

General Offices Selden Street, Berlin Connecticut

PO.BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 (203)665-5000 December 13, 1993 MP-93-982

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-21 Docket No. 50-245 Licensee Event Report 93-019-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 93 - 019 - 00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

FOR: Donald B. Miller, Jr. Septer Vice President - Millstone Station

BY: Fred R. Dacimo Director – Millstone Unit 3

DBM/NJ:dlr

Attachment: LER 93-019-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator

P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 J. W. Andersen, NRC Acting Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1

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requirements of Technical Specification (Tech. Spec.) 4.7.B.3.c were not being met due to inadequate surveillance testing. Specifically, Tech. Spec. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.B.3.c states that "when one circuit of the standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable, the other circuit shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter." The applicable surveillance procedure used to fulfill these requirements was determined to be insufficient to definitively verify the operability of all active components in the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system at the specified frequency required by this Tech. Spec.

Additional surveillances have and will be performed to verify SBGT train operability. No safety consequences resulted from this event.

NRC F (5-92	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST. 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20565-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (\$150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503											
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TEXT (If mic e space is required, uss additional popies of NRC Form 366A) (17)			tem scarinne i cone, tak					1 I				
J	Description of Event												
	On November 11, 1993 at 1345 hours with the plant operating at 100% power, it was determined that the requirements of Technical Specification (Tech. Spec.) 4.7.8.3.c were not being met due to inadequate surveillance testing. Specifically, Tech. Spec. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.3.c states that "when one circuit of the standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable, the other circuit shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter." The applicable surveillance procedure used to fulfill these requirements was determined to be insufficient to definitively verify the operability of all active components in the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system at the specified frequency required by this Tech. Spec.												
Ш,	Cause of Event												
	A failure to adequately translate a Tech. Spec. surveillance requirement for demonstration of train operability into specific component level operability requirements, was determined to be the cause of this event.												
Di.	Analysis of Event												
	The surveillance procedure performed for functionally testing one train when the other train of the Standby Gas Treatment system becomes inoperable, verifies that the Standby Gas Treatment Fan (HVE-5A(B)) initiates and establishes a nominal train flowrate of \sim 500 scfm. However, use of the nominal flowrate was determined to be inadequate to verify train operability. The surveillance procedure requires establishment of a:												
	 System Design Flowrate of ~ 1100 scfm for restorative surveillances which would be perform filter, damper, heater or logic maintenance has been completed or 												
	 Nominal Train Flowrate of ~500 scfr 4.7.B.3.c. 	erabili	bility to comply with Tech. Spec.										
	Verification of the operability of another active component in the train, the 5 kW heater, which is energized upon receiving a SBGT start signal, was not performed as part of the surveillance procedure. The design function of the 5 kW electric heater is to warm the entering airstream to lower its relative humidity to less than 70%. The 5 kW electric heater, which auto-starts in conjunction with a fan auto-start is not tested in accordance with the frequency prescribed in this surveillance procedure i.e. initially and daily thereafter.												
	The 5 kW heater is tested functionally once per operating cycle in accordance with Tech. Spec. 4.7.B.1.b. In addition, once per month relative humidity in the charcoal bed is verified to be less than 70% as part of surveillance testing to fulfill the requirements of Tech. Spec. 4.7.B.2.d. Other surveillances are performed to ensure the SBGT fans are specifically verified to operate at 1100 \pm 10% scfm design flowrate once per year to meet the requirements of Tech. Spec. 3.7.B.2.c. A flow rate of ~ 1100 scfm is also established for other surveillances such as those which are performed once per operating cycle to measure total SBGT train differential pressure and secondary containment integrity. Secondary containment was maintained at all times, with recent testing verifying this condition.												
Due to a failure to test all active components of one train of the SBGT system for operability at flowrates when the other train is out of service, the intent of verifying operability per Tech. Spec was not met and hence this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Tech. Specs.													

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 5/31/95

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	05000245	93	- 019 -	00	03 OF 4	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

IV. Corrective Action

NRC Form 366A (5-92)

> A complete review of the SBGT surveillance procedures has been performed to ensure all Tech. Spec. Surveillance Requirements are fully met to verify SBGT train operability, with no other findings. Additionally, a consolidation of the associated surveillance procedures has been initiated. Any necessary revisions will be incorporated at that time. During the next internal Tech. Spec. – required surveillance audit increased attention will also be focused on the root cause of this LER.

V. Additional Information

NRC Form 366A (5-82)

A Tech. Spec. Change Request is also being processed which will remove the requirement to verify operability of one of the SBGT trains before and after the other train is removed from service. This is fully consistent with the NRC position on alternate train testing as outlined in an NRC memorandum from C. Grimes to NRR Project Directors, "Operability Requirements During Testing and Requirements For Alternate Train Testing", dated April 10, 1992.

