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch.

Hand deliver comments to: One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD between 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.

Copies of comments may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 (301-504-2741).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The NRC's current policy on enforcement conferences is addressed in Section V of the latest revision to the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy) 10 CFR part 2, appendix C that was published on February 18, 1992 (57 FR 5791). The Enforcement Policy states that, "enforcement conferences will not normally be open to the public." However, the Commission has decided to implement a trial program to determine whether to maintain the current policy with regard to enforcement conferences or to adopt a new policy that would allow most enforcement conferences to be open to attendance by all members of the public.

Policy Statement

Position

The NRC is implementing a two-year trial program to allow public observation of selected enforcement conferences. The NRC will monitor the program and determine whether to establish a permanent policy for conducting open enforcement conferences based on an assessment of the following criteria:

- (1) Whether the fact that the conference was open impacted the NRC's ability to conduct a meaningful conference and/or implement the NRC's enforcement program;
- (2) Whether the open conference impacted the licensee's participation in the conference;
- (3) Whether the NRC expended a significant amount of resources in making the conference public; and
- (4) The extent of public interest in opening the enforcement conference.

I. Criteria For Selecting Open Enforcement Conferences

Enforcement conferences will not be open to the public if the enforcement action being contemplated—

- (1) Would be taken against an individual, or if the action, though not taken against an individual, turns on whether an individual has committed wrongdoing;
- (2) Involves significant personnel failures where the NRC has requested that the individual(s) involved be present at the conference;
- (3) Is based on the findings of an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) report; or
- (4) Involves safeguards information, Privacy Act information, or other information which could be considered proprietary.

Enforcement conferences involving medical misadministrations or overexposures will be open assuming the conference can be conducted without disclosing the exposed individual's name. In addition, enforcement conferences will not be open to the public if the conference will be conducted by telephone or the conference will be conducted at a relatively small licensee's facility. Finally, with the approval of the Executive Director for Operations, enforcement conferences will not be open to the public in special cases where good cause has been shown after balancing the benefit of public observation against the potential impact on the agency's enforcement action in a particular case.

The NRC will strive to conduct open enforcement conferences during the two-year trial program in accordance with the following three goals:

- (1) Approximately 25 percent of all eligible enforcement conferences conducted by the NRC will be open for public observation;
- (2) At least one open enforcement conference will be conducted in each of the regional offices; and
- (3) Open enforcement conferences will be conducted with a variety of the types of licensees.

To avoid potential bias in the selection process and to attempt to meet the three goals stated above, every fourth eligible enforcement conference involving one of three categories of licensees will normally be open to the public during the trial program. However, in cases where there is an ongoing adjudicatory proceeding with one or more intervenors, enforcement conferences involving issues related to the subject matter of the ongoing adjudication may also be opened. For the purposes of this trial program, the

three categories of licensees will be commercial operating reactors, hospitals, and other licensees, which will consist of the remaining types of licensees.

II. Announcing Open Enforcement Conferences

As soon as it is determined that an enforcement conference will be open to public observation, the NRC will orally notify the licensee that the enforcement conference will be open to public observation as part of the agency's trial program and send the licensee a copy of this Federal Register notice that outlines the program. Licensees will be asked to estimate the number of participants it will bring to the enforcement conference so that the NRC can schedule an appropriately sized conference room. The NRC will also notify appropriate State liaison officers that an enforcement conference has been scheduled and that it is open to public observation.

The NRC intends to announce open enforcement conferences to the public normally at least 10 working days in advance of the enforcement conference through the following mechanisms:

- (1) Notices posted in the Public Document Room;
- (2) Toll-free telephone messages; and
- (3) Toll-free electronic bulletin board messages.

Pending establishment of the toll-free message systems, the public may call (301) 492-4732 to obtain a recording of upcoming open enforcement conferences. The NRC will issue another Federal Register notice after the toll-free message systems are established.

To assist the NRC in making appropriate arrangements to support public observation of enforcement conferences, individuals interested in attending a particular enforcement conference should notify the individual identified in the meeting notice announcing the open enforcement conference no later than five business days prior to the enforcement conference.

III. Conduct of Open Enforcement Conferences

In accordance with current practice, enforcement conferences will continue to normally be held at the NRC regional offices. Members of the public will be allowed access to the NRC regional offices to attend open enforcement conferences in accordance with the "Standard Operating Procedures For Providing Security Support For NRC Hearings And Meetings" published November 1, 1991 [56 FR 58251]. These procedures provide that visitors may be

subject to personnel screening, that signs, banners, posters, etc., not larger than 18" be permitted, and that disruptive persons may be removed.

Each regional office will continue to conduct the enforcement conference proceedings in accordance with regional practice. The enforcement conference will continue to be a meeting between the NRC and the licensee. While the enforcement conference is open for public observation, it is not open for public participation.

Persons attending open enforcement conferences are reminded that (1) the apparent violations discussed at open enforcement conferences are subject to further review and may be subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action and (2) the statements of views or expressions of opinion made by NRC employees at open enforcement conferences or the lack thereof, are not intended to represent final determinations or beliefs.

In addition to providing comments on the agency's trial program in accordance with the guidance in this notice, persons attending open enforcement conferences will be provided an opportunity to submit written comments anonymously to the regional office. These comments will subsequently be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Enforcement for review and consideration.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 7th day of July 1992.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Samuel J. Chilk,
Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 92-16233 Filed 7-9-92; 8:45 a.m.]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-26

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Request for Clearance of a Revised Information Collection to Add Form RI 36-7 to OMB Clearance Number 3206-0128

AGENCY: Office of Personnel Management.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (title 44, U.S. Code, chapter 35), this notice announces a request for clearance of a revised information collection, to add form RI 36-7 to the Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions (CSRS). OPM must have SF 2802 completely filled out and signed before paying a refund of retirement contributions. SF 2802B must also be complete if there are spouse(s) or former

Dated: August 21, 1992.
 Marvin M. Fooks,
 Director, Office of Trade Adjustment
 Assistance.
 [FR Doc. 92-21836 Filed 9-8-92; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4810-30-01

**Job Training Partnership Act:
 Announcement of Proposed
 Noncompetitive Grant Award**

AGENCY: Employment and Training
 Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Notice of intent to award a
 noncompetitive grant.

SUMMARY: The Employment and
 Training Administration (ETA)
 announces its intent to award a
 noncompetitive grant to The Institute for
 Workplace Learning of the American
 Society for Training and Development of
 Alexandria, Virginia for the provision of
 specialized services under the authority
 of the Job Training Partnership Act
 (JTPA).

DATES: It is anticipated that this grant
 award will be executed by September
 25, 1992, and will be funded for twelve
 months. Submit comments by 4:45 p.m.
 (Eastern Time), on September 24, 1992.

ADDRESSEE: Submit comments regarding
 this proposed assistance award to US
 Department of Labor, Employment and
 Training Administration, room C-4305,
 200 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
 Washington, DC 20210, Attention: Willie
 Harris; Reference FR-DAA-004.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION: The
 Employment and Training
 Administration (ETA) announces its
 intent to award a noncompetitive grant to
 The Institute for Workplace Learning
 of the American Society for Training
 and Development. The Grantee shall
 extract multicultural instruments for
 dissemination to the public sector. The
 compilation of multicultural
 programming tools will represent the
 state-of-the-art in the private sector and
 will be compiled in a practitioners
 toolkit. This kit will be made available
 to JTPA staff members throughout the
 nation, thus providing a valuable
 resource for the JTPA system, as well as
 providing JTPA practitioners with
 information they can share with
 employers in need of Technical
 Assistance.

Funds for this activity are authorized
 by the Job Training Partnership Act, as
 amended, Title IV—Federally
 Administered Programs. The proposed
 funding is approximately \$92,000 for
 twelve months.

Signed at Washington, DC on August 27,
 1992.

James C. DeLuca,
 ETA Grant Officer.
 [FR Doc. 92-21837 Filed 9-8-92; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4810-30-01

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

**Special Emphasis Panel in Mechanical
 and Structural Systems; Meeting**

In accordance with the Federal
 Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-483,
 as amended), the National Science
 Foundation announces the following
 meeting.

Date and Time: September 17, 1992: 10 a.m.
 to 8 p.m. September 18, 1992: 8:30 a.m. to 8
 p.m.

Place: Holiday Inn, The Governor's House,
 Rhode Island Avenue at 17th Street, NW.,
 Washington, DC.

Type of Meeting: Closed.

Contact Person: Drs. John B. Scabzi and Ken
 F. Chong, Program Directors, Division of
 Mechanical and Structural Systems, room
 1108, National Science Foundation, 1800 G St.
 NW., Washington, DC 20550. Telephone: (202)
 357-6542.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and
 recommendations concerning proposals
 submitted to NSF for financial support.

Agenda: To review and evaluate Large
 Structural and Building Systems and
 Structural Systems and Construction
 Processes research proposals as part of the
 selection process for awards.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being
 reviewed include information of a proprietary
 or confidential nature, including technical
 information; financial data, such as salaries;
 and personal information concerning
 individuals associated with the proposals.
 These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C.
 552b(c), (4) and (6) of the Government in the
 Sunshine Act.

Reason for Late Notice: Difficulty
 arranging a suitable meeting time for all
 committee members.

Dated: September 3, 1992.

Moderate Rogers,
 Acting Committee Management Officer.
 [FR Doc. 92-21874 Filed 9-8-92; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7550-01-01

**NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 COMMISSION**

**Two-Year Trial Program for
 Conducting Open Enforcement
 Conferences; Availability of Toll-Free
 Phone Number**

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission.
ACTION: Policy statement supplement.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission (NRC) is issuing a

supplement to its policy statement that
 establishes a two-year trial program for
 conducting open enforcement
 conferences. The purpose of this
 supplement is to inform the public of the
 toll-free phone number that may be used
 to get information on upcoming open
 enforcement conferences.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 8, 1992.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
 James Lieberman, Director, Office of
 Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, Washington, DC 20555
 (301-504-2741).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July
 10, 1992 (57 FR 30782), the Commission
 published a policy statement on the
 implementation of a two-year trial
 program to allow selected enforcement
 conferences to be open to public
 observation. The policy statement
 explained that the NRC would announce
 open enforcement conferences to the
 public normally at least 10 working days
 in advance of the enforcement
 conference through the following
 mechanisms:

- (1) Notices posted in the Public
 Document Room;
- (2) Toll-free telephone messages; and
- (3) Toll-free electronic bulletin board
 messages.

At the time the policy statement was
 published, the toll-free message systems
 were not available and a commercial
 phone number was provided pending
 establishment of the toll-free message
 systems. Although the toll-free
 electronic bulletin board message
 system is still unavailable, the public
 may call (800) 952-9874 to obtain a
 recording of upcoming open enforcement
 conferences. The NRC will issue another
 Federal Register notice after the toll-free
 electronic bulletin board message
 system is established.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 2d day of
 September 1992.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
 James Lieberman,
 Director, Office of Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 92-21834 Filed 9-8-92; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-01

**Intent To Establish a Local Public
 Document Room in the Vicinity of
 Hematite, Missouri, for records
 pertaining to the Combustion
 Engineering, Inc. Uranium Fuel Facility**

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission.
ACTION: Notice of intent to establish a
 local public document room in the
 vicinity of Hematite, Missouri, for