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EF2 - 56,767

Mr. L. L. Kintner
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Division of Licensing
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Kintner:

Reference: Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2
NRC Docket No. 50-341

Subject: Fermi 2 Safety Evaluation Report Corrections

We have reviewed the Fermi 2 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Supplement No. 1 of the SER and have the following comments:

1. Page 1-6, Section 1.2, Line 6 of the top paragraph - remove the phrase "except the switchyard". The switchyard contains no safety grade equipment.

2. Page 1-13, Figure 1-3 - The control rod drive system flow originates from the condensate polishing demineralizer system during steady-state operation, not the condensate storage tank shown in Figure 1-3.

3. Page 3-4, Section 3.3.2 - The next-to-last sentence in the first paragraph says that the residual heat removal building is protected by concrete walls that are designed for tornado winds and depressurization without venting. The RHR building was generally considered to be vented. Therefore, the end walls were not designed for the 3 psi depressurization. However, the east and west walls were conservatively designed for the full 3 psi depressurization.

4. Page 3-17, Section 3.8.1 - The last paragraph on the page refers to ASME, Section IV. It should refer to ASME, Section III.

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5. Page 3-18, Section 3.8.1 - With regard to the second paragraph on the page, refer to B. J. Youngblood's letter of May 26, 1982 for the current status.

6. Page 3-27, Section 3.9.3 - the third paragraph on the page refers to a fatigue evaluation of the SRV piping. Only the portion of the SRV piping in the wetwell will have a fatigue evaluation. This has been clarified at the bottom of page 3-5 of Supplement No. 1, Section 3.9.3.

7. Supplement No. 1, Page 3-8, Section 3.10 - The following comments, apply to the last paragraph of the section.

   a) The Fermi-2 plant unique analysis will be completed using the original design response spectra. An assessment of the torus using the new site-specific response spectra will be documented in a separate assessment report. The submittal date for the assessment report will be consistent with the submittal date for the remainder of the seismic reassessment results. As discussed in B. J.Youngblood's May 26, 1982 letter, this date is March 15, 1983.

   b) The seismic reassessment of the torus and attached piping using the new site-specific response spectra will be combined only with the Safety Relief Valve discharge load.

   c) The analysis of the torus attached piping, using final acceptance criteria as much as possible, will be submitted to the staff by March 15, 1983. This date is confirmed in B. J. Youngblood's March 26, 1982 letter. All necessary modifications will be completed before the plant returns to power after the first refueling.

8. Page 4-23, Section 4.6.2 - The fourth paragraph refers to the instrument volume and mentions two rod block instruments for each instrument volume. Each instrument volume will have only one rod block level instrument.

9. Page 5-18, Section 5.2.5 - With regard to the second paragraph, item (4), we do not directly monitor drywell cooler condensate flow. We do monitor drywell sump activity and are adding on an analog drywell sump level indicating recorder (Category 1).

10. Page 6-11, Section 6.2.4 - The second paragraph in the discussion on containment purge should mention that the 1½" diameter piping system is used for containment atmosphere pressure control. The 1½" system allows for nitrogen makeup or venting through separate drywell and torus flow paths.

11. Page 6-13, Section 6.2.6 - In the first paragraph, the last sentence should be clarified with the information that the recombiner design is for combination of 6 SCFM hydrogen with 3 SCFM oxygen. Recombiner inlet flow rate is based on 60 SCFM inlet gas containing 5% oxygen or 150 SCFM inlet gas containing 2% hydrogen for the inerted and non-inerted containment atmospheres, respectively.

12. Page 6-26, Section 6.4.2 - Although the design basis event for a toxic gas release on the Fermi 2 site is an instantaneous failure of a 50 ton chlorine tank, the maximum amount of chlorine on the Fermi 2 site is 12 tons located 1,000 feet from the control room. Fermi 2 meets the requirements of a Type I control room specified by Regulatory Guide 1.95, Rev. 1.

13. Page 6-27, Section 6.5.2.1 - In the first paragraph, a clarification is needed. The standby gas treatment system cooling fan starts at a charcoal temperature of 255°F, to ensure that the charcoal temperature does not exceed 310°F.

14. Page 8-9, Section 8.3.2 - The third paragraph discusses manual throwover switches. The manual throwover feature has been removed because it has been found that the load does not have to be removed for equalization.

15. Page 9-14, Section 9.3.1 - In the fourth paragraph, only the intertie valves for the non-interruptible control air close automatically on low air pressure in the control air system. The interruptible control air intertie valve does not close automatically on low air pressure.

16. Page 10-1, Section 10.2 - In the second paragraph, the first sentence should be corrected to state that the turbine-generator is manufactured by GEC Turbine-Generators Limited not the General Electric Company.

17. Page 10-2, Section 10.2.1 - In the third paragraph, the third item should say vacuum decreases to less than 25.5" Hg. The number 4.5" Hg is absolute pressure, not vacuum.

18. Page 10-4, Section 10.3.1 - In the first paragraph, the third sentence states that the station air system supplies air to the main steam isolation valves. The sentence should state that the interruptible control air system supplies air to the valves.

9. Page 10-5, Section 10.4.2 - In the first paragraph, the SER states that a bypass capacity of 25% together with a 40% reactor automatic step load capability is sufficient to withstand a 65% generator load loss without tripping the turbine or causing control rod movement. Detroit Edison does not consider the 40% reactor step load capability to be linearly additive to the 25% bypass capacity because of the different response times of these systems. Detroit Edison believes it sufficient and more accurate to say simply that Fermi 2 has a 25% bypass capacity.

20. Appendix E, Page E-6, Section III.A - The final list of fire rated barriers has been revised in the response to NRC question 021.32, filed in FSAR Amendment 38, July 1981. Apparently the SER description was based on the preliminary list presented in the meeting with the NRC in May.

21. Appendix E, Page E-8, Section III.B - In the third paragraph, a fixed piping open head manual spray system for the cable spreading room is mentioned. The sentence should be revised to specify a closed head manual spray system. An open head system has the potential for significant flooding.

22. Appendix E, Page E-8, Section III.C - The first paragraph mentions the use of ionization smoke detectors throughout the drywell. Since the drywell is inerted, there are no plans to install smoke detectors in the drywell.

Should you have any further questions, please contact Larry E. Schuerman, (313) 649-7562.

Sincerely,

Harry Tauber

cc: B. Little