

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-272

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 149 License No. DPR-70

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated May 26, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 149, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Larry E. Nicholson, Acting Director

Project Directorate I-2

Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 16. 1993

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages	
3/4 1-1	3/4 1-1	
3/4 3-24	3/4 3-24	
3/4 3-25	3/4 3-25	
3/4 3-27	3/4 3-27	
3/4 3-29	3/4 3-29	

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T > 200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be \geq 1.6% $\Delta k/k^{\#\#}$.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN < 1.6% $\Delta k/k^{\#\#\#}$, immediately initiate and continue boration at \geq 33 gpm of a solution containing \geq 6,560 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be \geq 1.6% $\Delta k/k^{\#\#}$:
 - a. Within one hour after deterion of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN had be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).
 - b. When in MODES 1 or 2[#], at least once per 12 hours by verifying that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.5.
 - c. When in MODE 2^{##}, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of specification 3.1.3.5.

#With $K_{eff} \ge 1.0$

##With Keff < 1.0

1.85% delta k/k during Cycle 11 of operation.

^{*}See Special Test Exception 3.10.1

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUN	CTIONAL UNIT	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUES
2.	CONTAINMENT SPRAY		
	a. Manual Initiation	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	b. Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	c. Containment PressureHigh-High	≤ 15.0 psig	≤ 16.0 psig
3.	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		
	a. Phase "A" Isolation		
	1. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	2. From Safety Injection Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	b. Phase "B" Isolation		
	1. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	2. Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	3. Containment PressureHigh-High	≤ 15.0 psig	≤ 16.0 psig
	c. Containment Ventilation Isolation		
	1. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	2. Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT

TRIP SETPOINT

ALLOWABLE VALUES

 Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity Per Table 3.3-6

4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION

a. Manual

b. Automatic Actuation Logic

c. Containment Pressure--High-High

d. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines-High Coincident with
Tavg -- Low-Low or
Steam Line Pressure -- Low

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

≤ 15.u psig

 \leq A function defined as follows: A Δp corresponding to 40% of full steam flow between 0% and 20% load and then a Δp increasing linearly to a Δp corresponding to 110% of full steam flow at full load.

T avg ≥ 543°F ≥ 600 psig steam line pressure Not Applicable

Not Applicable

≤ 16.0 psig

S A function defined as follows: A Δp corresponding to 44% of full steam flow between 0% and 20% load and then a Δp increasing linearly to a Δp corresponding to 111.5% of full steam flow at full load.

T avg ≥ 541°F ≥ 579 psig steam line pressure

TABLE 3.3-5

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

1. Manual

a.	Safety Injection (ECCS)	Not	Applicable
	Feedwater Isolation	Not	Applicable
	Reactor Trip (SI)	Not	Applicable
	Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	Not	Applicable
	Containment Ventilation Isolation	Not	Applicable
	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	Not	Applicable
	Service Water System	Not	Applicable
	Containment Fan Cooler	Not	Applicable

b,	Containment	Spray	Not	Applicable
	Containment	Isolation-Phase "B"	Not	Applicable
	Containment	Ventilation Isolation	Not	applicable

c.	Containment	Isolation-Phase "A"	Not	Applicable
	Containment	Ventilation Isolation	Not	Applicable

d.	Steam Line	Isolation	Not	Applicable
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2. Containment Pressure-High

a.	Safety Injection (ECCS)	≤27.0(1)
b.	Reactor Trip (from SI)	≤2.0
c.	Feedwater Isolation	≤10.0
d.	Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	≤17.0(2)/27.0(3)
€.	. Containment Ventilation Isolation	Not Applicable
f.	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	≤60
g.	. Service Water System	≤13.0(2)/45.0(3)
h.	Containment Fan Coolers	≤45.0

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

≤ 8.0

6. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines-High Coincident with Steam Line Pressure-Low

a.	Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 12.0^{(2)}/22.0^{(3)}$
b.	Reactor Trip (from SI)	≤ 2.0
c.	Fuedwater Isolation	≤ 10.0
d.	Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	$\leq 17.0^{(2)}/27.0^{(3)}$
e.	Containment Ventilation Isolation	Not Applicable
f.	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	≤ 60
g.	Service Water System	$\leq 14.0^{(2)}/48.0^{(3)}$

7. Containment Pressure--High-High

h. Steam Line Isolation

a.	Containment Spray	≤ 33.0
b.	Containment Isolation-Phase "B"	Not Applicable
c.	Steam Line Isolation	≤ 7.0 [*]

8. Steam Generator Water Level--High High

b. Feedwater Isolation ≤ 10.0			35 2.2
	b.	Feedwater Isolation	≤ 10.0

9. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low

a Turbing Trin

a.	Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater	
	Pumps(4)	≤ 60.0
b,	Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater	
	Pumpa / 5)	< 60 D

^{* ≤10.0} seconds until restart following the tenth refueling outage.



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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-311

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 127 License No. DPR-75

- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated May 26, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. $_{127}$, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

 This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Larry €. Nicholson, Acting Director

Project Directorate I-2

Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 16. 1993

FACILI Y OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert	Pages
3/4 1-1	3/4	1-1
3/4 3-25	3/4	3-25
3/4 3-26	3/4	3-26
3/4 3-28	3/4	3-28
3/4 3-30	3/4	3-30

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T > 200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k^{**} .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% delta k/k^{π} , immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 10 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 20,000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

A 1 1 1 1 The CHITTONIN MADOTN shall be determined to be exceeded that

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k^{**} :

- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).
- b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K $_{
 m eff}$ greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by verifying that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.5.
- c. When in MODE 2 with $K_{\mbox{eff}}$ less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.5.

^{*}See Special Test Exception 3.10.1

^{** 1.85%} delta k/k during Cycle 7 of operation.

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUES
2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY		
a. Manual Initiation	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
c. Containment PressureHigh-High	≤ 15.0 psig	≤ 16.0 psig
3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		
a. Phase "A" Isolation		
1. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
2. From Safety Injection Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Phase "B" Isolation		
1. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
2. Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
3. Containment PressureHigh-High	≤ 15.0 psig	≤ 16.0 psig
c. Containment Ventilation Isolation		
1. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
2. Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable

6. SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTI	ONAL UNIT	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUES
	3. Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity	Per Table 3.	3-6
4. ST	TEAM LINE ISOLATION		
a.	Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b.	Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicat'
c.	Containment PressureHigh-High	≤ 15.0 pmig	≤ 16.0 psly
d.	Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines High Coincident with Tavg Low-Low or Steam Line Pressure Low	<pre>≤ A function defined as follows: A \(\Delta \) corresponding to 40% of full steam flow between 0% and 20% load and then a \(\Delta \) increasing linearly to a \(\Delta \) corresponding to 110% of full steam flow at full load. T avg \(\geq 543^\text{°F} \) \(\geq 600 \) psig steam line pressure</pre>	≤ A function defined as follows: A Δp corresponding to 44% of full steam flow between 0% and 20% load and then a Δp increasing linearly to a Δp corresponding to 111.5% of full steam flow at full load. T avg ≥ 541°F ≥ 579 psig steam line pressure
5. TU	URBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION		
a.	Steam Generator Water Level High-High	≤ 67% of narrow range instrument span each steam generator	≤ 68% of narrow range instrument span each steam generator

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

TABLE 3.3-5

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

1. Manual

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) Not Applicable Feedwater Isolation Not Applicable Reactor Trip (SI) Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable Auxiliary Fredwater Pumps Not Applicable Service Water System Not Applicable Containment Fan Cooler Not Applicable b. Containment Spray Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "B" Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not applicable c. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable d. Steam Line Isolation Not Applicable

2. Containment Pressure-High

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) $\leq 27.0^{(1)}$ b. Reactor Trip (from SI) ≤ 2.0 c. Feedwater Isolation ≤ 10.0 d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" $\leq 17.0^{(2)}/27.0^{(3)}$ e. Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps ≤ 60 g. Service Water System $\leq 13.0^{(2)}/45.0^{(3)}$ h. Containment Fan Coolers ≤ 45.0

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

6.	Steam	F.	low in	Two	Steam	Lines-High
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Coincident	with	Steam	Line	Pressure-Low

a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 12.0^{(2)}/22.0^{(3)}$
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d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"
$$\leq 17.0^{(2)}/27.0^{(3)}$$

g. Service Water System
$$\leq 14.0^{(2)}/48.0^{(3)}$$

7. Containment Pressure--High-High

8. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High

9. Steam Generator Water Level -- Low-Low

Pumps (4)

a.	Motor-Driven	Auxiliary	Feedwater	≤ 60.0

^{* ≤10.0} seconds until restart following the sixth refueling outage.