



80-555  
#16

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

October 4, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: W. M. Morrison, Assistant Director for General  
Engineering Standards, SD

FROM: D. G. Eisenhut, Assistant Director for Systems  
& Projects, DOR

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON REVISION NO. 1 TO REGULATORY GUIDE  
1.141

In response to your memorandum, dated August 23, 1978, we have reviewed and concur with the proposed changes to Regulatory Guide 1.141, "Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid System." However, the proposed Regulatory Position C.1 clarifies that in implementing the single failure criterion, the staff requires only that at least one isolation valve per pipeline take the position of greatest safety upon loss of actuating power. This position is not entirely consistent with General Design Criteria 55 and 56, which require that all automatic isolation valves take the position of greatest safety upon loss of actuating power. Therefore, we recommend that serious attention be directed towards ensuring that GDC 55/56 and the Regulatory Guide position be consistent.

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Assistant  
Director for Systems & Projects  
Division of Operating Reactors

Contact:  
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