SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT ☐ 6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813; (916) 452-3211

February 5, 1981

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director
Region V Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1990 North California Boulevard
Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202
Walnut Creek, CA 94926

Re: Operating License DPR-54
Docket No. 50-312
Reportable Occurrence 81-2

Dear Mr. Engelken:

In accordance with Technical Specifications for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Section 6.9.4.2.d, and Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, Section C.2.b(4), the Sacramento Municipal Utility District is hereby submitting a thirty-day report of Reportable Occurrence 81-2.

On January 12, 1981, during routine sampling operations, the analysis of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System indicated a tritium level greater than MDA. To determine the validity of the analysis a second sample was obtained. A gross Beta and Gamma scan, as well as a tritium analysis, was performed on the second sample. The results of the second sample analysis verified that some activity was present in the CCW system. The CCW system cools various components containing potentially radioactive liquid. However, the system is not normally considered as a radioactive system.

In compliance with IE Bulletin 80-10, an immediate safety evaluation of the operation of the system as a radioactive system was performed. The safety evaluation, performed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.59, determined that operation of the system as a radioactive system was acceptable (i.e. did not involve an unreviewed safety question or a change to the Technical Specifications). The safety evaluation futher determined that continued operation would comply with 10CFR20.201, General Design Criterion 64, 10CFR50 Appendix I, 40CFR190, and the Rancho Seco Technical Specifications.

The normal surveillance program was significantly augmented by sampling, monitoring and data collection work under a leak search program. The leak search program involved isolating suspected components (i.e. those which interface the CCW and a radioactive system) and analyzing the CCW System to determine any changes in the activity level.

6

On January 26, 1981, the "A" Letdown Cooler, E-220A, was isolated. Subsequent analyses indicated no evidence of increased activity in the CCW system and the short-life isotope level began decreasing. Based on those analyses, the "A" Letdown Cooler was determined to be the source of the contamination.

A new letdown cooler system, to supplement the existing system, has been designed. However, receipt of the necessary material to install the new system is not expected until mid 1981. As a result, Cycle 5 operations will utilize the "B" cooler as the normal letdown flow path. The "A" cooler will normally remain isolated except during periods when plant conditions necessitate additional cooling capability. Those periods are expected to be minimal and of short duration. Continued operation of the CCW system with the source of the contamination unidentified was determined to be in compliance with all the applicable regulations and requirements.

Identification of the "A" Letdown Cooler as the source and limiting the use thereof will assure continued compliance throughout Cycle 5 operations.

There were no transients nor power reductions associated with this event.

Respectfully submitted,

John J. Mattimoe

John J. Mattimoe
Assistant General Manager
and Chief Engineer

JJM:HH:rm

cc: I&E, Washington (30)
MIPC (3)
EPRI-NSAC