

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 70-1257/s3-13

Docket No. 70-1257

License No. SNM-1227

Licensee: Siemens Power Corporation
2101 Horn Rapids Road
Richland, Washington 99352-0130

Facility Name: Siemens Power Corporation (SPC)

Management Meeting at: Siemens Power Corporation - Richland, Washington

Meeting Conducted: December 9, 1993

Approved by:

J. A. Wenslawski
James H. Reese, Chief
Facilities Radiological Protection Branch

12/16/93
Date Signed

Meeting Summary:

An open management meeting was held to discuss topics of mutual interest between the NRC and licensee. The licensee gave a presentation on the following matters: (1) Licensee initiatives to improve performance, (2) Criticality Safety Analysis Update Program, (3) programs for managing radioactive and non-radioactive waste, (4) causal factors/generic implications from events at the licensee's facility, (5) details of the licensee's planned expanded dry conversion facility, and (6) licensing issues of concern.

Discussion ensued each presentation. A copy of the meeting agenda and a copy of non-proprietary licensee handouts are enclosed.

DETAILS

1. Meeting Participants

1.1 Siemens Power Corporation

R. G. Frain, Vice President, Manufacturing
B. N. Femreite, Plant Manager
M. K. Valentine, Manager, Manufacturing Engineering
B. F. Bentley, Manager, Plant Operations
R. E. Vaughan, Manager, Safety, Security and Licensing
S. S. Koegler, Manager, Waste Management Engineering
N. J. Urza, Manager, Manufacturing Engineering
L. J. Maas, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
W. A. Baker, Manager, Public Relations
J. B. Edgar, Senior Engineer, Licensing

1.2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region V Office

B. H. Faulkenberry, Regional Administrator
K. E. Perkins, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
F. A. Wenslawski, Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
J. H. Reese, Chief, Facilities Radiological Protection Branch
C. A. Hooker, Fuel Facilities Inspector
G. N. Cook, Senior Public Affairs Officer

Headquarters Office

J. Roth, Section Leader, Fuel Cycle Operations Branch, NMSS
R. F. Cassano, Lead Inspector, Fuel Cycle Operations Branch, NMSS

Note: There were no members of the media or public present at this meeting.

2. Meeting Details

Mr. Faulkenberry opened the meeting by stating that Region V has observed improved operational performance and noted that reportable events have diminished. He also stated that this meeting was to foster communications between the NRC and Siemens.

Mr. Femreite and his staff then gave a presentation on each of the topics listed on the agenda. Non-proprietary topics covered during the meeting are included with the attached licensee handouts. The NRC staff had no dissenting comments related to the data presented by the licensee. The NRC expressed concerns regarding the volume of waste awaiting uranium recovery, including the impact of ongoing receipt of materials from the Lingen facility.

PROPOSED AGENDA
December 9, 1993 - Management Meeting

Non-Proprietary Meeting

8:30 a.m.	Opening Remarks	NRC/Siemens
8:40 a.m.	Initiatives to Improve Performance	BN Femreite
9:10 a.m.	CSA Update Program	RE Vaughan
10:00 a.m.	Causal Factors/Generic Implications from Licensee Events	MK Valentine
10:30 a.m.	Waste Management Plan	SS Koegler
11:00 a.m.	Licensing Issues	RE Vaughan

Proprietary Meeting

11:30 a.m.	Waste Management Plan	SS Koegler
11:45 a.m.	Dry Conversion Overview	IJ Urza
12:30 p.m.	Closing Remarks	NRC/Siemens

INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE
AND COMPLIANCE - MAY 1992 - DECEMBER 1993

- Staffing
- Criticality Safety Program Update
- Bulletin 91-01 Implementation
- Configuration Control
- Problem Solving
- Communications
- Training
- Event Management
- Participative Management
- Rapport with NRC

Prepared by B.N. Femreite
Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division
December 8, 1993

**INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE
AND COMPLIANCE - MAY 1992 - DECEMBER 1993**

• **STAFFING**

- Replaced retiring Manager, Safety, Security & Licensing.
- Created and filled Plant Manager position.
- Hired certified Health Physicist.
- Added second and third criticality safety specialist; added contractors.
- Radiation protection staff increased from 11 to 21.
- Top HP Technicians assigned as assistants for Health Physicist and H&S Supervisor.
- Created and filled Radiological Safety Supervisor position.
- Created and staffed Waste Management Engineering group.

• **CRITICALITY SAFETY PROGRAM UPDATE**

- Phase I* - Systems review and prioritization - complete.
- Phase II* - Reanalyze Category I CSA (Critical/Urgent systems).
- Phase III* - Reanalyze Category II CSA, As-built fissile material systems, develop accident scenarios.

- BULLETIN 91-01 IMPLEMENTATION

- Implemented procedure 5/92; first licensee to implement and report.
- Acknowledged as being conservative with low threshold for reporting and short reporting time.
- Six reports in 1992, five in 1993 (3 from CSA Update Program).

- CONFIGURATION CONTROL

- Changed Engineering Change Notice (ECN) procedure to remove discretion about its required use.
- Enhanced control via CSA update program.
- Complete update of as-builts for fissile material systems.
- Training of Plant Engineering staff and strong reinforcement of expectations.

- PROBLEM SOLVING

Precipitated by 5/92 criticism by NRC regarding timeliness and depth of investigations.

- Implemented new methodology using causal factors, root cause, generic implications, and barrier analysis.
- Self-assessment methodology introduced; implementation has begun.
- Effectiveness has been acknowledged by NRC staff and customers.

- COMMUNICATIONS

- Detailed, division-wide communications regarding events, investigations, causal factors, new procedures or methods.
- Abnormal Event reporting procedure for unusual events and safety problems.
- New Operator Aid developed to improve operating procedures.
- All safety-related events (radiological, criticality, industrial, chemical) reviewed daily in manufacturing status meeting.
- Instituted monthly "all-hands" meeting for Manufacturing supervisory and management staff.
- Formalized shift turnover meetings to address status, abnormal events, changes, special instructions.

- TRAINING

- Implemented Operator Qualification program for Plant Operations technicians.
- **Effective Problem Closeout** ° W.R. Corcoran:
Plant Manager, Manufacturing V.P., and 28 key staff - causal factors, root cause, barrier analysis, generic implications.
- **TAPROOT™** Root Cause Analysis:
Seventy-nine professionals and supervisors formally trained.
- **Conduct of Operations** ° Techstar:
Eighteen fundamentals of effective operations; 26 managers and senior engineers, 130 supervisors, lead technicians, and engineers.

- Self-Assessment

- Thirty-six (36) supervisors, technicians, and craftsmen; trained and conducted 3-day SA regarding shift turnover, log keeping, communications, shift routines, procedures, and safety.
- Several assessments completed within the last 4 months on specific topics.
- Twelve major SA projects intended for CY 94, within Manufacturing.

- New Environmental Compliance Training

- Treatment, Storage, Disposal (TSD) training for all Chemical and Maintenance workers.
- Solid Waste Generator training for Chemical & Ceramics workers.

- Interactive Training Computer

- CD-ROM Computer aquired for individual routine training updates.

- EVENT MANAGEMENT

- Formalized reporting procedure, internal and external.
- Management involvement from outset to closure.
- Staff involvement via line responsibility, problem investigations, and self-assessment.
- Effective problem investigations/closeout.
- Corrective action tracking.

- PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT

- Enhanced teamwork via formal programs and projects: self-assessment, statistical process control, QIP task teams, root cause analysis, production area teams, readiness reviews.

- RAPPORT WITH NRC

- Increased sensitivity at Siemens across the organization.
- Effective interaction with Region V staff.
- Management review sessions, internal and with NRC.
- Proactive with NRC inspectors.

SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION
CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSES
UPDATE PROGRAM

Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Description

- Plan approved by SPC management December 30, 1992

- Three phase program
 - Phase 1: Review, validate and categorize CSAs, ECD: June 30, 1993 (complete)
 - Phase 2: Prioritize and reanalyze Category I CSAs, ECD: January 31, 1994
 - Phase 3: Prioritize and reanalyze Category II CSAs, ECD: January 31, 1995

- Expected duration: Two years - completion scheduled for January 31, 1995

- Program resource analysis: Expected 12 to 14 man-year effort

- Multi-disciplinary effort: Operations, Manufacturing Engineering, Safety (Criticality, Radiological, Industrial, Fire)

**Siemens Power Corporation
Criticality Safety Analyses
Update Program Progress Summary**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACCOMPLISHMENT</u>
May 17, 1993	First status report on CSA update program to NRC HQ and Region V in Walnut Creek
June 9, 1993	SPC makes Bulletin 91-01 Report on Line 1 Process Offgas (POG) Scrubber Separator configuration. NRC Report Number 25632 and SPC letter dated July 9, 1993 refer.
June 17, 1993	SPC makes Bulletin 91-01 Report on UO ₂ Pellet Grinder Water Centrifuge Reservoir Configuration. NRC Report Number 25662 and SPC letters dated June 17, 1993, and July 15, 1993 refer.
June 14-18, 1993	NRC routine inspection review of program status. (NRC Inspection Report No. 93-07).
June 29, 1993	Phase I complete - review and categorization by Criticality Safety Component.

**Siemens Power Corporation
Criticality Safety Analyses
Update Program Progress Summary**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACCOMPLISHMENT</u>
July 15, 1993	Oversight Committee program status review. System review priorities established for first four systems. Team members for walkdown (as-built) of first system selected.
July 23, 1993	As-built walkdown pilot team trained.
July 26-30, 1993	NRC routine inspection review of program status. (NRC Inspection Report Number 93-09).
August 11, 1993	As-built pilot team debriefing to Oversight Committee. Additional walkdowns of Line 2 Powder Prep System required.
August 23, 1993	Oversight Committee meeting to review as-built task resources and refine instructions for task.
August 24, 1993	First Quarterly Progress Report submitted to NRC.
August 30, 1993	Initial contract engineering team (Meier and Associates) on-site for "as-built" task team augmentation.

**Siemens Power Corporation
Criticality Safety Analyses
Update Program Progress Summary**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACCOMPLISHMENT</u>
September 2, 1993	Program task flow diagram for Phase 3 revised.
September 8, 1993	CSA Update Program review with NRC Headquarters/Region V staff in Washington D.C.
September 17, 1993	Oversight Committee meeting to select Accident Scenario Development Team members and review priority of initial CSA systems.
September 27 - October 1, 1993	NRC routine inspection review of program status. Inspection Report 70-1257/93-11 refers.
October 7, 1993	Accident Scenario Development Team Training. Weekly meetings established every Wednesday from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
October 13, 1993	Criticality Safety Component establishes accident scenario development documentation format. The Accident Scenario Development Team continued to work on Lines 2 & 3 Powder Prep scenarios.

**Siemens Power Corporation
Criticality Safety Analyses
Update Program Progress Summary**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACCOMPLISHMENT</u>
October 25, 1993	Third Criticality Safety Specialist on-board. This completes the staffing for this area.
November 17, 1993	Accident Scenario Development Team completes Lines 2 & 3 Powder Prep scenarios.
November 24, 1993	Quarterly Progress Report submitted to NRC Region V and Headquarters.
November 30, 1993	Criticality Safety Analysis for Dry Conversion System completed.
December 1, 1993	Oversight Committee meeting to review overall program status, including system configuration "as-built" task, accident scenario development task, and criticality analysis task. Priority of first twelve systems established.

**Siemens Power Corporation
Criticality Safety Analyses
Update Program Phase I Completion Summary**

Total Number of CSAs	216
Total Number of original systems	53
Total Number of current systems	59
Number of category 1 systems identified	4
Number of category 2 systems identified	28
Number of category 3 systems identified	27

Of the 4 packages originally identified as category 1 during this review, only SWUR remains a category 1. One category 2 system, MOP powder dissolution, will remain out of service pending implementation of stronger criticality safety controls on the process. Immediate actions taken for each of the systems initially identified as category 1 shown on following slide.

**Siemens Power Corporation
Criticality Safety Analyses
Update Program Category I Determination**

System Package	Action Taken
1.4 Line 1 Uranium Recovery	The checklist for this package shows this as a category 1 system. However, the GEN 2.0 analysis adequately provides a safety basis for this operation. Therefore the system will be handled as a category 2.
1.6 Process Offgas, Line 1	An additional overflow line was added to the Line 1 POG Offgas scrubber system and an addendum to CSA U-1.29 was completed and this system was changed to category 2.
2.6 Pellet Grind & Inspection	The centrifuge clean water tank was equipped with an overflow line with a maximum overflow depth of 8 inches. An elbow was found to be turned upward and the overflow depth was approximately 10 inches. The elbow was immediately turned down which returned the system to compliance. Engineering did further modifications to provide a more positive means of overflow. After these changes the system was changed to category 2.
4.10 SWUR	The system was shut down for repairs prior to this review. This system will remain down until a new analysis is complete and a startup council gives permission for the system to restart.

**Siemens Power Corporation
CSA Update Program
Phase I Categorization Checklist**

- a. Are all obvious accident conditions with serious consequences documented?
- b. Is the existing CSA adequately consistent with plant configuration to assure safety?
- c. Are all major assumptions that have a primary impact on safety valid?
- d. Are stronger controls needed to implement existing limits?
- e. Does the system description need to be updated to include key items?
- f. Are all major / minor assumptions that have a small impact on safety valid?
- g. Does the existing analysis meet license conditions for FWR & Optimum Moderation?

A "no" for any items a-c is a criterion for a Category 1 unless / until an addenda and / or modifications are complete so these questions could be answered affirmative.

A "yes" for items d and e or a "no" for items f and g are criteria for a Category 2

A "yes" for all items except d and e is a criterion for a Category 3

**Siemens Power Corporation
CSA Update Program
Phase I Categorization Matrix**

System #	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	Category	Comments
1.2 Line 1 Vaporization (Continued)	y	y	y	y	n	y	y	2	<p>U-1.2 requires 2 independent, positive controls to prevent moisture from process streams from entering UF₆ cylinders-the presence of these two positive controls was evaluated and found to be in place. However, desired improvements were identified and will be specifically listed in the CSS when the new system CSA is complete.</p> <p>The frequency for periodic checks of these systems should be documented in the CSS where they are more visible.</p>
1.3 ADU Process	y	y	y	n	n	y	y	2	<p>The interaction analyses should be updated to reflect current equipment arrangements.</p> <p>The dryer analysis does not include the consequences of spilling uranium liquids on the insulation. However, the insulation was recently changed and the consequences are not major. This condition will be specifically addressed when the analysis is redone.</p>

**CSA UPDATE PROGRAM
PHASE 3 MAJOR TASK STATUS
DECEMBER 1, 1993**

TASKSTATUS

- | | |
|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Plant System Configuration As-Built Task | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 18% complete• Schedule issued for entire scope- completion by December 1994 on target.• Contractor (Meier & Associates) staff = 8 FTE. Two additions in January 1994. Three full teams available with additions. |
| Accident Scenario Development Task | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Weekly meetings in progress.• First three systems complete.• Two more systems to complete by December 15, 1993. |
| Criticality Safety Analysis Task | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Permanent staffing of three Criticality Specialists on board as of October 25, 1993.• Two contractor organizations available.• First CSA system (Dry Conversion Pilot Plant) complete.• Five CSA systems in progress. |

COMPARISON BETWEEN NEW AND OLD CSA FORMAT AND METHODOLOGY

Format Differences

- CSA format is now consistent from one CSA to another
- Purpose and scope of each analysis is clearly stated
- System and equipment component descriptions are more detailed
- Accident conditions are more detailed and include the specific defenses used to preclude a potential critical condition and the required recovery actions if a defense is lost or degraded
- System accident interaction with other equipment more detailed


Methodology Differences

- Neutron interaction models are more detailed
- Accident conditions are developed using a team approach to validate CSA assumptions/establish worst case credible accident conditions
- The sensitivity studies on system reactivity are more detailed
- The second party review comments and resolution documented in CSA

Final Approval

- Plant Manager now accepts the CSA as part of the approval process

Investigation of February 7, 1993 ACCU-RATE Feeder Limit Switch Incident



IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

7 Actions Identified

7 Actions Completed

LONG RANGE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

9 Actions Identified

9 Actions Completed

ORIGINAL "LIST OF NINE"

29 Recommendations Identified

25 Actions Completed

OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Design/install rotary valve on Line 2 Central Vac
2. Interlock barrel/bucket fill to Blender discharge valves.
3. Design/install new scales for U_3O_8 klinkers.
4. Design/install Central Vac for Line 1.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS - INTERLOCKS

13 Recommendations Identified

10 Actions Completed

OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Complete re-design of remaining 2 interlocks.
2. Analyze PM procedures for inclusion in CSA's.
3. Creation of Area Review Teams.

MODERATOR INTRUSION ANALYSIS

7 Recommendations Identified

6 Actions Completed

OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATION

Complete installation of false floors (2 of 7 complete) in hoods and elevate Vac-U-Max pickup heads.

MODERATOR INTRUSION GENERIC IMPLICATIONS

8 Actions Identified

8 Actions Completed

POWDER SPILL
IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

8 Recommendations Identified

7 Actions Completed

OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATION

Complete re-design of powder connector on Line 3 Granulator.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS ON POWDER CONNECTORS

7 Recommendations Identified

1 Action Completed

OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS

Complete design and installation of new powder connectors in the following locations:

- Line 1 hammermill feed
- Line 1 Calciner to offset feeder
- Line 1 offset feeder to diverter valve
- Line 1 granulator feed
- Line 2 hammermill feed
- NAF hammermill discharge

DIRECT BENEFITS OF INVESTIGATION

- Upgrade of ECN/WO procedures.
- Increased awareness of interlocks and improved procedures/methods for temporary bypass.
- Detailed and documented analysis of moderation control in the conversion and powder preparation areas.
- Enhanced barriers of moderation control and powder containment.

INDIRECT BENEFITS OF INVESTIGATION

- Implemented an improved commitment tracking system.
- Enhanced training and new methodology for incident investigation and accident prevention.
- Improved criticality safety awareness.
- Developed detailed accident scenarios and evaluated barriers.
- Upgraded "as-built" drawings.
- Improved abnormal event reporting.
- Improved emphasis on preventive maintenance.
- Renewed emphasis on the value of "robust" engineering as a primary barrier.

WASTE MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

The mission of the Waste Management Engineering Section is to help assure that the SPC Richland Plant is in compliance with environmental regulations.

Our objectives are to:

- Examine current waste management practices and scrap recovery or waste treatment processes to provide direction and help set priorities
- Implement projects and recommend process changes to support waste treatment and environmental compliance
- Provide equipment engineering for waste treatment facilities
- Provide engineering support for environmental compliance - Part B Application preparation

WASTE MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING AREAS OF EMPHASIS

- Solid Waste Management - Mark Stricker
- Lagoons - Rich Kimura
- Plant Effluents - Mike Salisbury
- Off Gas Treatment - Syd Koegler

WASTE MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TASKS

- Solid Waste Management - Mark Stricker
 - Solid waste sorting, volume reduction, disposal
 - * satellite station program implemented
 - * waste generator training underway
 - * operating procedures written for LLW QC program
 - SWUR criticality safety control
 - * economic analysis completed
 - * investigating improved U assay system
 - HEPA filter decon facility
 - Equipment decon facility
 - General engineering support for solid waste operations

WASTE MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TASKS (con't)

- Lagoons - Rich Kimura
- Lagoon stored waste treatment and U recovery
 - * lagoon resampling completed
 - * lagoon inventory treatment plan completed
 - * biodenitrification under development
- LUR containment
 - * cost estimate partially completed
- Decommission lagoons
- Engineering support for ARF, Lagoons, IX, LUR

WASTE MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TASKS (con't)

- Plant Effluents - Mike Salisbury
 - Etch room and etch room trench
 - * plan to eliminate all etch effluents to lagoons
 - UO₂, Lab, and MURS effluents
 - * installed new silver recovery unit in photo lab
 - * installing DIW effluent treatment
 - ELO solvent extraction effluents
 - Dangerous waste minimization

WASTE MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TASKS (con't)

- NOx Treatment - Syd Koegler
 - Design ELO NOx scrubber
 - * NOx data taken at pellet dissolver
 - * scrubber calculation validation underway

- Environmental Compliance - All
 - Sample and characterize waste streams

 - Flowsheets and process descriptions for Part B application

BRIEFING ON
REGULATORY REFORM
AND
LICENSE RENEWAL
ISSUES

LICENSE RENEWAL ACTIVITIES

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
September 18, 1987	Current license (SNM-1227) renewed for 5-year term
February 1992	NUREG-1324, Proposed Method For Regulating Major Materials Licensees issued
August 1992	Renewal application submitted
November 3, 1992	NRC acknowledges receipt of renewal application under "timely renewal" criterion
November 13, 1992	NRC Staff - Briefing of Commissioners on NUREG-1324
January 15, 1993	Staff Requirements Memorandum from Commissioners directs staff to reconsider proposed methods of regulating Materials Licensees <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Upgrade and clearly define regulatory basis- Evaluate existing regulations to identify unnecessary requirements- Define scope of ISAs- Consult with licensees- Defer SALP type assessments

LICENSE RENEWAL ACTIVITIES


<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
May 18, 1993	Staff Briefing of Commissioners on Action Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- License renewal target dates for all licensees presented - SPC estimated as 12/95- Regulatory Development<ul style="list-style-type: none">• New 10CFR70 Rule• Guidance<ul style="list-style-type: none">- ISA's- SF&CG- SRP
August 27, 1993	ISA Development Workshop <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Industry (FOC) presentations- Westinghouse Savannah River presentations
September 8, 1993	SPC/NRC meeting on CSA update, dry conversion, license renewal
November 1-16, 1993	SRP chapter review meeting series. See attached schedule.
November 16, 1993	SPC/NRC Licensing Branch meeting on license renewal

LICENSE RENEWAL ACTIVITIESDATEACTIVITY**PLANNED ACTIVITIES**

December 8-9, 1993	Quarterly management meeting at Richland
December 14-16, 1993	NRC Licensing Branch Staff and Contractor (SAIC) site visit
February 1994	Issue request for additional information - 60 day response
January 1995	License renewal issued
August 1995	Revised 10CFR70, SRP, and SF&CG issued. Implementation schedule issued.

11/93

PLANNED SCHEDULE FOR FUEL CYCLE SAFETY REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT



*SRP text that pertains to proposed regulations will be bracketed.

0/1/93

PUBLIC MEETINGS ON ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SECTIONS
OF THE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

DATE/ TIME	TOPIC	ROOM NO.	LEAD CONTACT	LICENS'G CONTACT
<u>11/1/93</u>				
9:30 a.m.*	8.0 Fire Protection	4B11	ADatta	TCox
12:30 p.m.- 5:00 p.m.*	9.0 Emergency Preparedness	4B11	JSwift	MLamastra
<u>11/6/93</u>				
9:30 a.m.	11.0 Decommissioning	1F7/9	JSwift	GComfort
12:30 p.m.- 5:00 p.m.	13.0 Waste Mgmt	1F7/9	JSwift	TWenck
<u>11/9/93</u>				
8:30 a.m.	10.0 Environmental Protection	1F5	TMo	MAdams EKeegan
12:30 p.m.- 5:00 p.m.	5.0 Radiation Protection	1F5	JSwift	EFlack
<u>11/15/93</u>				
9:30 a.m.	2.0 Organiz't/Mgmt Control & Oversight	2F17/21	WBrown	CEmeigh
12:30 p.m.- 5:00 p.m.	3.0 Quality Assurance	2F17/21	WBrown	CEmeigh
<u>11/16/93</u>				
8:30 a.m.- 5:00 p.m.**	6.0 Nuclear Criticality Safety	4B11	GBidinger	MKlasky

*If necessary, discussions will continue the morning of 11/2/93 in Room 4B11.

If necessary, discussions will continue the morning of 11/17/93 in Room 4B11.

ENCLOSURE