



SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 
6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813; (916) 452-3211

August 6, 1982

R H ENGELKEN, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR REGION V OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1450 MARIA LANE SUITE 210 WALNUT CREEK CA 94596

DOCKET NO. 50-312 LICENSE NO. DPR-54 FOLLOW-UP TO REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE NO. 82-01 - FOLLOW-UP REPORT


In accordance with Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification Section 6.9.4.1(i) and Regulatory Guide 1.16, Section C.2.a(9), the Sacramento Municipal Utility District hereby submits a follow-up report of Licensee Event Report 82-01.

On January 30, 1982, maintenance personnel attempted to make a containment entry for snubber inspection via the personnel hatch. Initially both doors were closed. The individual attempted to open the inner door first, however recognized his error and reclosed the inner door. Then he began to open the outer door, as he properly should, to gain entry. The door interlocks permitted the outer door to open although the inner door had not actually latched. Apparently, the inner door had closed then had rebounded from its seat a sufficient distance that the latching mechanism, although closed, did not engage. The closed mechanism provided the mechanical interlock to permit the outer door to open, even though the door itself was not latched closed. As soon as the outer door latching mechanism had cleared, the door swung open. This was due to the fact that the containment was at a pressure of approximately 5" water below the auxiliary building. This pressure difference was due to the purge that was then in progress.

At this point, the outer door was fully open and the inner door had been forced open a few inches by the pressure surge.

Plant personnel immediately closed the outer door and latched it, then the inner door was closed and latched. Estimated time for the closing of the doors was two to three minutes.

The air lock doors appeared to close satisfactorily and the only damage was a pinion shaft that operates an equalizing valve in the air lock. This was repaired by the end of the day on February 1, 1982. It should



R H ENGELKEN -2-AUGUST 6, 1982 be noted that this valve does not have to operate for the air lock to be functional. The air lock doors were leak tested using the standard local leak rate procedure, SP 205.02, and were found to be acceptable. The Plant Review Committee (PRC) reviewed this event on February 2, 1982 and recommended investigation of specific methods to avoid door misoperation. On February 16, 1982, the PRC reviewed a proposal to use status lights that would operate off the actual door position of the reactor building hatch rather than just the latching mechanism. The status lights will be visible from each hatch hand wheel station. Attached is a sketch of the proposed circuit that will be used for the hatch status monitor lights. John J. Mattimoe Assistant General Manager and Chief Engineer Attachment cc: DCD, Washington INPO

