U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (7.77) Attachment 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 4400-82-L-0133 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: 10) 0 0 0 0 0 -03 0 0 TM (2)0 LICENSEE CODE CON'T 0 3 2 0 7 0 7 0 8 101 REPORT 0 5 0 0 (8)0 1 (6) SOURCE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) 1982, the Fuel Handling Building exhaust fans AH-E-10 At 1216 hours on July 8, 0 2 The Control Room Operators immediately switched over to exhaust fans C/D tripped. 03 However, after fans 10A/B reached operating speeds the flowrate AH-E-10A/B. 0 4 remained low. This event is reportable per Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b) due to inadvertent 0 5 entry into the action statement of Tech Spec 3.9.12. This LER is similar to 80-34 0 6 This event has no effect on the health and safety of the public and 82-09. 0 7 0 8 CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMP VALVE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE CODE Z (15 Z (16) A (12) C (13) X X X A (11 18 REVISION OCCURRENCE REPORT SEQUENTIAL CODE NO REPORT NO TYPE EVENT YEAR LER RO 0 01214 0 3 T. 8 12 REPORT NUMBER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED METHOD ACTION (22) HOURS FORMSUB SUPPLIER N 24 Z (21 01010 0 19 91 9 (26) Z (25 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The 10C/D fan trip was the result of a technician inadvertently grounding a lead 1 0 during performance of a calibration procedure. The low flow condition with fans 1 1 10A/B was due to an open exhaust damper on fan 10D. The exhaust fans 10C/D were 1 2 reset and restarted, returning normal flow at 1315 hours on July 8, 1982. The 1 3 damper for fan 10D was returned to auto mode. 4 80 9 METHOD OF FACILITY (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) OTHER STATUS % POWER (28) 0 0 (29) (31) mode observat 5 Recovery Operator 80 10 CONTENT ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A 6 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) 37 Z 38 NUMBER 0 0 0 N/A 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 N/A (40) 12 11 STATE OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) YPE DESCRIPTION N/A Z (42) 10 8208180060 820809 PDR ADOCK 05000320 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) IN 44 11111 PDR N 60 68 10 80. PHONE (717) 948-8461 Steven D. Chaplin NAME OF PREPARER.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NARRATIVE REPORT LER 82-024/03L-0 EVENT DATE - July 8, 1982

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1216 hours on July 8, 1982, the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) exhaust flowrate dropped below the Technical Specification (Tech Spec) minimum required exhaust flowrate of 36,000 cfm. The Control Room Operators immediately switched over to the other FHB exhaust fans (AH-E-10A/B), however, these fans could not supply the minimum required exhaust flowrate of 36,000 cfm.

This placed the unit in the action statement of Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.12.

The FHB exhaust flowrate was returned to the Tech Spec operating band using exhaust fans AH-E-10C/D at 1315 hours on July 8, 1982. This event is considered reportable under Tech Spec 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the requirements of the action statement of Tech Spec 3.9.12.

This LER is similar in nature (inoperable ventilation system due to personnel error) to LER 80-34 and 82-09.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The fan trip, combined with the inability of the backup fans AH-E-10A/B to supply the required flow, rendered the system inoperable.

The event was initiated by the inadvertent grounding of an electrical lead in the flow switch assembly of exhaust fan AH-E-10C. The grounding occurred during the performance of Procedure IC-11, 'Flow Switch Calibration' when, while restoring a lead to its terminal, it made contact with another terminal resulting in tripping exhaust fans AH-E-10C/D.

The cause of the low flowrate during operation of exhaust fans AH-E-10A/B was determined to be an open exhaust damper (D5670) on the exhaust fan 10C. The open damper allowed a recirculation path through the ductwork between 10A/B and C, effectively reducing the net flowrate out of the system. The damper should have been closed automatically by its solenoid operator when exhaust fans AH-E-10C and D tripped. However, on August 1, 1982, during performance of preventive maintenance on ventilation system dampers, it was discovered that solenoid controller for damper D5670 was in the manual open position. It should have been in the auto position.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate action was to switch FHB exhaust ventilation over to the other set of exhaust fans, AH-E-10A/B. This action was not successful due to the fact that while running, these fans did not supply the required minimum exhaust flowrate. Upon determining the cause of exhaust fans AH-E-10C/D tripping, the fans were reset, restarted, and the flowrate was returned to normal at 1315 hours on July 8, 1982. Additionally, the solenoid controller for damper D5670 was returned to the auto mode on August 1, 1982. Investigation to the circumstances in which damper control was placed in manual position is still under investigation.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A

1