LICENSKE EVENT HENORT

CONTROL BLOCK
1 LILE B R F 2 30 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O 1 SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 12 6 0 0 0 1 1 1 9 8 1 8 0 1 2 8 8 1 9
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During normal operation while performing SI-4.1.A-7, reactor water level
[6]3 switches LIS-3-203A switch 1, LIS-3-A, B, C, and D switches 2 were found
0 4 outside T.S. 3.1.A and 3.2.B limits by 2.3%; 0.6%; 1.5%; 2.1%, and 3.6%
o[5] respectively. Redundant switches LIS-3-203 B, C, and D switches were
operating within limits. There was no effect on the health or safety of the
public. Previous events: 260/8029.
7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP VALVE
CODE COURS SUBCODE SUB
17) HE POINT EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. COOF TYPE NO.
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NAME COMPLIES MANUAL THE SUBMITTED FORM 3UB SUPPLIES MANUAL THE SUBMITTED FORM 3UB SUBMITTED FORM 3UB SUPPLIES MANUAL THE SUBMITTED FORM 3UB SU
The Barton model/288 switches drifted due to air impact drilling next to
the panel on which they were mounted. This drilling was necessary to install
panel stanchion guards. Each switch was inspected, recalibrated, functionally
tested and returned to service. No recurrence control can be identified at
this time.
FACILITY STATUS (30) METALOS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (12) 1 0 0 0 NA B (31) Surveillance Testing
ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA NA NA NA NA
PENSONNEL EXPOSURES
1 7 0 0 0 0 10 Z (10) NA
NUMBED DESCRIPTION 41 NA
LOSS OF ON DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
1 7 Z 42 NA
Z O N GG N GG NA
, A ; 68 69

*Revision:

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 814 Technical Specification Involved 3.1.A and 3.2.B
Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.A(1)
Date of Occurrence 1/19/81 Time of Occurrence 0930 Unit 2
Identification and Description of Occurrence: LIS-3-203A switch 1 and LIS-3-A, B, C, and D switches 2 were found outside of
technical specification limits by 2.3%; 0.6%; 1.5%; 2.1%; and 3.6%, respectively.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence.
Unit 1 at 99% power. Unit 2 at 100% power. Unit 3 at 20% power.
Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.
None
Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
Impact air drilling next to the instrument panel caused instruments to drift.
Analysis of Occurrence:
There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, no release of activity no damage to plant or equipment, and no resulting significant chain of events.
Corrective Action:
Inspected, recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned switches to service. These switches will be replaced with analog transmitters by DCR 1398.
Fadure Data: 259/7322, 259/7341, 259/7333, 259/7824, 259/741, 260/804, 296/8028, and 260/8029

*Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Administrative Supervisor