

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

REPORT SOURCE 1 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 1 1 0 8 8 1 1 2 0 8 8 1 9

DOCKET NUMBER 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVEN - DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 3 With the unit at a cold shutdown condition, the performance of the refueling
0 3 consequence limiting safeguards function. A test revealed that TV-MS-201B (Main
0 4 Steam Trip Valve for "B" steam generator) would not respond to train "A" CLS
0 5 Hi Hi actuation. This is contrary to T.S. - 3.8A.1 and is reportable per T.S.
0 5 6.6.2.b.(2). The redundant train's actuation signal was verified to be operable.
0 7 Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

SYSTEM CODE S D 11		CAUSE CODE X 12		CAUSE SUBCODE Z 13		COMPONENT CODE V A L V O P 14				COMP. SUBCODE F 15		VALVE SUBCODE 7 16	
EVENT YEAR 8 1 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 7 5 24		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28		REPORT TYPE 1 30		REVISION NO. 0 32		ACTION TAKEN A 18		FUTURE ACTION A 19	
EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23		NPRO-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER A 4 9 9 26	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

010 Although the cause for the failure of the main steam trip valve to close could
011 not positively be identified, the SOV is the most suspect. Therefore, the train
012 "A" SOV will be replaced.

1	4													
7	8	9												
FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		
1	5	H	28	0	0	0	29	N/A	30	B	31	Periodic Testing		
1	5	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 3 34

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35

N/A

LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES				DESCRIPTION (39)	
NUMBER			TYPE		
1	7	0 0 0	(37) Z	(38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION (4)	
1	2	0	0	0	40
N/A					

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
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8 9 10
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
N (44)
N/A
NRC USE ONLY

NRC USE ONLY

8112180253 811208
PDR ADDCK 05000291
S PDR

J. L. Wilson

804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 81-075/031-0
EVENT DATE: 11-08-81

TITLE OF THE EVENT: TV-MS-201B WOULD NOT CLOSE ON CLS H1 H1

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With the unit at cold shutdown, the performance of the refueling consequence limiting safeguards (CLS) functional test revealed that TV-MS-201B would not close on a train "A" actuation signal. This is contrary to Tech. Spec. 3.8.A.1 and is reportable per Tech. Spec. 6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The main steam trip valves receive a Phase 3 containment isolation signal, from both trains of CLS, to ensure double barrier isolation of lines penetrating the containment.

Prior to the function testing of the CLS logic, the train "A" SOV functioned properly upon receiving a test signal from a high steam flow/low tax safety injection. Also, the redundant actuation signal, train "B", was verified to be operable during the CLS functional logic test. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The cause for the main steam trip valve failure could not be identified.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to complete testing of the consequence limiting safeguards logic and verify the redundant train to be operable.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Following the failure of TV-MS-201B to close, the CLS logic and the main steam trip valve's pneumatic closure system were proven operable.

The CLS logic circuitry was tested by the performance of the monthly Periodic Test (PT 8.5). During this testing, the CLS logic's slave relay, that controls the main steam trip valve, was energized and its state verified. The continuity of the controlling SOV coil was also verified via a test light check in the monthly logic test.

The main steam trip valve's pneumatic closure system was proven operable by installing a Jumper across the CLS logic's slave relay and venting air from the main steam trip valve via its controlling SOV.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Although the cause for the failure of the main steam trip valve to close could not positively be identified, the SOV is the most suspect. Therefore, the train "A" SOV will be replaced.

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REPORT NO: 81-075/03L-0

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.