



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 167

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16

GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION AND
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-219

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 18, 1993, GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN/the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification (TS). The request would revise TS 3.2C (Standby Liquid Control System), TS 3.4A (Core Spray System), TS 3.4B (Automatic Depressurization System), TS 3.4C (Containment Spray System and Emergency Service Water System), TS 3.5B (Secondary Containment), TS 3.8 (Isolation Condenser), and TS 3.17 (Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning System) to delete the current requirements to demonstrate by testing, that a redundant system/component is declared inoperable. These testing requirements would be replaced by requirements to verify that the redundant system/component is operable. These operability verifications would be accomplished by administrative checks of appropriate plant records (e.g., appropriate surveillance records and logs). Conforming changes would be made to Definition 1.1 (Operable-Operability).

2.0 EVALUATION

The requirement to demonstrate the operability, by testing, of a redundant system/component when a system/component is declared inoperable is a typical requirement that was included in the TS when Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station was granted its operating license. However, based on further operating experience, the NRC staff subsequently dropped such testing requirements. Testing of redundant systems/components is not required in the NRC's Standard Technical Specifications nor in recently issued TS. Deletion of such testing requirements was implemented by the NRC staff since the added operability assurance provided by such testing is not sufficient to justify the loss of safety function during the test, provided the periodic surveillance testing is current and that there are no known reasons to suggest that the redundant system/component is inoperable. The periodic surveillance tests and the proposed verifications that the redundant systems/components are

operable are sufficient to demonstrate the operability of the redundant system/component. Therefore, the proposed changes to delete demonstration of operability by testing redundant system/components are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In a letter dated December 10, 1993, the State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection and Energy - Division of Environmental Safety, Health and Analytical Programs, had the following comment in regard to GPUN's request to revise the Oyster Creek Technical Specifications for seven systems to delete the requirement for daily testing of redundant components when one train is inoperable.

The determination of operability is an on-going process by plant operators. This concept was stressed by the NRC at the Operational Safety Team Inspection exit meeting at oyster Creek in October 1993. It should not be necessary to perform a special review of past surveillance tests and logs to verify operability. An effective surveillance testing program, accurate operating logs, timely preventive maintenance and other processes form the basis for operability decisions as these processes are performed. If GPU Nuclear and the NRC are satisfied with the performance of these existing programs at Oyster Creek, a special records review to verify operability should not be necessary.

In reviewing NUREG 1433, Standard Technical Specifications for GE Plants, we could find no limiting condition that required a records review to determine operability. In addition, the definition of operability in this NUREG does not include the records review contained in the definition proposed by GPU Nuclear.

Staff's Response

Generic Letter 91-18 describes the relationship between surveillance requirements and the on-going process of assessing the operability of equipment. Older technical specifications included provisions to conduct tests on the alternate train of equipment when a train of equipment was determined to be inoperable. That position was later changed because such testing usually caused a loss of safety function. Instead, administrative procedures verified the operability of the alternate train. The same concept is reflected in the improved standard technical specifications (NUREG-1430 through NUREG-1434) in the administrative control for the Safety Function Determination Program (Section 5.8). That program provides the means to use plant status to determine whether inoperable equipment has caused a loss of safety function.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 59749). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: A. W. Dromerick

Date: December 21, 1993