## Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
P.O. BOX 128

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H. B. RAY

August 6, 1982



U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361

30-day Report

Licensee Event Report No. 82-048

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

This submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 6.9.1.13b of Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-10. It describes a reportable condition involving Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.5.1 associated with the Reactor Coolant Leakage Detection System. A completed copy of LER 82-048 is enclosed.

While in Mode 4, at 1830 hours on July 7, 1982, the monthly safety injection tank operability test was in progress. Because of an error in the governing procedure (SO23-3-3.8), Containment Airborne Monitor 2RT-7804-1 was rendered inoperable. The cause was misidentification of a fuse to be pulled during the test. The wrong fuse was pulled and replaced deenergizing valve 2HV-7801 isolating the monitor and tripping the sample pump. The fuse was replaced, but the sample pump motor was not restarted, nor was the monitor reset. The monitor remained inoperable.

Additional tests required by procedures \$023-3-3.26 and \$023-3-3.21 resulted in identification of this condition on July 8, 1982 at 0530 hours. The alarm was reset, the motor started, and the monitor returned to service.

During the period of inoperability of 2RT-7804-1 however, redundant monitor 2RT-7807-2 was out of service for calibration. As a result, the Action Statement of Section 3.4.5.1 was implemented until 2R-7804-1 was returned to operation.

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The fuse numbering has been corrected by a change to Surveillance Test Procedure S023-3-3.8. The inoperability of the monitor 2RT-7804-1 was not annunciated in the Control Room. An engineering study is underway to establish the advisability of adding this annunciation on loss of flow.

There was no irradiated fuel in the core and no containment

purging occurred during this event, hence public health and safety were not affected.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Ablay

Enclosure: LER 82-048

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information & Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations