APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV

Inspection Report: 50-482/93-30

Operating Licenses: DPR-42

Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

P.O. Box 411

Burlington, Kansas 66839

Facility Name: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

Inspection At: Burlington, Kansas

Inspection Conducted: November 1-5, 1993

Inspector: T. W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist

Facilities Inspection Program Section

Approved:

Blaine Murray, Chief, Facilities Inspection

Programs Section

Date

Inspection Summary

Areas Inspected: Special inspection of the licensee's access authorization program as it relates to the granting of unescorted access to the plant site.

Results:

- The Human Resources staff was very professional, and the access authorization program received good management support. However, there was no practice or procedure in place to evaluate the activities of individuals not working at a licensed facility for more than 30 days. The licensee corrected this concern prior to the end of the inspection (Section 1.1).
- Licensee and contractor background investigation files were generally complete and thorough (Section 1.2).
- A very good psychological evaluation program had been established (Section 1.3).
- All applicable supervisors and managers had been trained and retrained in behavioral observation (Section 1.4).

- A good program was maintained to grandfather, reinstate, and transfer access authorizations. A full background investigation was generally completed within 180 days (Section 1.5).
- A very good program for denying or revoking unescorted access had been established (Section 1.6).
- A very good program was in place to protect personal information from unauthorized disclosure (Section 1.7)
- An adequate access authorization audit program was in place (Section 1.8).
- A very good records retention system with supporting procedures was in place (Section 1.9).

Summary of Inspection Findings:

Inspection Followup Item 298/9325-02 was reviewed and closed (Section 3).

Attachment:

Attachment - Persons contacted and exit meeting.

DETAILS

1 ACCESS AUTHORIZATION (TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/116)

On April 25, 1991, the Commission published 10 CFR 73.56 which required licensees to design and implement access authorization programs by April 27, 1992. The primary objective of the access authorization requirements is to ensure that all individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public, including having a potential to commit radiological sabotage. This inspection included a review of the licensee's Access Authorization Program.

1.1 Access Authorization Program Administration and Organization

The licensee's Access Authorization Program was implemented from an office located at the plant site. Responsibility for the program was assigned to the Corporate Human Resources Department. The Manager Human Resources, Vice President Plant Operations, or their designee was responsible for making a final determination as to whether unescorted access would be granted.

The inspector interviewed program administrators and site representatives and determined that they were very professional and dedicated to performing their duties in a responsible manner. The inspector reviewed the corporate access authorization procedures and plant directives. The inspector noted that the procedure relating to the Behavioral Program did not require that licensee employees who were absent from the plant or behavioral observation for more than 30 days to account for their activities when outside the behavioral observation program. The licensee's procedure did reference contractor obligations. The licensee changed the procedure to address appropriate program requirements prior to the end of the inspection. Overall, the licensee's procedures were very effective.

The inspector conducted interviews with corporate and plant staff and management and determined there was good support for the program.

Conclusion

The inspector determined that the Human Resources staff was dedicated and very professional. In addition, there was good management support for the program. The concern about the behavioral observation procedure was corrected prior to the end of the inspection.

1.2 Background Investigations

The inspector reviewed records and conducted interviews to determine the adequacy of the program to verify the true identity of an applicant and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service, and the character and reputation of the applicants before granting them unescorted access to protected and vital areas.

The inspector reviewed approximately 20 background investigation files. The files were licensee files and files transmitted from a self-screening contractor. The files were complete and thorough.

During a review of records, the inspector reviewed four records that contained derogatory information. The licensee had reviewed the derogatory information, gathered additional information on each case, and then granted unescorted access to only one of the four individuals.

Conclusion

Licensee and contractor background investigation files were generally complete and thorough.

1.3 Psychological Evaluations

The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for administering psychological tests and the methodology of evaluating the results of those tests. Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that the tests must be evaluated by qualified and, if applicable, licensed psychologists or psychiatrists.

The licensee had contracted with a psychologist in Wichita, Kansas, to evaluate the tests of the employees being screened for access. The psychologist had standards for use in reviewing test results. The licensee had developed a very good procedure for the psychological evaluation portion of the program. The psychological tests were given at the site, and they were always proctored by licensee staff to prevent compromise. Persons taking the tests were positively identified before being given the test. The licensee was aware of NRC Information Notices addressing access authorization concerns, and these Information Notices had been sent to the contractors.

Conclusion

The licensee's psychological evaluation program was very good. A very good procedure was developed and used by the licensee.

1.4 Behavioral Observation

The licensee s behavioral observation program was inspected to determine if the licensee had a training and retraining program in place to train supervisors and managers to have the awareness and sensitivity to detect and report changes in behavior that could adversely affect trustworthiness and reliability and to refer those persons to appropriate licensee management for evaluation and action.

The inspector reviewed licensee lesson plans and procedures. In addition, the inspectors interviewed licensee supervisory and management personnel from the first line supervisor through the manager level. All of the supervisory and management personnel had been trained in behavioral observation. It was apparent that the behavioral observation program had been implemented and that training and annual retraining were ongoing. The inspector determined that

the licensee had notified individuals that arrests involving drugs and alcohol have to be reported.

Conclusion

The licensee's behavioral observation program ensured that all applicable supervisors and managers had been trained and retrained as appropriate.

1.5 Grandfathering, Reinstatement, Transfer, and Temporary Access Authorization

Records were reviewed to determine if the licensee was correctly grandfathering, reinstating, transferring, and granting temporary access authorizations.

The licensee's grandfathering and reinstatement programs were generally adequate. A concern is discussed in Section 1.1 regarding individuals who were away from a licensee or licensee approved behavioral observation program for more than 30 days. The inspector reviewed several examples of access authorization transfers. The licensee had included a form that was used to record information. The transfer files reviewed were adequate.

The inspector reviewed the temporary access authorization files on several employees. The licensee had a good system to prevent temporary unescorted access in excess of 180 days. The files reviewed were well maintained and easy to review and audit. The licensee also ensured that a full background investigation was normally completed within that 180 days.

Conclusion

The licensee had a good program to grandfather, reinstate, and transfer access authorizations. The licensee also ensured that a full background investigation was normally completed within 180 days.

1.6 Denial or Revocation of Unescorted Access

The licensee's Human Resources representative or designee was the individual responsible for making a final determination whether unescorted access would be granted.

The inspector reviewed files in which fingerprint submittals had been returned with a criminal record. In several instances, the persons were granted access. The inspector reviewed the rationale used by the licensee in its decision in each instance. Other files were reviewed wherein persons investigated were denied access because of a criminal record. The criteria used by the licensee was consistent and equitable. The persons denied access were notified of the denial of access and of their right to review and reply to anything in the records used as a reason for the access denial. They were also provided with information on the appeal process that was available to them. The inspector reviewed one file that was in the appeal process.

Conclusion

The licensee had a very good program for denying or revoking unescorted access. The criteria used by the licensee appeared to be consistent and equitable. The licensee had an appeal process, and personnel denied access were advised of their right to appeal that denial.

1.7 Protection of Personal Information

The inspector interviewed licensee staff and management in order to ascertain that personal inform: ion was protected from disclosure to anyone without a need to know and authority to have access to that information. The background information files were kept in locked containers in a vault with access limited to only those staff members with a need for access. Procedures were in place to ensure that information was only released to those staff members with a need for access.

Conclusion

The licensee had a very good program to protect personal information from unauthorized disclosure. Procedures were in place to ensure that information was only released to those staff members with a need for access.

1.8 Audits

The inspector reviewed the licensee's audit program to determine if audits of sufficient depth and scope had been conducted. The licensee had copies of several audits of contractor programs in their records. Some of the audits were performed by other licensees and, according to the regulations, can be accepted by the licensee to satisfy their own audit requirements. In addition, the licensee had copies of audits they had conducted of contractor programs. The licensee retained responsibility for the effectiveness of the contractors' programs and for the implementation of appropriate corrective actions by the contractors.

Conclusion

The inspector determined that the licensee had a good audit program.

1.9 Record Retention

The inspector reviewed the licensee's record retention activities in order to ensure that records on access authorization were retained for the appropriate time.

The inspector determined that the licensee's procedure for records retention correctly identified the required records, and times for the records were retained. Since the advent of the rule, the licensee had maintained the proper records. The licensee maintains the records on file at the plant site.

Conclusion

The licensee had organized a good records retention system and supporting procedures to ensure that the specified records are retained for the correct period of time.

2 FOLLOWUP (92701)

(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 298/9325-02: Access Author zation

The issue involved a behavioral observation procedure that did not take into account continuous behavioral observation for employees who are absent from the plant environs and the absence of behavioral observation during that absence. The inspector determined that the problem with the procedure only affected the licensee staff and not contractor staff. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee had changed the procedure to cover all personnel with unescorted access.