



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

October 29, 1979

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Sander
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NOTE FOR: D. Ross
FROM: D. Eisenhut
SUBJECT: EFFECT OF FEEDWATER SYSTEM MODIFICATION IN OPERATING PWR PLANTS
ON ORIGINAL STEAM LINE BREAK ANALYSES

In the Oconee FSAR, Section 14 Safety Analysis for the steam line break (SLB) accident inside containment, Duke considered only one emergency FW pump, pumping through the break, and causing an increase in containment pressure due to the SLB accident. The plant modifications resulting from the TMI Bulletins and Orders may have affected the FSAR SLB analyses not only for Oconee but perhaps the other operating PWRs. It is requested that this subject be specifically addressed in your review of the proposed modifications at Oconee. It is further requested that this subject be reviewed for the other operating PWRs.

The containment pressure response to a SLB inside containment was the subject of a Part 21 notification from Virginia Electric Power Company for North Anna 3 and 4. The problem at North Anna 3/4 involved inadequate consideration of the auxiliary FW flow under pump runout conditions. It seems appropriate that you should also consider this subject for any actions resulting from Bulletins and Orders activities.

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director
Division of Operating Reactors
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

cc: WGamill
WButler
GLainas
RReid
MFairtile

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270
and 50-287

OCT 16 1979

Mr. William O. Parker
Vice President - Steam Production
Duke Power Company
P.O. Box 2178
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Parker:

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW RATE AND STABILITY TEST FOR OCONEE 1, 2, & 3

In your letter dated August 22, 1979, you requested exemption from the flow rate and flow stability test that we required in our May 18, 1979 evaluation of your compliance with the NRC Order of May 7, 1979.

We have reviewed your request and conclude that the flow test we required in our May 18, 1979 evaluation will not be necessary provided all motor-operated pumps are available prior to three unit operation. The enclosed evaluation describes the details of our review and provides the basis for our conclusion.

As stated on page two of the enclosed evaluation, the addition of the two motor-driven pumps to each unit requires that new analyses be performed regarding a main steam line break inside containment since the peak containment pressure may be affected due to the emergency feedwater flow which is dependent on manual actions to isolate flow to the affected steam generator. In performing the analyses, you must consider the run out flow from the turbine-driven pump and one motor-driven pump. Please provide us a date by which we can expect to receive the revised analyses.

If you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to call me.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Supplement 1 to Evaluation of
Licensee's Compliance with the
NRC Order dated May 7, 1979

cc: See attached distribution list

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