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12015 East 46th Avenue, Suite 440; Denver, CO

STATE

October 3, 1980
Fort St. Vrain
Unit No. 1
P-80350

50-26794

Mr. Karl V. Seyfrit, Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012

Subject: Environmental Qualification
of Class 1E Equipment

Reference: IE Bulletin 79-01B
NRC August 29, 1980 Order
(G-80144)

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

The following is Public Service Company of Colorado's (PSC) response to the NRC's August 29, 1980 order concerning Environmental Qualification of electrical equipment for the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station as originally requested in I&E Bulletin 79-01B:

Summary of Previous Submittals:

PSC has previously submitted letters in response to I&E Bulletin 79-01B on March 18, 1980 (P-80051), April 11, 1980 (P-80078) and April 18, 1980 (P-80090). The information contained in these letters is summarized below:

P-80051 - March 18, 1980

1. Discussion of steam line accidents including report entitled "Environmental Temperatures in the vicinity of the rupture point of steam lines for Fort St. Vrain Equipment Qualification," (Attachment "D" to P-80051)
2. Discussion of plant equipment numbering (Attachment "B" to P-80051) and computer programming similar to enclosure 2 (master list and generic items) IE-79-01B, (Attachment "A" to P-80051)
3. Discussion of areas not applicable to an HTGR, including radiological details of DBA #1. (Attachment C to P-80051)

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
POOR QUALITY PAGES

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P-80078 - April 11, 1980

1. Summary of items from March 18, 1980 submittal that were previously accepted by the NRC. (i.e. Attachments C and D to P-80051)
2. Updated submittals (Master List, Generic Items, Attachment "A" to P-80078) and Component Evaluation Work Sheets (enclosure #3 to P-80078)

P-80090 - April 18, 1980

1. Updated versions of Master List and Generic Items (Attachment "A" to P-80090) and Component Evaluation Work Sheets (Enclosure 3 to P-80090)
2. Finalization of Emergency Procedures Review
3. Commitment for additional testing for "clean up" of Environmental Records (Generic Items)
4. Clarification of Component Evaluation Work Sheets (Attachment B to P-80090)

No written response has been received from the NRC concerning the submittals, but per our verbal communications with Mr. Dan McDonald of I&E, it has been suggested that they are acceptable.

The above listed correspondence covered PSC's position on all areas of IE-79-01B with the exception of long term Aging.

CURRENT STATUS of PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS and SUBMITTALS:

Qualification Record System

PSC is in the middle of the turnover of all Fort St. Vrain Design Documents and Records from General Atomic. This places us in a handicapped position as far as auditing the environmental records and finalizing "clean up" work. The final documents and computer tapes will be received from GA during the month of October 1980 at which time the record review will continue. The review and update of the records should be complete by January 15, 1981.

Qualification Testing

PSC committed April 18, 1980 to the testing of minor Generic Items, (previously tested, but not fully documented) for purposes of Qualification Record "clean up."

The testing process for these items is in progress and should be complete by January 15, 1981.

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Clarification of Component Worksheets (Attachment "B" to P-80090
April 18, 1980)

Field inspections have provided additional clarification to our previous submittal and has necessitated its revision and updating.

This information is included as Attachment "E" to this letter and replaces Attachment "B" to P-80090 in its entirety.

OPEN ITEMS:

General

As we have previously indicated, many areas of concern listed in IE-79-01B do not apply to the Fort St. Vrain HTGR. The design concept, normal and accident conditions experienced are completely different from that of a light water reactor. These differences often negate - or set aside many of the requirements set forth in the DOR's "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactor's and NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment" documents obviously aimed at light water reactor facilities. It is imperative that our response to IE-79-01B be evaluated with these specific design, operating, safety and environmental differences in mind.

PSC has always had to essentially develop our own criteria utilizing the light water reactor criteria set forth by various Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents. The specific differences in concept and thus regulatory requirements have been recognized by the NRC in the past and accepted when an adequate basis was presented.

Replacement Parts

As previously discussed, the 1974 Industry Standard presented in NUREG-0588 is based on Light Water Reactor Technology. PSC believes there are "sound reasons to the contrary" for requiring replacement parts for FSV to be purchased to the requirements of this document. Purchasing of spare parts must be made in accordance with requirements consistent with criteria established during the licensing of the plant.

Aging

The only open item remaining to be addressed from IE-79-01B is the subject of Aging.

The subject of aging was discussed with Mr. Dan McDonald at the regional meeting on IE-79-01B and it was concluded that radiation aging was definitely not a concern at Fort St. Vrain. However, Thermal Aging was thought to apply.

PSC has been pursuing a dual path concerning thermal aging. That is, manufacturers have been contacted regarding thermal aging information on their equipment and we have been evaluating the necessity for aging qualification of any equipment on the basis of plant design and conditions.

At this time, PSC has concluded its engineering evaluation as outlined in IE-79-01B, and has concluded that adequate basis exists to justify taking exception to the necessity for requiring full aging qualification records on Class 1E electrical items as outlined in IE-79-01B for FSV.

The basis for the above follows and discusses plant design features, habitability, manual operations capability, on line safety systems and conclusions:

BASIS

Plant Design Features:

As discussed in the facility FSAR, two basic modes of core cooling are available at Fort St. Vrain. These are forced circulation cooling and prestressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) liner cooling. There are, in addition, various redundant means for applying each of these basic cooling modes.

A) Force Circulation Cooling

The normal cooling system for Fort St. Vrain Unit 1 with the reactor at power is shown in bold lines in Figure 1. Starting at the condenser, four condensate pumps supply water through the low-pressure heaters to the three boiler feed pumps (two driven by steam turbines and one driven by an electric motor). After leaving the boiler feed pumps and passing through the high-pressure heaters, the feedwater line divides into two headers - one serving each of the two secondary cooling loops. Feedwater then passes through the economizer, evaporator, and superheater (EES) of the steam generators, emerging as steam. The main steam headers from each loop combine into a main steam header which delivers steam to the high-pressure turbine. The steam leaving the high-pressure turbine enters the cold reheat header which subsequently divides into two 50% headers, each of which provides motive power to the two helium circulators serving each loop. After passing through the circulators, the cold reheat steam enters the reheater serving that loop and exits as hot reheat steam via a loop hot reheat header. The two hot reheat headers join and supply steam to the IP and LP stages of the turbine, finally being condensed in the condenser. There are, of course, the usual extraction and bypass lines as shown in Figure 1.

During low power or decay heat level operation of the reactor with the turbine generator out of service, the superheater discharge flow is directed to the By-Pass Flash Tank which is provided with the appropriate steam and water outlets.




Fig. 1—Overall flow diagram — secondary coolant and power conversion system

B) Backup Cooling With Forced Helium Circulation

The Fort St. Vrain plant design does not incorporate a separate system reserved solely for emergency cooling. Instead, the reactor cooling system normally in operation, as described above, has been enhanced by the addition of features required for an emergency cooling function. These features include two independent drives on a common shaft for each circulator, two separate heat transfer sections in each steam generator, two helium circulators in each loop, multiple cooling water supplies, and multiple power sources. No credible failure can prevent adequate core cooling. The controls for the operation of forced circulation emergency cooling meet the intent of IEEE-279.

Decay heat removal requires operation of only one circulator within the primary coolant system to transfer heat from the core to a steam generator. Only one heat transfer section within one steam generator must remain in operation, and an adequate supply of cooling water to the steam generator must be provided. Adequate cooling is ensured by the provision of suitable redundancy in each portion of the heat removal systems. The supply of cooling water to the steam generator may come from the feedwater, condensate or firewater systems.

Four helium circulators are installed in the primary coolant system, and all four are normally in operation. Each circulator has two independent sources of power: the steam-turbine drive which is normally used, and an auxiliary water-turbine drive. Steam is normally supplied from the steam generator through the flash tank or from one or both of the auxiliary boilers. Water for the pelton turbines may be supplied from the feedwater, condensate or firewater systems. Each primary coolant loop is equipped with a circulator auxiliary system which has sufficient redundant capacity to ensure a supply of lubricating water for the bearings at all times. Operation of one circulator with either its steam turbine drive or with its water turbine drive is adequate for afterheat removal after a scram from full load with an equilibrium fission product inventory.

The steam generator, located in each of the two primary coolant loops, contains an economizer-evaporator-superheater section and a reheater section. Either economizer-evaporator-superheater section has sufficient heat transfer surface for afterheat removal immediately after a scram from full load. Either reheater also has sufficient heat transfer surface, when flooded with water, to remove afterheat from the reactor following a scram from full load.

A continuous supply of feedwater to the steam generators is ensured by the provision of an emergency feedwater line and an emergency condensate line as backups for the main lines and by provisions of three feedwater pumps, two driven by steam turbines and one by electric motor, and by four motor-driven condensate pumps. In addition, the fire water pumps, can deliver water directly to the feedwater system. The fire water pumps, one driven by a gasoline engine and the other by an electric motor, draw their supply of water from on-site storage ponds which have a capacity in excess of 22×10^6 gallons.

A summary of the redundant means for providing forced circulation cooling of the core is given in Table 1. As can be seen, either of the two loops can be used to cool the core and either of two circulators can be used in each loop. In addition, there are five sources of cooling water to the EES section of each steam generator and five sources of motive power to either of the circulators. While not all of the cooling modes have equal heat removal capacity, all of the modes are capable of safely cooling the core as discussed in the FSAR, Section 14.1.

C) Cooling With Complete Loss of Forced Circulation (LOFC)

In addition to the highly redundant cooling modes described in the preceding section, and in the highly unlikely event of their complete failure, the core may also be cooled solely by operation of one of the two loops of the PCRV liner cooling system as described in the FSAR, Section 9.7. Although this mode of cooling would result in extensive fuel damage, the depressurization of the PCRV to an internal pressure of one atmosphere, which is performed as part of this mode of cooling, prevents the release of fission products even with subsequent failure of PCRV liner integrity. The analysis of this mode of cooling is extensively described in Appendix D to the FSAR. The analysis presented in Appendix D also concludes that safe cooldown can be obtained using this mode of cooling even if there is a total loss of all forms of cooling for up to 30 hours following initiation of the incident.

It is also to be noted that if any of the forced circulation cooling modes are available for core cooling after shutdown, the PCRV can sustain a complete and permanent loss of liner cooling without producing a hazard to the public (FSAR, Section 5.9.2).

In either of the above cases, core and core support physical integrity has not been jeopardized. Partial information from Appendix D of the FSAR is included here, as Attachment F, for ease of reference.

Table 1

SUMMARY OF FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING REDUNDANCIES

<u>Number of Cooling Loops</u>	2	
<u>Number of Cooling Sections per Loop</u>	2 (EES* & Reheater)	
<u>Sources of Water to EES*</u>	<u>(Each Loop)</u>	<u>Location</u>
1. Normal Feedwater	(3 FW Pumps)**	TB2
2. Feedwater via Emergency Feedwater Line	(3 FW Pumps)**	TB2
3. Condensate via Emergency Condensate Line	(4 Condensate Pumps)	TB2
4. Firewater via Emergency Feedwater Line	(2 Fire Pumps)***	OPL
5. Firewater via Emergency Condensate	(2 Fire Pumps)***	OPL
<u>Sources of Water to Reheater</u>	<u>(Each Loop)</u>	<u>Location</u>
1. Condensate via Emergency Condensate Line	(4 Condensate Pumps)	TB2
2. Firewater via Emergency Condensate Line	(2 Fire Pumps)***	OPL
<u>Number of Circulators Per Loop</u>	2	
<u>Sources of Motive Power to Circulators</u>	<u>(Each Circulator)</u>	<u>Location</u>
1. Cold Reheat Steam		
2. Auxiliary Boiler Steam	(2 Auxiliary Boilers)	RX2 & TB2
3. Feedwater via Emergency Feedwater Line	(3 FW Pumps)**	TB2
4. Condensate via Emergency Condensate Line	(4 Condensate Pumps)	TB2
5. Firewater via Emergency Feedwater Line	(2 Fire Pumps)***	OPL
6. Firewater via Emergency Condensate Line	(2 Fire Pumps)***	OPL

*Economizer-Evaporator-Superheater

**2 Steam Driven, 1 Electric Motor-Driven

***1 Diesel Engine Driven, 1 Electric Motor-Driven

OPL = Outside of Plant

TB2 = Turbine Building HELB Environment

RX2 = Reactor Building HELB Environment

Habitability:

The Fort St. Vrain station does not utilize a conventional form of Reactor containment.

Since conventional containment and Light Water Reactor Safety Systems do not exist at Fort St. Vrain, many of the environmental areas of concern outlined in IE-79-01B do not apply. These areas were discussed in our March 18, 1980 letter P-80051.

For convenience of reference, similar discussions will be repeated here.

"Areas not Applicable to an HTGR"

Pressure:

The FSV HTGR does not have a containment building, therefore, there is no storage of blowdown steam or primary coolant and thus no ambient pressure buildup.

The reactor and turbine buildings are both vented. Therefore, pressure transients resulting from a high energy line break will be very localized and short-term in nature.

Further details about steamline rupture analysis at FSV may be found in Attachment D to P-77137, dated June 15, 1977.

Relative Humidity:

For the same reasons as discussed above, under the pressure heading, Relative Humidity is not a problem at FSV after a high energy line break.

Chemical Spray:

No chemical sprays are utilized at FSV for cooling.

Radiation:

There are no radiological concerns directly associated with a high energy line break at FSV. That is, the process fluid (steam or feedwater) is not contaminated.

To postulate a radiological incident DBA #1 "Permanent Loss of Forced Circulation" and DBA #2 "Rapid Depressurization/Blowdown" were considered. DBA #1 provides the worst case radiological conditions, but the overall radiological concerns are minimal.

Complete details of this accident may be found in Section 2.1.6.b of P-79312 (Swart to Varga) dated December 1979, enclosed as Attachment C.

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In summary, the peak doses in the Reactor Building following DBA #1 are as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Peak Gamma Dose Rate</u>	<u>Time of Peak</u>	<u>180 Day Accumulated Dose (REM)</u>
Reactor Building	1.4 R/hr	24 hours	400

In conclusion, the reactor building will be accessible for short-term operations following such an accident. The accumulated doses indicated above would have no operational effect on the Reactor Building equipment.

Submergence

The nuclear reactor at Fort St. Vrain is cooled by gas and not water. Normal shutdown of the reactor is accomplished by control rod insertion. Emergency shutdown of the reactor is accomplished by pressurizing shutdown hoppers that drop boron carbide balls into the reactor. Water is not used for shutdown or emergency core spray of the reactor in an HTGR. Venting of the reactor cooling quench water and/or primary coolant water into the containment sump is not applicable for Fort St. Vrain."

Habitability Conclusions

Environmental conditions will not exist that will prohibit access to the Reactor Building or other areas of the plant for extended periods of time following a high energy line break (HELB) or the worst case radiological accident, i.e., DBA #1.

MANUAL OPERATION CAPABILITY AND ACM:

A) Forced Circulation Cooling

Twenty-six (26) different equipment combinations for forced circulation cooling are described in the procedures for safe shutdown cooling with highly degraded conditions.

It is not practical to go through each of these modes in great detail.

It is important to note that multiple equipment items, located in different areas of the plant are available for forced circulation cooling. The sources are located as indicated:

TB2 = Turbine Building HELB Environment
RX2 = Reactor Building HELB Environment
OPL = Outside of Plant

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<u>Steam Generator EES or Reheater</u>	<u>Motive Power to Circulators</u>	<u>Bearing Water to Circulators</u>
TB2 OPL	TB2 OPL	TB2 RX2

More detailed information is available from Table 1.

It is highly unlikely that a HELB in the Reactor Building could interrupt forced circulation cooling. Multiple flow paths that are physically separated, by design, insure that vital services would not be disrupted. To further insure continued operation, valves with "fail open" or "fail as is" (normally open during plant operation) failure modes have been incorporated in critical systems.

A detailed evaluation of the consequences of pipe failures outside of the reactor building was previously requested by the NRC by a letter dated December 18, 1972.

This evaluation was made and was included in the FSAR as Amendment 26. The evaluation concluded that no single pipe failure outside the reactor building is likely to disable the vital services (electrical cable routing, instrument air, and hydraulic power) needed for forced circulation cooling.

It is concluded that a HELB incident in either the turbine or reactor building would not prohibit forced circulation cooling.

B) PCRV Liner Cooling

Three options for PCRV Liner Cooling are described in the procedures for safe shutdown cooling with highly degraded conditions

Option A - Service water cooling, using PCRV cooling water pump

Option B - Circulating water using PCRV cooling water pump

Option C - Firewater cooling direct to PCRV cooling tubes

Options B or C can be implemented with electrical equipment that is not in the accident environment. See Table 2 for details:

TABLE 2
Summary of PCRV Liner Cooling Options

Electrically Operated ooling Equipment Required	Option A B C	Location Relative to Accident Environment (HELB)	ACM Backup Power
PCRV Cooling Water Pumps	P-4601 or P-4601S	X X	Not in Accident Environment
	P-4602 or P-4602S	X X	Not in Accident Environment
Circulating Water Makeup Pumps	P-4101 or P-4102 or P-4103 or P-4104		Not in Accident Environment
		X	No
Service Water Pumps	P-4201 or P-4202		Not in Accident Environment
	P-4202S	X	Yes
Service Water Cooling Tower Fans	C-4201X or C-4202X	X	Not in Accident Environment
			Yes
Firewater Pumps	P-4501 P-4501S*	X	Not in Accident Environment
Service Water Return Pumps		D	In Accident Environment
Circulating Water Makeup Pumps		X X X	Not in Accident Environment
Domestic Water Makeup		D	In Accident Environment
			No

X = Essential

D = Desirable

* = Diesel Driven

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All other operations required for PCRV liner cooling can be performed manually.

It is concluded that a HELB incident in the reactor or turbine buildings will not prohibit PCRV liner cooling.

SAFETY SYSTEMS ARE OPERATING SYSTEMS:

The Fort St. Vrain plant design does not include separate systems reserved solely for emergency cooling. Instead, the normal reactor cooling system has been enhanced by the addition of features required for the emergency cooling function. These features include two independent drives on a common shaft for each circulator, two separate heat transfer sections in each steam generator, two helium circulators in each loop, multiple cooling water supplies and multiple power sources.

The advantage of these provisions for emergency cooling over the usual "emergency core cooling system" lies in the fact that all parts of the system are continually, or frequently, operated in the course of normal plant operations. This feature eliminates the question associated with seldom or never used systems as to their ability to adequately perform on demand when compared to a system or piece of equipment that operates on a frequent basis. Maintenance is performed as required to insure continued reliable operation.

The above feature applies to both equipment utilized for reactor core forced circulation cooling and PCRV liner cooling.

Conclusions:

The Fort St. Vrain Station does not have a conventional containment building or the types of safety systems utilized in Light Water Reactors. Thus, long term Light Water Reactor environmental conditions are not possible and the majority of the environmental concerns of IE-79-01B do not apply.

Since the FSV HELB is short term in nature and radiological concerns are minimal, access to any location within the station will be possible shortly following any accident situation.

This access coupled with the time available to restore Forced Circulation Cooling or PCRV Liner Cooling provides very desirable flexibility in terms of manual overrides and maintenance (details are presented in the following paragraphs):

Redundant Forced Circulation Cooling equipment is physically located in different areas of the plant to preclude failures from a single accident. Further redundancy (flow paths and sources) exists within each redundant loop. This physical separation alone will insure continued operation of critical systems following an accident.

Additional assurance has been provided by valves that have manual overrides and/or "designed failure modes" to insure that they will continue to function following an accident.

In the extremely unlikely event that the designed safety features should fail, time is available to work on damaged equipment to make it functional following an accident.

In the unlikely event that Forced Circulation Cooling is not restored, PCRV Liner Cooling will protect the safety and health of the public.

The PCRV Liner Cooling System, like the Forced Circulation Cooling has redundancy and physical separation design features that preclude failure from a single accident.

As concluded in Amendment 26 of the FSAR "no single pipe failure outside of the reactor building could produce conditions wherein a single active failure could disable the PCRV Liner Cooling System so as to prevent safe reactor shutdown."

In the unlikely event that the normal PCRV Liner Cooling should fail during an accident, an alternate cooling system is available with a power source cabling and controls that are physically separate from the normal emergency equipment. This equipment is located outside* of the HELB environment.

*Cables for two depressurization system valves are in the Reactor Building HELB environment. Manual operators outside of the HELB environment have subsequently been added.

Because of the above reasons, the Fort St. Vrain Station has adequate means of protecting the safety and health of the public, should "aged" equipment fail during an HELB.

In conclusion, the ability of the thermally "aged" electrical equipment to survive a HELB accident is not a credible concern at Fort St. Vrain and no aging qualifications are deemed to be necessary.

Summary of PSC Response to IE-79-01B:

To insure that sufficient information has been submitted to allow for preparation of an SER, the topics itemized in the NRC Regional Meetings will be covered here.

A. Licensees Equipment Qualification Procedure and Quality Assurance

The validity of the Fort St. Vrain safety related lists and drawings has been reviewed by both PSC and General Atomic Company several times in the past 4 years. These reviews established the basis for the Class I components included on the lists, the categorization of the components based upon safety function and location and the existence, nature and content of seismic and environmental qualification documentation. These reviews were conducted on tagged components as well as subtier (untagged) components by both, GAC Engineering and QA personnel and PSC Engineering and QA personnel.

Reviews included seismic qualification of Class I components, environmental qualification of Class I/Safe Shutdown components subject to exposure during a postulated high energy line break and environmental qualification of Class I/Safe Shutdown components located in the 3-room control complex (control room, auxiliary electric room, 480V room) subject to exposure to a postulated loss of HVAC. These reviews have been documented by numerous Field Change Notices, Change Notices, PSC & GAC correspondence Inspection Reports, Corrective Action Requests, QA Deviation Reports and the Seismic and Environmental Punch List and are available for review and inspection at the plant site. These activities have been reviewed with various NRC officials in the past, both at the Bethesda, Maryland offices and at the site and have been found to be acceptable.

B. Identification of Safety Related Systems and Components

This information was submitted by PSC's March 18, 1980 letter P-80051.

See Page 2 of P-80051 under the heading "Partial Submittal" and Attachments A and B.

C. Identification of Service Conditions for Each Environmental Zone

This information was submitted by PSC's March 18, 1980 letter P-80051.

See Page 1 of P-80051 under the heading "General" and Attachment D.

D. Qualification Methods Utilized by Licensee

The qualification methods utilized were Qualification by Test, and Qualification by Similarity to Tested Articles. These details are present in the Environmental Qualification Records.

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E. Conditions for Which Equipment is Qualified

The latest revision of this information was supplied by PSC's April 18, 1980 letter P-80090.

See Enclosure 3 of P-80090.

F. Comparison with DOR Guideline or NUR-0588

Discussions of the non-applicability of the above were included in the March 18, 1980 letter P-80051 and in this letter.

G. Conclusions

The equipment identified in IE-79-01B is qualified with criteria consistent with the criteria for the Fort St. Vrain facility as established in our response to IE-79-01B.

Per our letter of September 17, 1980 (P-80321 Request for Hearing), the above completes PSC's response to IE Bulletin 79-01B.

Very truly yours,


J. K. Fuller, Vice President
Engineering and Planning

JKF/MEN:pa

Attachments

GENERAL POINTS OF
REFUGES FOR SITES

SAFETY RELATED LOCATIONS
(NOT SPOTTED IN UNIT III IF P9-016)

REF ID: 22 AUG 80
359/2, 8/9, 1/6
2651P80

	Coordinate	Ref	Time/Date	SPD	SHB	Complicated	LOC
	1	38	1	100	35	1	35
V-501-	111177	Hx2		1 SV-	2135-1	Hx2	
V-501-	111178	Hx2		1 SV-	2135-2	Hx2	
V-501-	111179	Hx2		1 SV-	2136	Hx2	
V-501-	111180	Hx2		1 SV-	2136-1	Hx2	
V-501-	111181	Hx2		1 SV-	2136-1	Hx2	
V-501-	111182	Hx2		1 SV-	2136-2	Hx2	
V-501-	111183	Hx2		1 V-	2137	Hx2	
V-501-	111184	Hx2		1 SL-	2137	Hx2	
V-501-	111185	Hx2		1 V-	2138	Hx2	
V-501-	111186	Hx2		1 SL-	2138	Hx2	
V-501-	111187	Hx2		1 SL-	2138	Hx2	
V-501-	111188	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2101	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2101-S	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2102	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2102-S	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2103-S	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2104	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2105	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2105	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2105	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2106	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2106	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2106	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2107	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2107	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2108	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2108	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2109	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2109	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2109-1	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2109-2	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2109-2	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2110	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2110	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2110	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2110-1	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2110-2	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2110-2	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2110-2	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2111	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2111	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2111	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2112	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2112	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2113	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2113	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2113	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2114	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2114	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2114	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2115	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2115	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2115	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2116	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2116	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2116	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2117	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2117	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2117	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2118	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2118	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2118	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2119	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2119	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2119	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2120	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
V-	2120	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	
ZS-	2120	Hx2		P615-	2138	Hx2	

P80350
Attachment A
Page A1

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
PLAN OF SYSTEM

Safety Valve Tag-Off (point 15)
tag point 16

Rt V277 22AUG80 Part 3
5,972,849,16
26ST P80

SPE	LOC	LIC	SRR		Complaint		LIC.		SRR	
			Current	1	Current	1	Current	1	Current	1
PV-	22130	1B2	HV-	2366-2	Hx2	H-	9231	Hx2		
KTP-	22130	1B2	PSL-	31c3	1B2	PSH-	95129	Hx2		
PT-	22130-1	1B2	PSL-	31c9	1B2	PSH-	95130	Hx2		
KTP-	22130-1	1B2	PSL-	31c5	1B2	PSH-	95131	Hx2		
HV-	22131	1B2	HV-	42c25	1B2	PSH-	95132	Hx2		
HV-	22132	1B2	HV-	42c57	1B2	PSH-	95133	Hx2		
HV-	22133	1B2	PSL-	42e6	1B2	PSH-	95134	Hx2		
HV-	22134	1B2	H5V-	42e6	1B2	SH-	95648	Hx2		
HV-	22135	1B2	H-	4637-3	Hx2	SH-	95449	Hx2		
H-	22136	1B2	H-	4638-3	Hx2	SH-	95450	Hx2		
H-	22137	1B2	L-	8201	1B2	SH-	95451	Hx2		
H-	22138	1B2	L-	8201-S	1B2	SH-	95452	Hx2		
H-	22139	1B2	L-	8203	1B2	SH-	95455	Hx2		
H-	22140	1B2	P5-	8207	1B2	X-	95456-A	Hx2		
H-	22142	1B2	PS-	8208	1B2	X-	95456-B	Hx2		
H-	22143	1B2	1S-	8208	1B2	X-	95456-C	Hx2		
H-	22144	1B2	P5-	8214	1B2	X-	95456-A	Hx2		
H-	22146	1B2	1S-	8214	1B2	X-	95455-B	Hx2		
PV-	22153	1B2	1S-	8216	1B2	X-	95455-C	Hx2		
KTP-	22153	1B2	1S-	8219	1B2	X-	95456-A	Hx2		
KTP-	22153-1	1B2				X-	95456-B	Hx2		
PV-	22154	1B2				X-	95456-C	Hx2		
KTP-	22154-1	1B2	P5-	8224	1B2	X-	95457-A	Hx2		
KTP-	22147	1B2	PS-	8226	1B2	X-	95457-B	Hx2		
PSH-	22196	1B2	1S-	8236	1B2	X-	95457-C	Hx2		
HV-	22200	1B2	1S-	8247	1B2	X-	95470-A	Hx2		
HV-	22201	1B2	P5-	8249	1B2	X-	95470-B	Hx2		
HV-	22202	1B2	1S-	8245	1B2	X-	95470-C	Hx2		
HV-	22203	1B2	P5-	8246	1B2	X-	95471-A	Hx2		
HV-	22204	1B2	P5-	8247	1B2	X-	95471-B	Hx2		
HV-	22205	1B2	P5-	8248	1B2	X-	95471-C	Hx2		
HV-	22206	1B2	1S-	8249	1B2	X-	95472-A	Hx2		
HV-	22207	1B2	1S-	9101-2	1S2	X-	95473	Hx2		
HV-	22208	1B2	P-	9101-5X	1S2	X-	95474	Hx2		
HV-	22209	1B2	F-	9101-X	1S2	X-	95479-A	Hx2		
HV-	22210	1B2	P5-	9102-2	1S2	X-	95479-B	Hx2		
HV-	22211	1B2	F-	9102-X	1S2	X-	95480-A	Hx2		
HV-	22212	1B2	P5-	9103-2	1S2	X-	95480-B	Hx2		
HV-	22213	1B2	PSL-	9106-2	1S2	X-	95480-C	Hx2		
HV-	22214	1B2	PSL-	9107	1S2	X-	95479-B	Hx2		
HV-	22215	1B2	PSL-	91104	1S2	X-	95479-C	Hx2		
HV-	22216	1B2	PSL-	9105-X	1S2	X-	95480-B	Hx2		
HV-	22217	1B2	PSL-	9106	1S2	X-	95480-C	Hx2		
HV-	22218	1B2	PSL-	9107	1S2	X-	95480-B	Hx2		
HV-	22219	1B2	PSL-	9108	1S2	X-	95480-C	Hx2		
HV-	22220	1B2	PSL-	9109	1S2	X-	95480-B	Hx2		
HV-	22221	1B2	PSL-	9110	1S2	X-	95480-C	Hx2		

DATE: 10/28/01 TIME: 072119

NETT Wt 1.32

*** 00 PROCESSING COMPLETE. ***

>0x01 SRB#0,1

>3=SUBT

R#9277 22AU680

>15=

>581=ELEC

>271;1,2,4,5,6,6

>206=2

R:1,4,23,24,35,58,60

COMPONENT	PRODUCT	SCI	SCI	SRB	ELEM	ELECTRIC
SUBT=		SUPPLIER	MODEL	1.0C	SCHEM	COMP
1	4	23	24	35	58	60
2	5
3	6	ALLEN BRADLEY	700H4400	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
4	7	ALLEN BRADLEY	700H800	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
5	8	ASCO	HKG30-3C254	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
6	9	ASCO	HKG30-3C290	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
7	10	ASCO	HKG30-3C294	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
8	11	ASCO
9	12	ASCO
10	13	ASCO
11	14	ASCO

SUBT-	016	VALVE	ASCO	HB8302C256	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	017	VALVE	ASCO	B302C26U	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	018	VALVE	ASCO	HB8302C25U	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	019	VALVE	ASCO	B320A89	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	023	VALVE	BARKSDALE	12453	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	024	TRANSMITTER	COLLINS	SS409	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	071	RELAY	GENERAL ELECTRIC	CR120A04222AA	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	072	CONTROL SW	GENERAL ELECTRIC	CR2940UM200AC	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	073	MOTOR	ITT GEN CONT'L	AH91	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	093	AIR SET	KIELEY MUELLER	467	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	116	E/P TRANSDUCER	MASONEILAN	8006	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	123	VALVE	HOOG	72-101D	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	129	VALVE	PARKER HANNIFIN	D1W20HVVY-10	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	131	VALVE	PARKER HANNIFIN	3MD20UBHP-38	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	205	VALVE	ASCO	B300C9U	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	209	VALVE	ASCO	B302C25F	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	248	RELAY	WESTINGHOUSE	AR440A	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	261	RELAY	AGASTAT	2412AE	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	287	VALVE ACTUATOR	ROTORK	70A	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	305	RELAY	GENERAL ELECTRIC	HEA61A293	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	320	VALVE ACTUATOR	ROTORK	30A	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	390	VALVE	VICKERS	B6554-042AT-21	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	391	VALVE	VICKERS	P6554-042AE-21	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	400	VALVE	ASCO	B316B16	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	466	VALVE	ASCO	B300B1U	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	487	STARTER	ITE	EF3-B015	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	495	VALVE	HOOG	72-102	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	509	CIRCUIT BREAKER	ITE	HE3A-100	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	511	VALVE	VICKERS	B6554-E42AWB-40	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	512	VALVE ACTUATOR	LIMITORQUE	SNR-4T	TB2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	513	VALVE	VICKERS	B6554-042AT-30	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	514	VALVE	VICKERS	B6554-042AT-31	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
SUBT-	515	THERMAL DOOR	ITE TEMP	Z181002	RX2	ELEC	ELEC

SUBT-	516	THERMAL HOOD	HI TEMP	71M1001	RX2	ELEC	ELEC
GSUBT-	001	TERMINAL BLOCK	BUCHANAN	0511	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	002	JUNCTION BOX	CIRCLE AW PRODU	312J	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	003	WIRE	DELCO	LINKE 1832	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	004	RING TOUNGE TERM MISC		MISC	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	005	CRIMP WIRE CONN MISC		MISC	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	006	JB FITTING	SCRUTITITE	3104120	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	007	FUSE HOLDER	GENERAL ELECTRI	108C-9633G	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	008	FUSE HOLDER	BUCHANAN	0351	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	009	CONNECTOR	CANNON	MS3100A20-33S	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	010	CONNECTOR	CANNON	MS3100A20-33P	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	011	CONNECTOR	CANNON	UG260A/U	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	012	CONNECTOR	CANNON	UG1094A/U	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	013	CONNECTOR	AMP	20276-2F71-28	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	014	CONNECTOR	AMP	20277-272447	RX2	ELEC	

COMPONENT	PRODUCT	SUPPLIER	SCI	SCI	SRB	ELEM	ELECTRIC
			MODEL	LOC	SCHM	DWG	CONN
1	4	23	24	35	58	60	

GSUBT-	015	FUSE	BUSS	NON-20	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	016	FUSE	FUSETRON	FRM-5	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	017	CABLE	931-170412-B-27	300VXL/PVC-2C12	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	018	WIRE	CERRO WIRE CO	FIRE ZONE 101 WI	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	019	CABLE	931-170412-C-46	300VPE/PVC-4PR16	RX2	ELEC	
GSUBT-	020	CABLE	931-170412-B-29	300VXL/PVC-3C12	RX2	ELEC	

GSUBT-	021	CABLE	93I-170#12-C-39	0/ASATH/PVC2PR10	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	022	CABLE	93I-170#12-B-27	600VXL/PVC-2C12	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	023	CABLE	93I-170#12-C-92	300VPE/PVC-3C16	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	024	CABLE	93I-170#12-C-49	0/ASHPE/PVC1PR16	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	025	CABLE	93I-170#12-C-50	0/ASHPE/PVC4PR16	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	026	CABLE	93I-170#12-A-17	600VBR/PVC-3C12	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	027	CABLE	93I-170#12-B-27	600VXL/PVC-2C12	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	028	CABLE	93I-170#12-B-35	600VXL/PVC-3C10	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	029	CABLE	93I-170#12-B-29	600VXL/PVC-5C12	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	030	CABLE	93I-170#12-B-30	600VXL/PVC-7C12	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	031	CABLE	93I-170#12-B-31	600VXL/PVC-9C12	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	032	CABLE	93I-170#12-B-32	600VXL/PVC12C12	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	033	CABLE	93I-170#12-C-44	300VTWPE/PVC1PR1	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	034	CABLE	BELDEN	300V-VNL/CRVNL	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	035	CABLE	BELDEN	RG-108U	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	036	CABLE	ROCKBESTOS	RG-108-XL/PLYFN	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	037	WIRE	GENERAL ELECTRIC	SIS	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	038	WIRE	PANSER-COLEMAN	WE2011304	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	039	CABLE	ROCKBESTOS	FRWL SR TC CABLE	RX2	ELEC
GSUBT-	040	CABLE	REVERE	T/C EBR/HPL4FR16	RX2	ELEC

>#TERM

-#ERROR - ILLEGAL TYPE

>#TERM

N -

ALPHA PREFIXES

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Description</u>
A	Absorbers, Traps and Demineralizers
C	Compressors, Blowers, Vacuum Pumps, Fans Including Drives
E	Exchangers, Cooling Towers
F	Filters, Strainers, and Dryers
I	Instrument and/or Control Racks and Panels
N	Electrical Power/Control Cabinets
P	Pumps and Drives
S	Special Packaged Items
T	Tanks and Vessels
FV	Flow Valve
FT	Flow Transmitter
HS	Hand Switch
HV	Hand Valve
LS	Level Switch
LT	Level Transmitter
LV	Level Valve
PS	Pressure Switch
PT	Pressure Transmitter
PV	Pressure Valve
SV	Speed Valve
TS	Temperature Switch
XE	Special Element (Steamline Rupture Sensor)
ZS	Position Switch
FIS	Flow Indicating Switch
FSL	Flow Switch Low
HSV	Hand Solenoid Valve
LSH	Level Switch High
LSL	Level Switch Low
LSV	Level Solenoid Valve
PDT	Pressure Differential Transmitter
PSH	Pressure Switch High
PSL	Pressure Switch Low
TSH	Temperature Switch High
XEP	Special Electrical Pneumatic Transducer
PDIS	Pressure Differential Indicating Switch
PDSH	Pressure Differential Switch High

SYSTEM NUMBERS

<u>System</u>	<u>Description</u>
11	Reactor Vessel and Internal Components
21	Primary Coolant System
22	Secondary Coolant System
23	Helium Purification System
31	Feedwater and Condensate
42	Service Water System
46	Reactor Plant Cooling Water System
82	Instrument and Service Air
91	Piping-Hydraulic Oil System
92	Electrical-Including Switchgear and Standby Diesel Generator
93	Control and Instrumentation

Section 2.1.6.b -- Design Review of Plant Shielding and Environmental Qualification of Equipment for Spaces/Systems Which May Be Used In Post-Accident Operations

PSC December 12, 1979 (P-79299) REPLY:

"PSC will perform the radiation protection design reviews required by Section 2.1.6.b, utilizing the source terms recommended in Regulatory Guides 1.3, 1.4, and 1.7, and will submit the results of the review to the NRC by January 1, 1980. Where doses received are in excess of GDC 19 guidelines, PSC will take those steps necessary to permit post-accident operations in vital areas. Any required modifications will be completed by January 1, 1981."

PSC December 27, 1979 (P-79312) SUBMITTAL:

The assessment of post-accident operator actions in vital areas at Fort St. Vrain (FSV) indicates that doses received from a hypothetical FSV accident scenario will not be in excess of the GDC 19 guidelines for the duration of the accident, provided the FSV reactor plant exhaust filters are adequately shielded.

PSC hereby commits to providing necessary shielding modifications to the FSV reactor plant exhaust filters by January 1, 1981 to permit operator access to vital areas under accident conditions.

The hypothetical Fort St. Vrain (FSV) accident scenario consists of the FSV Design Basis Accident (DBA) #1 combined with successive PCRV primary coolant leakage after depressurization. For clarification, the DBA #1 and PCRV leakage scenarios are explained below.

DISCUSSION:

To obtain a post-accident release of radioactivity equivalent to that described in Regulatory Guides 1.3, 1.4 and 1.7 requires a permanent loss of all forced circulation for the FSV HTGR. This specific accident was identified as DBA #1 in FSAR Section 14.10 and Appendix D. These analyses performed by General Atomic Company at the time of licensing did not consider Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4 source terms (i.e., the equivalent of the 50% of the core radioiodine and 100% of the core noble gas inventory for release to the primary coolant) appropriate for the HTGR. However, because of past precedence by the then Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) of using the above source terms, offsite doses resulting from the postulated accident were calculated and presented in the previously mentioned FSAR sections using both the General Atomic Company release assumptions and AEC TID-14844 release assumptions. In both cases the offsite doses are within 10CFR100 limits.

DBA #1 Description:

A non-mechanistic loss of forced circulation is postulated from full power operation, where the reactor is scrammed by the plant protection system and all attempts to restore forced circulation using the multiple heat sinks, circulators and motive power for the circulators fail. Because of the large heat sink provided by the graphite core, considerable time is available to initiate primary coolant depressurization and to restore forced circulation. The FSV FSAR specifies the time available to initiate depressurization to be 5 hours, which was later amended by PSC Letter P-77250 dated December 22, 1977 to be 2 hours. The reduction in time was due to the capability of the helium purification system to process primary coolant during the planned blowdown of the clean primary coolant to the reactor building ventilation stack. Thus, the depressurization of the PCRV is initiated after 2 hours and completed 7 hours later (or 9 hours from the onset of the accident), at which time the PCRV has been depressurized to 5 psig.

The fuel is slow to heat up due to the large heat sink provided by the core graphite. A peak average active core temperature of 5400°F is reached about 80 hours after the onset of the accident. At this temperature, the core structural integrity and geometry are not compromised since the vaporization temperature of graphite is 6900°F. Peak activity released to the primary coolant, considering decay, is reached about 24 hours into the accident.

Heat removal is provided by the liner cooling system in the redistribute mode which maximizes cooling in the top head of the PCRV.

Leakage of primary coolant from the PCRV is assumed to occur at a conservatively high leakage rate of 0.2% of the primary coolant inventory per day.

Offsite doses were calculated for a 6 month duration of the accident, but most of the offsite dose occurs in the first 200 hours of the accident, due to fission product decay.

The reactor building ventilation system maintains continuous venting of the reactor building environment at 1.5 volumes/hr during the entire period of the accident.

Primary Coolant Leakage Rate During DBA #1:

The FSV FSAR DBA #1 (Appendix D, page D.1-66) assumed an arbitrarily conservative and non-mechanistic estimate of PCRV leakage after the intentional depressurization by assuming that the liner has failed completely (or does not exist) and only concrete permeability controls the leakage. An internal 5 psi pressure differential was assumed which purportedly gave a PCRV leak rate of 8.33×10^{-9} fraction per hr (0.2%/day). Reference was made to Question IX.7 of Amendment No. 9 of the FSV FSAR for the calculation of the permeation rate for the FSV PCRV concrete under these conditions.

Examination of Question D.2 revealed simply the conclusion that a 5 psi positive differential pressure led to 0.2%/day and 2 psi positive differential pressure led to 0.08%/day. Question IX.7 also did not provide details of the calculation of the 0.2%/day rate. However, considerable

detail and a derivation was provided for the analysis of leakage rate tests at high pressures. The following equation was provided (eqn.14 on page IX.7-d):

$$W \text{ (lb/day)} = 1.13 \times 10^{-5} \frac{\Delta P}{\Delta P_c} \frac{A}{X} \ln\left(\frac{P_1}{P_2}\right) + 2.2 \times 10^{-6} \frac{\Delta P}{\Delta P_c} \frac{A}{X} (P_1^2 - P_2^2) \quad (\text{eqn. 14})$$

Where ΔP = PCRV inside pressure in psig

ΔP_c = PCRV inside pressure in psig for which the net compressive stress in concrete = 0

A = Face area of concrete, ft^2

X = Concrete thickness, ft

P_1 = Permeation or high side pressure, psia

P_2 = Ambient or low side pressure, psia

Numerical values were inserted for $P_1 = 345$ psig with the assumption that ΔP_c was approximately equal to P_1 , in the following equation (eqn.15 on same page):

$$W = 1.13 \times 10^{-5} \times \frac{9000}{10} \ln \frac{857.5}{12.5} + 9.1 \times 10^{-7} \frac{9000}{10} (857.5^2 - 12.5^2) \\ = 0.043 + 602 = 600 \text{ lb/day} \quad (\text{eqn. 15})$$

The first item to note is that the coefficient for the second (laminar flow) term is in error which is most likely a single error in transcribing from equation 14 to 15 since equation 13 has the 9.1×10^{-7} coefficient. Equation 15 should read:

$$W = 1.13 \times 10^{-5} \times \frac{9000}{10} \ln \frac{857.5}{12.5} + 2.2 \times 10^{-6} \frac{9000}{10} (857.5^2 - 12.5^2) \\ = 0.043 + 1445 = 1450 \text{ lb/day} \quad (\text{eqn. 15 revised})$$

The second item is that the $\Delta P/\Delta P_c$ term has been dropped in going from eqn.14 to eqn.15, which is significant if it is assumed that these equations are appropriate for evaluating the leak rate at $P_1 = 5$ psig.

LEAK RATE

Pressure P_1 (psig)	Eqn 14	lb/day			%/day			Given
		14	15	15 Revised	14	15	15 revised	
5	.0019	.13	.30	.001	.07	.17	.20	App D; Amend 9 Question 0.2
2	.0003	.046	.107	.0001	.025	.059	.08	Amend 9 Question 0.2

Since equation 14 is the appropriate equation, the 0.2%/day leak rate is conservative by a factor of 200. Furthermore, the only equation that comes close to the values given in the SAR is 15 Revised, that is, $\Delta P/\Delta P_0$ has been neglected which accounts for the factor of 200.

For purposes of plant shielding and equipment environmental evaluations, the historic 0.2%/day is assumed to exist as an upper limit of all potential contaminated primary coolant leakage including permeability through the PCRV concrete. This is judged to be conservative since the primary coolant with any significant activity is contained within the PCRV or helium purification components contained in wells within the PCRV.

Radionuclide Source Terms for O8A-1.

As previously stated, the fuel within the graphite core is slow to heatup during O8A#1. Once it has reached the FSAR fuel particle coating failure temperature of 1725°C (3137°F), the fission products are assumed, for purposes of this shielding evaluation, to be realeased per the TIC-14844 assumptions. For release to the primary coolant within the PCRV, this is 100% of noble gases, 50% of the iodines and 1% others. The total activity in curies contained in the primary coolant, assuming no leakage from the PCRV, as a function of lapsed time, is given in Table 2.1.6.b-1.

Consistent with TIC-14844 release assumptions, 50% of the iodines plateau within the primary coolant system resulting in a depletion of the iodine to 25% of core inventory in the reactor building air. Thus, the total activity in curies in the reactor building, assuming the upper limit of 0.2%/day leakage (which is being purged by the reactor building ventilation system at the rate 1.5 volumes/hr), is given in Table 2.1.6.b-2.

TABLE 2.1.6.b-1

CLIDE	ELAPSED TIME (Hours)													
	2	8	24	34	40	48	52	58	72	120	240	475	720	4320
-88	1.05104	2.89105	2.80105	2.39104	5.89103	1.37103	5.50102	1.76102	7.04101	0	0	0	0	0
-88	8.57103	2.79105	2.80105	2.66104	6.51103	1.46103	6.07102	1.89102	7.08101	0	0	0	0	0
-95	3.15101	6.66103	1.84105	2.57105	3.01105	3.59105	3.69105	3.84105	4.18105	4.12105	3.88105	3.43105	3.02105	4.6010-
-95	3.18101	6.74103	1.87105	2.63105	3.09105	3.69105	3.80105	3.97105	4.35105	4.37105	4.31105	4.12105	3.88105	8.9010-
-131	1.33103	3.50105	6.18106	6.91106	7.33106	7.08106	7.90105	7.93106	7.98106	7.57106	4.89106	2.07106	8.45105	0
-132	1.44103	2.34105	1.79106	6.09105	5.64105	5.61105	3.68105	2.96105	2.72105	1.76105	4.02104	4.99103	5.46102	0
-133	2.48103	5.30105	6.44106	5.25106	4.70106	4.12106	3.65106	3.05106	2.04106	4.84105	8.81103	0	0	0
-133	5.25103	1.40106	2.50107	2.78107	2.94107	3.14107	3.14107	3.12107	3.09107	2.73107	1.41107	3.86106	9.90105	0
-135	1.98103	2.46105	1.40106	5.49105	3.31105	1.88105	1.25105	6.83104	1.78104	2.94102	0	0	0	0
-135H	7.28102	8.34104	4.59105	1.72105	1.04105	5.97104	3.91104	2.14104	5.58103	0	0	0	0	0
-135	1.75103	5.43105	6.24106	3.86106	2.93106	2.11106	1.62106	1.08106	4.39105	1.01104	0	0	0	0
-140	5.44101	1.44104	2.58105	2.92105	3.13105	3.39105	3.42105	3.45105	3.54105	3.57105	2.70105	1.56105	8.80104	0
-140	3.04101	7.37103	2.01105	2.60105	2.93105	3.36105	3.43105	3.54105	3.75105	3.96105	3.10105	1.80105	1.01105	0

TABLE 2.1.6.b-2

JUREG-0578 STUDY TOTAL ACTIVITY (Ci) PRESENT IN THE REACTOR BUILDING ATMOSPHERE AT GIVEN ELAPSED TIME (hours). PCRV LEAK RATE TO BUILDING 0.2%/DAY. REACTOR BUILDING VENTED AT 1.5 VOLUMES/HR. TID-14044 NORMALIZED FRACTIONS USED, 100% NOBLE GASES, 25% IODINE, 1% OTHERS

LIDE	ELAPSED TIME (Hours)													
	2	8	24	36	40	48	52	56	72	120	240	475	720	4320
88	3.77-01	1.31101	1.33101	1.32100	3.22-01	7.10-02	3.00-02	9.23-03	3.38-03	0	0	0	0	0
88	3.55-01	1.37101	1.42101	1.48100	3.58-01	7.77-02	3.34-02	1.02-02	3.61-03	0	0	0	0	0
95	1.20-03	3.29-01	9.81100	1.40101	1.64101	1.97101	2.04101	2.12101	2.31101	2.29101	2.16101	1.91101	1.68101	2.56100
95	1.21-03	3.33-01	9.98100	1.43101	1.69101	2.02101	2.10101	2.19101	2.41101	2.43101	2.39101	2.29101	2.16101	4.94100
31	2.52-02	0.64100	1.65102	1.90102	2.02102	2.17102	2.19102	2.20102	2.21102	2.10102	1.36102	5.76101	2.35101	0
32	2.57-02	5.24100	4.24101	1.58101	1.46101	1.46101	1.05101	0.46100	7.75100	5.14100	1.30100	1.61-01	1.77-02	0
33	4.68-02	1.30101	1.70102	1.44102	1.29102	1.13102	1.01102	8.45101	5.65101	1.34101	2.45-01	0	0	0
33	1.99-01	6.94101	1.34103	1.54103	1.63103	1.75103	1.75103	1.75103	1.75103	1.52103	7.85102	2.14102	5.50101	0
35	3.68-02	5.89100	3.60101	1.51101	9.05100	5.09100	3.47100	1.89100	4.89-01	6	0	0	0	0
35H	3.14-02	7.71100	8.59101	7.38101	5.53101	3.53101	2.75101	1.81101	6.20100	1.07-01	0	0	0	0
35	6.75-02	2.73101	3.40102	2.26102	1.72102	1.22102	9.56101	6.40101	2.56101	1.01100	0	0	0	0
40	2.06-03	7.12-01	1.38101	1.61101	1.72101	1.07101	1.89101	1.91101	1.96101	1.98101	1.50101	0.67100	4.89100	0
40	1.27-03	3.66-01	1.08101	1.43101	1.61101	1.85101	1.90101	1.96101	2.08101	2.20101	1.72101	9.98100	5.62100	0

Radiation Levels During DBA-1:

Based upon TID-14844 source term release assumptions, the radiation levels were calculated in the reactor building and the control room to determine the operator accessibility. Details are described herein.

Assumptions

In addition to the assumptions used in deriving the source terms, the following assumptions were made for evaluating shielding adequacy:

1. Credit was taken for a 50% depletion of the iodines due to plateout in the primary coolant system prior to release to the reactor building atmosphere.
2. All fission products were assumed to remain gasborne. In other words, no plateout of fission products was contemplated.
3. All the activities were uniformly distributed throughout the free space of the reactor building or the PCRV.
4. The iodines and particulates removed by the reactor-building ventilation filters were deposited in any two of the three filters available.
5. Only major shielding such as concrete walls was considered.

Reactor Building

To determine the accessibility of the reactor building during the course of DBA-1, the gamma dose rate in the reactor building was calculated as a function of elapsed time. The contributing sources consist of the gasborne activity in the reactor building as a result of PCRV leakage, the primary coolant activity contained in the PCRV, and the buildup of iodines and particulates on the reactor building ventilation HEPA and charcoal adsorbers. The contribution from the ventilation filters was not considered, as the filters will be properly shielded.

Two dose points were selected for the dose-rate calculation. The first point is located at the center of the space above the refueling floor (≈ 40 ft from the floor), and the second point is on the refueling floor directly above the refueling penetration. The PATH code described in FSAR Section 11.2.2.4 was utilized to perform the calculation.

Figure 1 shows the dose rate at the first dose point. Essentially all the contributions come from the gasborne activity in the reactor building. The activity in the PCRV is relatively insignificant to the first dose point, because of a large separation distance between the source and dose point. Short-term access to the reactor building is possible.

The dose rate at the second dose point (i.e., on the refueling floor) is given in Figure 2. The contributions from the reactor building and from the PCRV are individually represented, along with the total dose rate. The contribution from the PCRV is due to the primary coolant activity present in the interspace below the primary closure for the control rod drive. The maximum dose rate on the floor is 1.0 rem/hr, which is less than the peak dose rate of 1.4 rem/hr at the first dose point. Therefore, the refueling floor is accessible on a short-term basis.

Control Room

The dose rates in the control room include the contributions from the airborne activity in the reactor building atmosphere, and from the iodine and particulate activity accumulated in the plant ventilation filters. The PATH code was used to determine the contribution from each source as a function of time into accident. The dose point was located in the reactor engineer's office, as shown in Figure 3.

The results of the PATH calculations are shown in Figure 3 as a function of elapsed time. It is apparent that the contribution from the airborne activity in the reactor building is relatively small or negligible as compared with that from the reactor building ventilation filters. The dose rate reaches a peak of 700 mrem/hr about one month into accident. The important nuclides are Zr95, Nb95 and La140 accumulated in the filters.

The dose rate in the control room appears to be excessive for continuous manned access. Adequate shielding will be provided for the ventilation filters so that the dose rate from the filters can be reduced to an acceptable level.

Summary Results

The peak dose rates in the reactor building and control room are summarized below. Also indicated are the time at which the peak dose rate occurs following an accident, and the total dose accumulated over a period of 180 days from the initiation of the accident.

<u>Location & Condition</u>	<u>Peak Gamma Dose Rate</u>	<u>Time of Peak</u>	<u>180 Day Accumulated Dose (rem)</u>
Reactor Building (above refueling floor)	1.4 R/hr	24 hrs.	400
Control Room			
From Vent Filters (Unshielded)	700 mR/hr	≈ 720 hrs.	2400
From Reactor Building	3 mR/hr	24 hrs.	0.9

Conclusion

The following conclusions are reached from the review of shielding design adequacy for D8A-1 conditions and TID-14844 source term release assumptions:

1. The reactor building ventilation filters will be adequately shielded to reduce the dosage contribution from the filters.
2. Areas immediately outside the reactor building should be accessible only on a restricted basis, because of direct radiation from the activity in the reactor building.

FIG. 1 - RADIATION LEVELS IN REACTOR BUILDING
- DURING DBA - 3






FIG. 2. RADIATION LEVELS ON REFUELING FLOOR
DURING DBA-1



10^3

FIG. 3 RADIATION LEVELS IN CONTROL
ROOM DURING DBA-1





GENERAL ATOMIC

GA-A14212

ENVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURES IN THE VICINITY OF THE RUPTURE POINT OF STEAM LINES FOR FORT ST. VRAIN EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION

by
J. V. DEL BENE

NOVEMBER 1976

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1. SUMMARY

This report presents temperature response curves for the environment within 20 ft of a steam pipe rupture for use in equipment qualification. Worst case blowdown conditions were taken from the test and analysis report on the qualification of Fort St. Vrain safe shutdown equipment (Ref. 1).

For distances up to 10 ft from the rupture, the environment temperature is in the range of 600° to 650°F for the 4-minute steam blowdown period. Cooldown temperatures to 30 minutes are in the range of 300° to 350°F.

2. INTRODUCTION

For the qualification of the Fort St. Vrain safe shutdown equipment, the environmental temperature response for the worst case pipe rupture was determined for the reactor building and the turbine building (Ref. 1).

- Response curves of the environmental temperature were determined at several distances from the steam pipe rupture for distances equal to or greater than 20 ft. This report presents response curves for distances less than 20 ft.

3. ANALYSIS

3.1. SPECIFICATION OF WORST STEAM LEAK

As indicated in Ref. 1, a double-ended rupture of the cold reheat pipe in the reactor building produces the most severe environmental blowdown condition. With this rupture, the steam line is not immediately isolated and the steam blowdown is postulated to last for 4 min. The blowdown flow rate and enthalpy for a reactor building cold reheat rupture are taken from Fig. 3.3 of Ref. 1. They are reproduced in Fig. 1. The rupture of a main steam pipe or a hot reheat pipe in the reactor building is isolated within several seconds, and the steam blowdown flow rate decays to zero in about 10 to 15 sec. Thus, initially high main steam or hot reheat temperatures of approximately 900°F would only last 10 to 15 sec with a rapidly decreasing steam flow rate during this time period.

Reference 1 indicates that the most severe environmental conditions in the turbine building occur with a double-ended rupture of a hot reheat pipe. The rupture flow rate is not terminated until 4 min, and the enthalpy of the hot reheat steam is higher than the enthalpy of the main steam. The blowdown flow rate and enthalpy for a turbine building hot reheat rupture are given in Fig. 2. These curves were reproduced from Fig. 3.4 of Ref. 1.

3.2. ANALYTICAL MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS

The analytical model considers a double-ended rupture of a 20-in.-diameter cold reheat pipe in the lower portion of the reactor building and a double-ended rupture of a 34-in.-diameter hot reheat pipe in the lower portion of the turbine building. Since the reactor and turbine building are vented, there is no storage of blowdown steam or environmental pressure buildup in the buildings. Instead, the escaping steam blows past walls,




Fig. 1. Steam blowdown rate and enthalpy for a postulated cold reheat pipe rupture in the reactor building

2000 1000 0

1000 500 0

500 0

0




Fig. 2. Steam blowdown rate and enthalpy for a postulated hot reheat pipe rupture in the turbine building without scram action

structures, and equipment within the buildings. This scenario is especially true for the conditions near the rupture point. The scenario is also supported by the fact that both buildings are very crowded with piping, structural steel, walkways, and instrument racks.

The analytical model is based on the blowdown steam flowing past heat transfer surfaces. The model yields the temperature response of these surfaces and the response of the steam temperature with respect to distance from the rupture and time. The assumptions and input for the model are:

1. The steam expands spherically outward from its rupture. The volume enclosed as a function of distance r from the rupture is $V = 4/3 \pi r^3$.
2. The heat transfer surface areas of the steel and concrete are distributed homogeneously throughout the regions in consideration. Data from Ref. 1 are used to calculate these distributions. The results are given in Table 1.
3. The decay of the heat transfer coefficient versus distance from the steam leak during the steam blowdown period is the same as used in Ref. 1. The value at 10 ft ($36.9 \text{ Btu/hr-ft}^2\text{-}^\circ\text{F}$) is used for all distances less than 10 ft. The heat transfer coefficient after the termination of the steam leak is taken as $5 \text{ Btu/hr-ft}^2\text{-}^\circ\text{F}$.
4. The initial temperature of all the steel and concrete is taken as 100°F .

The calculations were performed using the TAC2D thermal analysis computer program (Ref. 2). Since no collection of blowdown steam in the buildings is considered in the analytical model, it was more convenient and expedient to use a thermal analysis program rather than a containment blowdown program. The TAC2D program was modeled to simulate the steam expanding spherically outward and passing over the steel and concrete

TABLE 1
UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF HEAT TRANSFER SURFACE AREAS

Reactor Building
(Ref. 1, Table 3.1)

Volume of lower portion of reactor building	198,000 ft ³
Total surface area of steel in this volume	104,000 ft ²
Total surface area of concrete in this volume	33,800 ft ²
Steel surface area per unit volume of reactor building	0.525 ft ² /ft ³
Concrete surface area per unit volume of reactor building	0.171 ft ² /ft ³

Turbine Building
(Ref. 1, Table 3.2)

Volume of lower portion of turbine building	750,000 ft ³
Total surface area of steel in this volume	216,200 ft ²
Total surface area of concrete in this volume	80,800 ft ²
Steel surface area per unit volume of turbine building	0.288 ft ² /ft ³
Concrete surface area per unit volume of turbine building	0.108 ft ² /ft ³

surface areas. The steam blowdown flow rate as a function of time was taken from Figs. 1 and 2. The steam temperature at the rupture point corresponds to the steam enthalpy from Figs. 1 and 2 and atmospheric pressure.

4. CALCULATED RESULTS

The calculated temperature response of the steam environment at several distances within 20 ft from the rupture are given in Fig. 3 for the reactor building and Fig. 4 for the turbine building. The response curves very close to the rupture are approximately the same and are drawn as one curve. The response curves after the termination of the steam leak are conservative. They are representative of the cooldown of steam remaining stagnant and coming to equilibrium with the local surrounding surfaces.




Fig. 3. Temperature response of the environment near the rupture for a reactor building cold reheat pipe rupture




Fig. 4. Temperature response of the environment near the rupture for a turbine building hot reheat pipe rupture

REFERENCES

1. Benham, R. G., et al., "Qualification of Fort St. Vrain Safe Shutdown Equipment for Steam Environment Resulting from Pipe Ruptures," USAEC Report Gulf-GA-A12045, Gulf General Atomic, May 30, 1972.
2. Boonstra, R. H., "TAC2D - A General Purpose Two-Dimensional Heat Transfer Computer Code," General Atomic Report GA-A14032, July 15, 1976.

Location of Equipment in the Plant

Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station has been divided into areas for purposes of identifying components and equipment requiring environmental qualification. These areas are:

- RX1 -Above the Refueling Floor, Reactor Building
- RX2 -Beneath the Refueling Floor, Reactor Building
- RX3 -Process Area, Reactor Building
- CR -Control Room
- AX -Auxiliary Equipment Room
- SWR -480 Volt Switchgear and Battery Room
- TB1 -Turbine Building - All Other Areas
- TB2 -Below Operating Floor - Turbine Building
- TB3 -Diesel Generator Room - Turbine Building
- OPL -Outside the Plant
- PCRV -Internal to the RCRV Pressure Boundary

Figures 1 through 5 depict the area described above. RX2 and TB2 are the High Energy Line Break Areas.




Fig. 1. Reactor building elevation showing regions that were analyzed




fig. 2. Reactor building plan view at elevation 4740 ft.-6 in. showing region of detailed analysis




Fig. 3. Turbine building elevation showing region that was analyzed




Fig. 4. Turbine building plan view at elevation 4791 ft showing region of detailed analysis




Fig. 5. Turbine Building Plan View Below Elevation 4829 Ft. Showing Region of Detailed Analysis

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

C-8201	DESCR.	MOTOR
	MFR.	GENERAL ELECTRIC
C-8201S	MODEL	SK365AK2033
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B49
C-8203	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	
P-2101	MFR.	
	MODEL	
P-2101S	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----
P-2102	DESCR.	MOTOR
	MFR.	WESTINGHOUSE
P-2102S	MODEL	TBDP-7206
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B49
P-2106	NOTES	-----
P-2107	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
P-2107	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
P-2103	NOTES	-----
P-2103S	DESCR.	MOTOR
	MFR.	WESTINGHOUSE
P-2103S	MODEL	TBDP-6902
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B49
	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

<i>P-2108</i>	DESCR.	<i>MOTOR</i>	
	MFR.	<i>U.S. ELECTRIC</i>	
<i>P-2109</i>	MODEL	<i>H1706-03-171</i>	
	TEST RPT.	<i>RECORD SECT. B54</i>	
<i>P-2110</i>	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.	<i>MOTOR</i>	
<i>P-2110</i>	MFR.	<i>WESTINGHOUSE</i>	
	MODEL	<i>TBDP-7801</i>	
<i>P-2110</i>	TEST RPT.	<i>RECORD SECT. A47</i>	
	NOTES	-----	-----
<i>P-9101-SX</i>	DESCR.		
	MFR.	<i>RELIANCE</i>	
<i>P-9101-SX</i>	MODEL	<i>P25G1/2A</i>	
	TEST RPT.	<i>RECORD SECT. B54</i>	
<i>P-9101-SX</i>	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
<i>P-9101-SX</i>	MFR.		
	MODEL		
<i>P-9101-SX</i>	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----

PARENT-
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

<i>P-9101-X</i>	DESCR.	MOTOR
	MFR.	U. S. ELECTRIC
<i>P-9102-SX</i> <i>P-9102-X</i>	MODEL	R8591-02-049
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B54
<i>P-9102-SX</i> <i>P-9102-X</i>	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	
<i>P-9105-X</i>	MFR.	
	MODEL	
<i>P-9105-X</i>	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B54
	NOTES	-----
<i>P-9105-X</i>	DESCR.	MOTOR
	MFR.	GENERAL ELECTRIC
<i>P-9105-X</i>	MODEL	BE-1474499
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B54
<i>P-9105-X</i>	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	
<i>P-9105-X</i>	MFR.	
	MODEL	
<i>P-9105-X</i>	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B54
	NOTES	-----
<i>P-9105-X</i>	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
<i>P-9105-X</i>	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
<i>P-9105-X</i>	NOTES	-----

PARENT-
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

P-9106-X	DESCR.	MOTOR	
	MFR.	GENERAL ELECTRIC	
	MODEL	D14J0147	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B54	
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
FV-2205	MFR.		
	MODEL		
FV-2206	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.	SERVO VALVE	
	MFR.	MOOG CONTROLS	
	MODEL	72-101	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AB	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 123	-----
	DESCR.	POSITIONER	
	MFR.	COLLINS	
	MODEL	SS-409	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AL	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 024	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	VICKERS	
	MODEL	DG554042AE21	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AP	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 391	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

	DESCR.	TRANSDUCER
FV-2239	MFR.	MASONEILAN
FV-2240	MODEL	8006
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AX
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 116
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE
FV-21297	MFR.	ASCO
FV-21298	MODEL	HB8302C25F
LV-2137	TEST RPT.	REPORT SECT. A46
LV-2138	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 011
PV-21120	DESCR.	
HV-21257	MFR.	
HV-21258	MODEL	
HV-21259	TEST RPT.	
HV-21260	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE
HV-2265	MFR.	ASCO
HV-2266	MODEL	LB 8320A108
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B52
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 015
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----

PARENT-
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

HV-2201 HV-2202	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	G.W. LISK CO. INC.
	MODEL	DIW-20-HVY-10	K12-90-66
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 131	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	LIMIT SWITCH
ZS-2201 ZS-2202	MFR.	NAMCO	NAMCO
	MODEL	D2400X-2	D2400X-2SR
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	RECORD SECT. BI
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ZS-2201 & ZS-2202)	BY SIMILARITY-(ZS-2201 & ZS-2202)
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
ZS-2201 ZS-2202	MODEL	EA-170-31100	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ZS-2201 & ZS-2202)	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	DECCO
	MODEL	DIW-20-HVY-10	11-111
HV-2203	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 131	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	LIMIT SWITCH
	MFR.	NAMCO	NAMCO
	MODEL	D2400X-2	D2400X-2SR
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	RECORD SECT. BI
ZS-2203	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ZS-2203)	BY SIMILARITY-(ZS-2203)
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
	MODEL	EA-170-31100	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ZS-2203)	-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE
HV-2109-1	MFR.	ASCO
HV-2109-2	MODEL	H88302C25F
HV-2110-1	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. A4G
HV-2110-2	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. O11
HV-2115-1		-----
HV-2115-2	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE
HV-2116-1	MFR.	ASCO
HV-2116-2	MODEL	H88302C25G
HV-22133	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. A4G
HV-22134	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. O1G

	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH
	MFR.	MICROSWITCH
	MODEL	BZEG-2RN
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. J
	NOTES	-----

HV-2193	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE
HV-2194	MFR.	ASCO
HV-21213	MODEL	H88302C25F
HV-21214	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. A4G
HV-2366-1	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. O11
HV-2366-2		-----

	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----

	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----

PARENT-
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

HV-2204	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	G.W. LISK CO., INC.
	MODEL	DIW-20-HVY-31	K12-90-66
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC(*)	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SUBT. 131 (*) BY SIMILARITY	-----
HV-2242	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	LIMIT SWITCH
	MFR.	NAMCO	NAMCO
	MODEL	D2400X-2	D2400X-2SR
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	RECORD SECT. BI
	NOTES	-----	-----
HV-2223	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
	MODEL	EA-170-31100	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	-----	-----
HV-2224	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	DECCO
	MODEL	DIW-20-HVY-10	11-111
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 131	-----
HV-2254	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

HV-2249	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	G. W. LISK CO. INC.
	MODEL	DIW-20-HVY-10	K12-90-66
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 131	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
	MODEL	D2400X-2	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ES-2249)	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
	MODEL	EA-170-32100	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ES-2249)	-----
HV-2250	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	DECCO
	MODEL	DIW-20-HVY-10	II-III
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 131	-----
HV-2251	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	LIMIT SWITCH
	MFR.	NAMCO	NAMCO
	MODEL	D2400X-2	D2400X-2SR
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	RECORD SECT. BI
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ES-2250, ES-2251 & ES-2252)	BY SIMILARITY-(ES-2250, ES-2251 & ES-2252)
HV-2252	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
	MODEL	EA-170-32100	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(ES-2250, ES-2251 & ES-2252)	-----

PARENT-
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

HV-2253	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	DECCO
	MODEL	DIW- 20 - HVY- 10	11-111
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 131	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	G.W. LISK CO. INC.
	MODEL	DIW-20- HVY- 31	K12- 90- 66
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC (*)	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SUBT. 131 (*) BY SIMILARITY	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
	MODEL	D2400X- SR	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(25-2253)	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	NAMCO	
	MODEL	D2400X-2SR	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	BY SIMILARITY-(25-2253)	-----
HV-2237 HV-2238	DESCR.	ELECT. ACTUATOR	
	MFR.	LIMITORQUE	
	MODEL	TYPE SMB-SIZE 4T	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B53(*)	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 512 (*) BY SIMILARITY	-----
HV-4225 HV-4257	DESCR.	ELECT. ACTUATOR	
	MFR.	LIMITORQUE	
	MODEL	TYPE SMB-SIZE 000	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B53	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 512	-----

PARENT-
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

HV-2292 HV-2293	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
	MFR.	MANATROL	G. W. LISK CO., INC.
	MODEL	DIW-20-HVY-10	K12-90-66
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AC	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 131	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
HV-2290 HV-2291	DESCR.	ELECT. ACTUATOR	
	MFR.	ROTORK	
	MODEL	70A	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B75(*)	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 287 (*) SIMILARITY TO A39	-----
HV-22131 HV-22132	DESCR.	ELECT. ACTUATOR	
	MFR.	ROTORK	
	MODEL	30A	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. A39	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 320	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

HV-21185 HV-21186 HV-21187 HV-21188	DESCR.	POSITIONER
	MFR.	MASONEILAN
	MODEL	8012
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. A32
	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----
HV-22200 HV-22201 HV-22202 HV-22203 HV-22204	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE
	MFR.	ASCO
	MODEL	HB8302C25U
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B52
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 018
HV-22205 HV-22206 HV-22207 HV-22208 HV-22209	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----
HV-22210 HV-22211 HV-22212 HV-22213	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----

PARENT- COMPONENT TAG NO'S.	ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (SUBTIER ITEMS)		
HV-21415-1	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	ASCO	
HV-21416-1	MODEL	HB8316B16	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECTION B52	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 400	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	ASCO	
	MODEL	HB8302C29F	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B52	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 013	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	MICROSWITCH	
	MODEL	BZEG-2RN	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. J	
	NOTES	(zs-21415-1 & zs-21416-1)	-----
HV-21415-2	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	← COIL
HV-21416-2	MFR.	BARKSDALE	BARKSDALE
	MODEL	12453	2003
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AF	← (AF)
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 023	PART OF 12453 UNIT TESTED
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

HV-22221	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	ASCO	
	MODEL	8300C9U	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B52	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 205	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	ASCO	
	MODEL	8300-81U	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B52	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 466	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
HV-22222	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	ASCO	
	MODEL	8300C9U	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B52	
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 205	-----
HV-22223	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
HV-22224	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
HV-22225	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
HV-22226	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
HV-22227	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
HV-22228	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

LV-21130	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE
	MFR.	ASCO
	MODEL	HB8302C29F
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BS2
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 013
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----
PV-2229 PV-2230	DESCR.	POSITIONER
	MFR.	COLLINS
	MODEL	SS-409
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AL
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 024
	DESCR.	SERVO VALVE
	MFR.	MOOG CONTROLS
	MODEL	72-101
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AB
	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 123
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----
	DESCR.	
	MFR.	
	MODEL	
	TEST RPT.	
	NOTES	-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

PV-2243 PV-2244	DESCR.	POSITIONER	
	MFR.	COLLINS	
	MODEL	SS- 410	
	TEST RPT.	SIMILAR TO SECT. AL	
	NOTES	<u>SIMILAR TO SS-409</u> <u>LISTED AS SUBT. 024</u>	-----
PV-22129 PV-22130	DESCR.	SERVO VALVE	
	MFR.	MOOG CONTROLS	
	MODEL	72-101	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AB	
	NOTES	<u>LISTED AS SUBT. 123</u>	-----
PV-22153 PV-22154	DESCR.	POSITIONER	
	MFR.	COLLINS	
	MODEL	SS- 410	
	TEST RPT.	SIMILAR TO SECT. AL	
	NOTES	<u>SIMILAR TO SS-409</u> <u>LISTED AS SUBT. 024</u>	-----
	DESCR.	TRANSDUCER	
	MFR.	MASONEILAN	
	MODEL	8005	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B62	
	NOTES	<u>LISTED AS SUBT. 101</u>	-----
	DESCR.	POSITIONER	
	MFR.	COLLINS	
	MODEL	SS- 409	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AL	
	NOTES	<u>LISTED AS SUBT. 024</u>	-----
	DESCR.	TRANSDUCER	
	MFR.	MASONEILAN	
	MODEL	8005	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. B62	
	NOTES	<u>LISTED AS SUBT. 101</u>	-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

SV-2105 SV-2112	DESCR.	POSITIONER	
	MFR.	COLLINS	
	MODEL	SS-410	
	TEST RPT.	SIMILAR TO SECT. AL	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SS-409 LISTED AS SUBT. 024	-----
	DESCR.	SERVO VALVE	
	MFR.	MOOG CONTROLS	
	MODEL	72-103	
	TEST RPT.	SIMILAR TO SECT. AB	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO 72-101 LISTED AS SUBT. 123	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	VICKERS	
	MODEL	DG5S4042AT21	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AP (*)	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SUBT. 390 (*) BY SIMILARITY	-----
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	VICKERS	
	MODEL	DG5S4042AWB40	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AP (*)	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SUBT. 390 (*) BY SIMILARITY	-----
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	MICROSWITCH	
	MODEL	EXD-AR-	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	(ZS-2105 & ZS-2112)	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		-----

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

SV-2106 SV-2111	DESCR.	POSITIONER	
	MFR.	COLLINS	
	MODEL	SS- 410	
	TEST RPT.	SIMILAR TO SECT. AL	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SS-409 LISTED AS SUBT. 024	- - - - -
	DESCR.	SERVO VALVE	
	MFR.	MOOG CONTROLS	
	MODEL	72-103	
	TEST RPT.	SIMILAR TO SECT AB	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO 72-101 LISTED AS SUBT. 123	- - - - -
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	VICKERS	
	MODEL	DG5S4042AT2I	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AP (*)	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SUBT. 390 (*) BY SIMILARITY	- - - - -
	DESCR.	SOLENOID VALVE	
	MFR.	VICKERS	
	MODEL	MOD 042A-3I	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. AP (*)	
	NOTES	SIMILAR TO SUBT. 390 (*) BY SIMILARITY	- - - - -
	DESCR.	LIMIT SWITCH	
	MFR.	MICROSWITCH	
	MODEL	EXD-AR-	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. BI	
	NOTES	(SV-2106 & SV-2111)	- - - - -
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES		- - - - -

PARENT -
COMPONENT
TAG NO'S.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(SUBTIER ITEMS)

SV-2109	DESCR.	ELECT. ACTUATOR	
	MFR.	ITT GEN. CONTROLS	
	MODEL	AH91H6102A217	
	TEST RPT.	RECORD SECT. A9	
SV-2110	NOTES	LISTED AS SUBT. 073	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
SV-2115	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
SV-2116	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
HV-2241	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	SOLENOID VALVE ← COIL MANATROL G. W. LISK CO. INC. DIW-20-HVY- 21 K12-90-66 RECORD SECT. AC (*) SIMILAR TO SUBT. 131 (*) BY SIMILARITY	-----
HV-2241	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
HV-2241	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
	MODEL		
HV-2241	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		
	MFR.		
HV-2241	MODEL		
	TEST RPT.		
	NOTES	-----	-----
	DESCR.		

APPENDIX D

DETAILED AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION PERTAINING TO A PERMANENT LOSS OF FORCED CIRCULATION (LOFC) FOR THE FORT ST. VRAIN HTGR

D.1 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT NO. 1

D.1.1 Background and Summary

A hypothetical permanent loss of forced circulation of primary coolant helium would require the extended failure of all four helium circulators, their steam and water drives or their multiple sources of motive power, or failure of both the main steam and reheat steam sections of both steam generators. This condition is the hypothetical extension of the 30 min temporary loss-of-normal shutdown cooling accidents described in Section 14.1 and is not considered credible. The LOFC accident consequences reported in this Appendix are identified as "design basis" information and was requested by the AEC-DRL during the construction permit application period.

D.1.1.1 Accident Conditions

Subcriticality. At the time of this hypothetical loss of forced circulation, the reactor would have scrammed, most probably on "two-loop trouble" as defined in Table 7.1-3. Loss of forced circulation in one loop causes isolation of that loop while subsequent loss of circulation in the second loop constitutes two-loop trouble signal due to either loss of circulator power, reheat steam temperature or pressure increases, high core exit gas temperatures or loss of feedwater function. Manual scram would result if automatic scram signals did not function. The reserve shutdown system would be operated after a few hours to assure an adequate shutdown margin at all times during the accident. Thus, the reactor will remain subcritical during the accident.

Depressurization. When it becomes apparent to the plant operator that the loss of forced circulation is permanent, e.g. before about 5 *hr when resumption of cooling would cause steam generator damage (see Appendix D.2, Section D.2.5), the primary coolant system would be depressurized to storage in the normal manner through the helium purification system as described in Section 9.4.3.3. This depressurization to atmospheric pressure requires several hours and would be nearly completed before primary coolant gas temperature or fission product activity increase to levels affecting normal helium purification system performance.

*Amended to be 2 hours by PSC letter P-77250 dated December 22, 1977.

Should one of the two helium purification trains fail during depressurization, or if one train is being regenerated (one day each year) at the time of the accident, then depressurization can either proceed more slowly while continuing purge helium to the PCRV penetrations, or at the normal rate without supplying purge helium. Should the helium transfer compressor fail, or lose power during depressurization, then the purified helium can be vented directly to the ventilation system exhaust filters as described in Section 9.5.4**.


Purification Systems. Following depressurization, the helium purification system would be shut down. The purified helium purge gas normally supplied by this system to the PCRV top head penetrations and penetration interspaces would not be supplied during the accident since PCRV penetration leakage during the accident with the maximum primary coolant system pressure remaining close to atmospheric pressure is extremely low (see Section D.1.3.4.2). Thus, no helium buffer gas would be supplied to the PCRV penetration interspaces during the accident. After PCRV depressurization is completed, cooling water flow to the helium and charcoal cooling systems in each helium purification system high temperature filter-adsorber unit is initiated as described in Section 9.4.3.3. This measure would permit further PCRV depressurization in the unlikely event that it should be required.

PCRV Liner Cooling. The PCRV cooling water system would continue in operation and be closely monitored since its operation is vital to the PCRV integrity during the accident. This system which is described in Section 9.7, is a Class I system and is connected to the essential electrical bus. Two separate identical closed loops supply cooling water to three separate zones of the PCRV: the top head penetrations; the core support floor, PCRV liner on the side wall, and top head; and the PCRV bottom head and bottom penetrations. Either one of the two PCRV cooling water loops is adequate to maintain safe PCRV liner and concrete temperatures during the accident, and the consequences of the accident reported here are based on the premise that the system operates at 50T capacity during the accident with a revised distribution of water flow and at an increased cover pressure as described below. Thus, half capacity liner cooling (one of two identical loops operating) is assumed as the conservative limiting case.

The accident calculations show that even with this reduced performance adequate PCRV liner temperatures and cooling during the accident are maintained. Thus, the liner will retain its integrity and the PCRV envelope will remain intact and leaktight throughout the accident as demonstrated by the analysis (see also Section D.2.1).

Plant Ventilation. The reactor plant ventilation system would continue to operate normally during the accident in order to provide filtration and elevated release for any fission product activity escaping from the PCRV during the course of the accident. This system is described in Section 6.1.3.2 as an engineered safeguard and is connected to the essential electrical bus.

**This is the mode of depressurization utilized in the alternate cooling system. (See Figure 2).



PRIMARY COOLANT DEPRESSURIZATION FLOW PATH

FIGURE 2

Other Plant Equipment. No other reactor plant equipment is required to function during this accident, although continued operation of equipment, instruments and controls normally operating during reactor shutdown is assumed for purposes of monitoring plant conditions. This equipment has no effect on the course of consequences of the accident.

D.1.1.2 Operator Actions

The following operator actions have been determined to be either necessary or desirable to mitigate the consequences of this accident:

1. Post scram operations to assure subcriticality.
2. Actions required to reestablish helium circulation (attempts assumed to be unsuccessful for this hypothetical accident).
3. Primary coolant system depressurization.
4. Connection of the high temperature filter absorber units to the plant cooling water system.
5. Operation of the reserve shutdown system.
6. Adjustment of the PCRV cooling system water flow rates and cover pressure to increase cooling ability in areas affected. The cooling water flow to the bottom head, bottom head penetrations and PCRV side wall below the core support floor, will be reduced to approximately 10% of normal flow. Reduced flow to these areas of the PCRV will be adequate during the accident because heat transfer to these areas is negligible. The cooling water flow rate to the top head and PCRV side wall liner region above the bottom of the core support floor will be approximately doubled. The core support floor cooling water flow rate will not be changed because heat transfer to the floor during the accident is less than during normal operation. The changes in PCRV cooling water flow will be accomplished by remote-manual valves actuated from the control room.
7. Adjustment of the PCRV cooling water system pressure. The gas cover pressure of the cooling water system (normally at about 2 psig of H₂) will be increased to about 30 psig of He as described in Section 9.7.3.5.4. This is accomplished remotely in the control room by activating a separate overriding helium pressure control system for the cooling water supply tank. This 30 psig cover pressure plus the approximately 60 psi pump head will ensure that the saturation temperature of the cooling water will be above about 300°F at all high flux locations.

There is ample time for these operations to be carried out in a methodical and unhurried manner since none of the above items require rapid operator response. They will be completed before large fission product release from the core develops.

D.1.1.3 Accident Consequences

The effects of this accident involve both core damage and fission product release causing off-site doses. The core hot regions slowly heat up to about 5400°F maximum occurring after 83 hr. After maximum temperature attainment, approximately 95% of the fuel particles in the core will suffer failed coatings resulting in a release of about 28% of the core fission product inventory from the core and top reflector. Of this 28% of the inventory, less than 5% remains gas borne in the PCRV. This 5% is essentially all noble gas with a small amount of iodine. In addition, melting of the steel components of the control rod assembly and some local failure of PCRV liner insulation will occur, but no other damage to the core or PCRV internals is expected. The core will remain subcritical during all periods of the accident due to control rod and reserve shutdown system poisons.

The doses resulting from this accident are several orders of magnitude lower than the guidelines of 10 CFR 100. The total duration (6 month) doses at the low population zone boundary (16,000 meters) are listed below.

Whole body gamma	0.37 mrem
Thyroid	36. mrem
Bone	1. mrem

D.1.1.4 Conclusions

The analysis of the LOFC accident has led to the following principal conclusions:

1. The PCRV liner, penetrations and cooling systems will remain intact during the accident.
2. The core support structure will remain intact during the accident and the core configuration will not be affected.
3. The core will remain subcritical throughout the accident transient.
4. About 5% of the total (decaying) core iodine, 0.02% of the strontium and 99% of the noble gas fission product inventory will escape from the graphite core and reflector and remain gas borne within the PCRV during the accident.
5. Fission product release from the PCRV was conservatively assumed to be 0.2%/day into the reactor building during the accident assuming an arbitrary 5 psig leakage pressure differential. All of the leakage would be collected and filtered before release at high velocity from roof elevation. The resulting conservative atmospheric release of activity (after six months) is about 8.0×10^5 curies of which 98.7% is Kr and Xe.

6. Using the above releases, the total duration doses at the low population zone (16,000 meters) would be orders of magnitude less than the guidance levels given in 10 CFR 100.
7. Using the TID-14844 arbitrary release values, the off-site doses at the low population zone would also be much less than the 10 CFR 100 guideline levels.

In general, no adverse thermal, structural or nuclear consequences of the LOFC have been found which would threaten either the reactor system integrity or the ability of the reactor plant to prevent uncontrolled fission product release to the atmosphere.

TEST# 11177	SUPER(24) 0401010	M01(24) 0400-7023-1530115	SUPER(55) C10C 1A PRINTW 0194R PRESS	ACLY(73) N/A
TEST# 11178	TEST-DIST(10) 620	*50411(72) X-97-01-05	*REPINT(01) A12005	A1, INT,(79)

TEST# 11179	SUPER(24) 0401010	M01(24) 0400-7023-1530115	SUPER(55) C10C 1C PRINTW 0194R PRESS	ACLY(73) N/A
TEST# 11180	TEST-DIST(10) 620	*50411(72) X-97-01-05	*REPINT(01) A12005	A1, INT,(79)

TEST# 11181	SUPER(24) 0401010	M01(24) 0400-7023-1530115	SUPER(55) C10C 1C PRINTW 0194R PRESS	ACLY(73) N/A
TEST# 11182	TEST-DIST(10) 620	*50411(72) X-97-01-05	*REPINT(01) A12005	A1, INT,(79)

TEST# 11183	SUPER(24) 0401010	M01(24) 0400-7023-1530115	SUPER(55) C10C 1C PRINTW 0194R PRESS	ACLY(73) N/A
TEST# 11184	TEST-DIST(10) 620	*50411(72) X-97-01-05	*REPINT(01) A12005	A1, INT,(79)

TEST# 11185	SUPER(24) 0401010	M01(24) 0400-7023-1530115	SUPER(55) C10C 1C PRINTW 0194R PRESS	ACLY(73) N/A
TEST# 11186	TEST-DIST(10) 620	*50411(72) X-97-01-05	*REPINT(01) A12005	A1, INT,(79)

TEST# 11187	SUPER(24) 0401010	M01(24) 0400-7023-1530115	SUPER(55) C10C 1C PRINTW 0194R PRESS	ACLY(73) N/A
TEST# 11188	TEST-DIST(10) 620	*50411(72) X-97-01-05	*REPINT(01) A12005	A1, INT,(79)

OPTIONAL FORMS FOR PAYMENT
BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT
FOR SERVICE TO MUNICIPALITIES

04-Nov-77 27000000 PAYE 0
350/288/9,1/b 265180

PSH# 11143 300P(23) 04/01/00 04/01/00 100-7023-153018 SERV(S) CIRC TO PRINT RIVER PRESS ACCY(73) N/A

LIN(35) 0x2 TEST-DIST(10) 620 -SPFC(72) X-93-01-61 -REF(01) A12045 ALIGN(7a)

PSH# 11144 300P(23) 04/01/00 04/01/00 100-7023-153018 SERV(S) CIRC TO PRINT RIVER PRESS ACCY(73) N/A

LIN(35) 0x2 TEST-DIST(10) 620 -SPFC(72) X-93-01-6F -REF(01) A12045 ALIGN(7a)

PSH# 11145 300P(23) 04/01/00 04/01/00 100-7023-153018 SERV(S) CIRC TO PRINT RIVER PRESS ACCY(73) N/A

LIN(35) 0x2 TEST-DIST(10) 620 -SPFC(72) X-93-01-6F -REF(01) A12045 ALIGN(7a)

PSH# 11146 300P(23) 04/01/00 04/01/00 100-7023-153018 SERV(S) CIRC TO PRINT RIVER PRESS ACCY(73) N/A

LIN(35) 0x2 TEST-DIST(10) 620 -SPFC(72) X-93-01-6F -REF(01) A12045 ALIGN(7a)

PSH# 11147 300P(23) 04/01/00 04/01/00 100-7023-153018 SERV(S) CIRC TO PRINT RIVER PRESS ACCY(73) N/A

LIN(35) 0x2 TEST-DIST(10) 620 -SPFC(72) X-93-01-6F -REF(01) A12045 ALIGN(7a)

PSH# 11148 300P(23) 04/01/00 04/01/00 100-7023-153018 SERV(S) CIRC TO PRINT RIVER PRESS ACCY(73) N/A

LIN(35) 0x2 TEST-DIST(10) 620 -SPFC(72) X-93-01-6F -REF(01) A12045 ALIGN(7a)

CENTRAL AUTO AC COMPANY
REFRIG. SYSTEM

SIGHT RELATED TAILED TUMPLING
(TESTING TO BUILD IN LT. 79-018)

REV 2772 2/28/80 PAGE 5
359/2,8/9,1/6 26880

F#	2101	SUPP(23) GND PUMP	MOT(24) V1-C-U-BJL0-1131	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCY(73) N/A
	LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	*SFT(72) X-0-3-U-6F	*REPORT(01) A12005	AL146(79)

F#	2101+3	SUPP(23) GND PUMP	MOT(24) V1-C-U-BJL0-1131	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCY(73) N/A
	LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	*SFT(72) X-0-3-U-6F	*REPORT(01) A12005	AL146(79)

F#	2101+2	SUPP(23) GND PUMP	MOT(24) V1-C-U-BJL0-1131	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCY(73) N/A
	LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	*SFT(72) X-0-3-U-6F	*REPORT(01) A12005	AL146(79)

F#	2101+5	SUPP(23) GND PUMP	MOT(24) V1-C-U-BJL0-1131	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCY(73) N/A
	LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	*SFT(72) X-0-3-U-6F	*REPORT(01) A12005	AL146(79)

F#	2101+3	SUPP(23) GND PUMP	MOT(24) V1-C-U-BJL0-1131	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCY(73) N/A
	LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	*SFT(72) X-0-3-U-6F	*REPORT(01) A12005	AL146(79)

F#	2101+5	SUPP(23) GND PUMP	MOT(24) V1-C-U-BJL0-1131	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCY(73) N/A
	LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	*SFT(72) X-0-3-U-6F	*REPORT(01) A12005	AL146(79)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPROX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-0183

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 4
3592,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

SYS- 2165	SUPP(23) ANIN	HOD(24) 247	SERV(55) CIRC 1A STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12005	AGING(78)
SYS- 2165	SUPP(23) MICROSWITCH	HOD(24) EXD-AR	SERV(55) CIRC 1A STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-I-653	-REPORT(41) 57519WYLE	AGING(78)
PS- 2166	SUPP(23) COILED PUMP	HOD(24) VIE-CC-BJL0-11ST	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCV(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12005	AGING(78)
SYS- 2166	SUPP(23) ANIN	HOD(24) 247	SERV(55) CIRC 1C STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12005	AGING(78)
SYS- 2166	SUPP(23) MICROSWITCH	HOD(24) EXD-AR	SERV(55) CIRC 1C STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-I-653	-REPORT(41) 57519WYLE	AGING(78)
PS- 2167	SUPP(23) COILED PUMP	HOD(24) VIE-CC-BJL0-11ST	SERV(55) BEARING WATER PUMP 1	ACCV(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12005	AGING(78)

GENERAL AUTOMATIC
RESPONSE SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED FACILITY COMMUNICATIONS
TESTING TO ROUTINE TE 79-010

010227Z MAR 80 PAGE 8
350287416 PESPRO

L= 2108 SUPPLY SYSTEM TESTER
HHP(24) 1-500R SERV(S) STB Being WTR MAKEUP
ACCV(75) N/A
L= 1003500X2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 9-031-65F REPORT(4) 1120NS AL166(74)
L= 2109 SUPPORT(24) 1000P SERV(S) ERG WTR BISTER PL
HHP(24) 1196RT ACCV(75) N/A
L= 1003500X2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 9-3-1-625 REPORT(4) 1120NS AL166(74)
L= 2109 SUPPORT(24) MAINT LAN HHP(24) 71-201721 SERV(S) CIRC 1A WTR TURB CIRCUIT
ACCV(75) N/A
L= 1003500X2 TEST-DIST(10) 830 -SPEC(72) 9-0T REPORT(4) 1265-1 GARDEN
AL166(74)
L= 2109-1 SUPPORT(24) VELAN HHP(24) 0-53076-271 SERV(S) CIRC 1A WTR TURB SIGHT
ACCV(75) N/A
L= 1003500X2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 9-3-1-566 REPORT(4) 1120NS AL166(74)
L= 2107-2 SUPPORT(24) VELAN HHP(24) 0-53076-37 SERV(S) CIRC 1A WTR TURB DRAIN
ACCV(75) N/A
L= 1003500X2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 9-3-1-566 REPORT(4) 1120NS AL166(74)
L= 2109-2 SUPPORT(24) MFR(SWITCH) HHP(24) 0-53076-271 SERV(S) CIRC 1A WTR TURB
ACCV(75) N/A
L= 1003500X2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 9-3-1-566 REPORT(4) 1120NS AL166(74)

GRANTHAM AUTOMATIC COMPANY
MATERIAL HANDLING SYSTEM

SAFETY VERIFIED TAGGED Components
TAG NUMBER: H-101110-11-79-010

REV 277 2010-06-01
359728916/016
26SEP09

PN - 2410	Supp(23) GND FUSE	H00124 41961	Supp(55) ESD RC WTH HISTW PL	ACCY(73) N/A
LIN(35) H62	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(T2) 93-1-695	-REFR(101) 50290-3 WLT	AGING(70)
Sy -	Supp(23) HASP HLN	H00124 71-20724	Supp(55) CIRC IC WTH TURN TBL	ACCY(73) N/A
LIN(35) H82	TEST-DIST(10) 930	-SPLC(T2) 90E	-REFR(101) 5265-1 GAP(0)	AGING(70)
HV -	2410+1 Supp(23) VFLA1	H00124 0-33076-2/1	Supp(55) CIRC IC WTH TURN SUPPLY	ACCY(73) N/A
LIN(35) H82	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(T2) 93-1-566	-REFR(101) 5060-600-2AFL	AGING(70)
HV -	2410+2 Supp(23) VFLA1	H00124 0-33076-37	Supp(55) CIRC IC WTH TURN FLSH	ACCY(73) N/A
LIN(35) H82	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(T2) 93-1-566	-REFR(101) 5060-600-2AFL	AGING(70)
TS -	2410+2 Supp(23) HUMISELCH	H00124 076-2KH	Supp(55) CIRC IC WTH TURN RKT	ACCY(73) N/A
LIN(35) H82	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(T2) 0-3-1-594	-REFR(101) SPORADIC	AGING(70)
Sy -	Supp(23) A(11)	H00124 247	Supp(55) CIRC IC WTH TURN FLSH	ACCY(73) N/A
LIN(35) H82	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(T2) 0-3-1-66	-REFR(101) ALDQS	AGING(70)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
OPTIONS IN SYSTEM

SUPPLY RELATED FACILITY COMBINATIONS
FOR SOURCE II BUDGET I.E. 79-010)

REV 277 20AUG80 PAGE 7
550/288/9,1/6 26SEP80

PSN	PIN	SUPP(23) EQUIPMENT	INFO(20) EX-AM	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
LIN	2111	SUPP(23) EQUIPMENT	INFO(20) EX-AM	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
		LIN(135) EXP2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
				SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
Sy	2112	SUPP(23) EQUIPMENT	INFO(20) EX-AM	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
		LIN(135) EXP2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
				SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
PSN	2112	SUPP(23) EQUIPMENT	INFO(20) EX-AM	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
		LIN(135) EXP2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
				SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
Sy	2113	SUPP(23) EQUIPMENT	INFO(20) EX-AM	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
		LIN(135) EXP2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
				SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB CTL VAL	ACCV(73) N/A
HV	2115	SUPP(23) VLT, A	INFO(20) EX-AM	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB SUPPLY	ACCV(73) N/A
		LIN(135) EXP2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB SUPPLY	ACCV(73) N/A
				SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB SUPPLY	ACCV(73) N/A
HV	2115-2	SUPP(23) VLT, A	INFO(20) EX-AM	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB SUPPLY	ACCV(73) N/A
		LIN(135) EXP2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB SUPPLY	ACCV(73) N/A
				SERV(55) CIRC TO STM TURB SUPPLY	ACCV(73) N/A

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 8

REPAIR BY SYSTEM

RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE-79-01B

559/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

ZS+ 2115-2 SUPP(23) MICROSNITCH R00(24) HEZ6-280 SERV(55) CIRC 10 KTR TURBINE ACCY(73) N/A

L00C351 RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- SPEC(72) 93-1-504 REPORT(41) 58080-BRYLE AGING(74) -----

SV+ 2116 SUPP(23) PASSEI PLAN R00(24) 71-20721 SERV(55) CIRC 10 KTR TURB CONTROL ACCY(73) N/A

L00C351 RX2 TEST-DIST(10) 630 ----- SPEC(72) NONE REPORT(41) 5265-1 GARNIER AGING(74) -----

HV+ 2116-1 SUPP(23) VELAN R00(24) P-33076-271 SERV(55) CIRC 10 KTR TURB SUPPLY ACCY(73) N/A

L00C351 RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- SPEC(72) 93-1-566 REPORT(41) 5460-6884-2AEIL AGING(74) -----

HV+ 2116-2 SUPP(23) VELAN R00(24) P-33076-37 SERV(55) CIRC 10 KTR TURB DISCH ACCY(73) N/A

L00C351 RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- SPEC(72) 93-1-566 REPORT(41) 5460-6884-2AEIL AGING(74) -----

ZS+ 2116-2 SUPP(23) MICROSNITCH R00(24) HEZ6-280 SERV(55) CIRC 10 KTR TURBINE ACCY(73) N/A

L00C351 RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- SPEC(72) 93-1-504 REPORT(41) 58080-BRYLE AGING(74) -----

ESV+ 2135 SUPP(23) ASID R00(24) 830202SF SERV(55) HBG KTR SURGE TANK 1 ACCY(73) 1/2X F.S.

L00C351 RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F REPORT(41) A12005 AGING(74) -----

GENERAL AUTOMATIC COMPANY
REFRIGERATION SYSTEM

Safety Related Test ID: Computer-N3
Test Spec: Test Plan ID: T9-010

WF V277 22A(1.8) FRI, E Q
359/2/E/9,1/6 26SEP0

15V=	215v-1	Supp(23) ASC0	HUD(24) H300091	STW(55) HBG WTR SIGHT TANK 1	ACCV(73) N/A
LIN(35)	0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X=930-U=6F	-REPORT(01) A12045	AGING(70)
15V=	215v-1	Supp(23) ASC0	HUD(24) H300010	STW(55) HBG WTR SIGHT TANK 1	ACCV(73) 1/24 F,S*
LIN(35)	0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X=930-U=6F	-REPORT(01) A12045	AGING(70)
15V=	215v-2	Supp(23) ASC0	HUD(24) H300091	STW(55) HBG WTR SIGHT TANK 1	ACCV(73) N/A
LIN(35)	0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X=930-U=6F	-REPORT(01) A12045	AGING(70)
15V=	215v-2	Supp(23) ASC0	HUD(24) H300091	STW(55) HBG WTR SIGHT TANK 1	ACCV(73) N/A
LIN(35)	0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X=930-U=6F	-REPORT(01) A12045	AGING(70)
15V=	215v	Supp(23) ASC0	HUD(24) H302U25F	STW(55) HBG WTR SIGHT TANK 1	ACCV(73) 1/24 F,S*
LIN(35)	0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X=930-U=6F	-REPORT(01) A12045	AGING(70)
15V=	215v-1	Supp(23) ASC0	HUD(24) H300091	STW(55) HBG WTR SIGHT TANK 1	ACCV(73) N/A
LIN(35)	0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X=930-U=6F	-REPORT(01) A12045	AGING(70)
15V=	215v-1	Supp(23) ASC0	HUD(24) H3000610	STW(55) HBG WTR SIGHT TANK 1	ACCV(73) 1/24 F,S*
LIN(35)	0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X=930-U=6F	-REPORT(01) A12045	AGING(70)

INTERFACIAL COMPANY
WAPERS SYSTEM

SAFETY CRITICAL EQUIPMENT
SPECIMEN TEST REPORT RE 79-010

REV 77 2200-80 DATE 10
550/28/91/n 26SEP80

1.00	216.2	Supp(73) ASCH	Min(2a) 0.300(9)	Stev(55) HBG W/ SHOT TANK 1	ACCY(73) N/A
1.00	135.82	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPF(172) X=0.3(0.6)	-REF(101) 120mS	At.116(7a)
1.00	214.7	Supp(73) VELA	Min(2a) 0.300(9)	Stev(55) HBG W/ SHOT TANK 1A	ACCY(73) N/A
1.00	135.82	TEST-DIST(10) 125	-SPF(172) X=0.3(0.6)	-REF(101) 120mS	At.116(7a)
1.00	215.7	Supp(73) VELA	Min(2a) 0.300(9)	Stev(55) HBG W/ SHOT TANK 1A	ACCY(73) N/A
1.00	135.82	TEST-DIST(10) 125	-SPF(172) X=0.3(0.6)	-REF(101) 120mS	At.116(7a)
1.00	216.0	Supp(73) VELA	Min(2a) 0.300(9)	Stev(55) HBG W/ SHOT TANK 1A	ACCY(73) N/A
1.00	135.82	TEST-DIST(10) 125	-SPF(172) X=0.3(0.6)	-REF(101) 120mS	At.116(7a)
1.00	216.0	Supp(73) VELA	Min(2a) 0.300(9)	Stev(55) HBG W/ SHOT TANK 1B	ACCY(73) N/A
1.00	135.82	TEST-DIST(10) 125	-SPF(172) X=0.3(0.6)	-REF(101) 120mS	At.116(7a)
1.00	215.5	Supp(73) VELA	Min(2a) 0.300(9)	Stev(55) LONG 1 LONG W/ FLAMES	ACCY(73) 0.5% F.S.
1.00	135.82	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPF(172) X=0.4(0.6)	-REF(101) 120mS	At.116(7a)

INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP
OF POSITION SYSTEM

SAYING RELATED FACILITY COMMANDS
TO SOURCE FOR DULUTH FE 79-016

PLANT 2184 PLANT 2185 DATE 11
359/28/91/6 265490

PLANT 2184 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2185
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
6

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

PLANT 2185 SUPPORT 1 PLANT 2184 0005
1151-0151101 020 *SPEC(72) x-93-0-6F
AG1NG(74)

FEDERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
EDISON, NEW JERSEY

SAFETY DATA SHEET (1040) USES
OF SPURS TO MULLETT IN 14-79-01H

REV 2/T 2 AUG 90 PAGE 12
350/2, 8/9, 1/6
26 SEP 90

F1S- P1040 S100(23) HAZARD
TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

F1C(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

F1S- P1040 S100(23) HAZARD
TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

F1C(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

F1S- P1040 S100(23) HAZARD
TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

F1C(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

F1S- P1040 S100(23) HAZARD
TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

F1C(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
min(24) 20H
SERV(S5) USE TO HAZ W/D SUPPLY
ACCV(T5) 0.52 F.S.

GEORGE F. WRIGHT COMPANY
APPROX. BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPUTERS
REFERENCE TO BULLETIN 14-79-01B

REV 277 2/28/80 DATE 13
354228/9,16 26SF80

REV - 2103	supp(23) vfa	supp(24) v=33076-0/40	serv(55) supp of 44076-0/40	ACCV(73) n/k
LNC(55) 082	TEST-DIST(10) 020	TEST-CUT(2) 0=93-0/64	DEPOINT(1) 012005	ALN(40)(74)
REV - 2104	supp(23) vfa	supp(24) v=33076-0/40	serv(55) supp of 44076-0/40	ACCV(73) n/k
LNC(55) 082	TEST-DIST(10) 020	TEST-CUT(2) 0=93-0/65	DEPOINT(1) 012005	ALN(40)(74)
LSI - 2113	supp(23) vfa	supp(24) v=33076-0/40	serv(55) supp of 44076-0/40	ACCV(73) n/k
LNC(55) 082	TEST-DIST(10) 050	TEST-CUT(2) 0=93-0/64	DEPOINT(1) 012005	ALN(40)(74)

GENERAL ATOMICS COMPANY
REFRIG. BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED EQUIPMENT
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

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35972,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

PV- 21120	SUPP(23) VELAN	HOD(29) E-35076-0	SERV(55) TURB WTR DRAIN TR VENT	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
LT- 21121	SUPP(23) FOXBORO	HOD(29) E130H-KAM2-0-XJB	SERV(55) HP SEPARATOR 1A	ACCY(73) +1/2SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
LT- 21122	SUPP(23) FOXBORO	HOD(29) E130H-KAM2-0-XJB	SERV(55) HP SEPARATOR 1L	ACCY(73) +1/2SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
LT- 21123	SUPP(23) FOXBORO	HOD(29) E130H-KAM2-0-XJB	SERV(55) HP SEPARATOR 1B	ACCY(73) +1/2SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
LT- 21124	SUPP(23) FOXBORO	HOD(29) E130H-KAM2-0-XJB	SERV(55) HP SEPARATOR 1D	ACCY(73) +1/2SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
LT- 21125	SUPP(23) FOXBORO	HOD(29) E130H	SERV(55) TURB WTR DRAIN TANK	ACCY(73) +1/2SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

GRUMMAN Aeronautical Company
REFLEX FY SYSTEM

SATLIT P1130 TAILORED COMMUNICATIONS
THE SPOT/7 31) RHEUET/4 IF 73-0101

HT 2277 22AU, RD DATE 15
553/2*H/9, L/6
26SEP80

L9- P1130 SUPP(23) HAGEN WILH.
THE SPOT/7 31) RHEUET/4 IF 73-0101

HHD(2A) 1-751-5P-0104
SERV(S) TURN W/DRAIN TANK
ACCV(73) N/A

LIC(35) 1X2 TEST-DIST(10) R30
TEST-DIST(10) R30
SPFT(72) X-93-1-6F
REPWT(01) A120aS
ALNG(70)

L.V- P1130 SUPP(23) VFLAN
HHD(2A) F-33076-52/61R
SERV(S) TURN W/DRAIN TANK
ACCV(73) N/A

LIC(35) 1X2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
TEST-DIST(10) R20
SPFT(72) X-93-1-6F
REPWT(01) A120aS
ALNG(70)

L.SI- P1132 SUPP(23) MAGNETIK
HHD(2A) F-751-3P-S105
SERV(S) TURN W/DRAIN TANK
ACCV(73) N/A

LIC(35) 1X2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
TEST-DIST(10) R20
SPFT(72) 93-1-625
REPWT(01) 57513-7 wlf
ALNG(70)

L.V- P1137 SUPP(23) HAGEN
HHD(2A) 2B8
SERV(S) CIRC 1A F-PPG BRG W/H
ACCV(73) +12 F_S*

LIC(35) 1X2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
TEST-DIST(10) R20
SPFT(72) X-93-1-6F
REPWT(01) A120aS
ALNG(70)

L.SI- P1138 SUPP(23) HAGEN
HHD(2A) 2B8
SERV(S) CIRC 1C THRG BRG W/H
ACCV(73) +12 F_S*

LIC(35) 1X2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
TEST-DIST(10) R20
SPFT(72) X-93-1-6F
REPWT(01) A120aS
ALNG(70)

L.V- P1139 SUPP(23) HAGEN
HHD(2A) 2B8
SERV(S) CIRC 1D F-PPG BRG W/H
ACCV(73) +12 F_S*

LIC(35) 1X2 TEST-DIST(10) R20
TEST-DIST(10) R20
SPFT(72) X-93-1-6F
REPWT(01) A120aS
ALNG(70)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPROX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 16
3592889176 26SEP80

FIES- 21100 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 288 SERV(55) CIRC 1D EMERG BRG WTR ACCY(73) +IX F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FIES- 21109 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 289 SERV(55) CIRC 1A BRG WTR LEAK ACCY(73) +IX F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FIES- 21150 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 289 SERV(55) CIRC 1C BRG WTR LEAK ACCY(73) +IX F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FIES- 21151 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 289 SERV(55) CIRC 1A BRG WTR LEAK ACCY(73) +IX F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FIES- 21152 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 289 SERV(55) CIRC 1C BRG WTR LEAK ACCY(73) +IX F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FIES- 21153 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 289 SERV(55) CIRC 1A BRG WTR LEAK ACCY(73) +IX F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
RPP/RX HY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMMANDS
REFERENCE TO HISTORICAL RE 79-010)

REV 277 228000Z PAGE 17
559/2, R/H/9, 1/6
26SEP00

PLS-2115₁ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₂ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₃ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₄ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₅ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₆ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₇ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₈ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

PLS-2115₉ SIPP(23) 041010
LHC(35) 082 TEST-DIST(10) 620 *SPT(72) 8-03-1-6F
SERV(S) C1C 1B HPG W/H LEAK ACCY(73) +12 F.S.
REFPOINT(01) A1200S AGING(7a)

GEOPHYSICAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
REFRAC BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED FACILITY INSPECTION
DEPARTMENT II: PLATEAU DE TQ-0110

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359/2, R/9, L/6 26SEP80

POLIS-21160 SUPP(23) HABITAT HABITAT SERV(55) CIRC IN HAB WIR LEAK ACCY(73) +1 1/4FS

LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPF(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 ATINC(74)

POLIS-21173 SUPP(23) HABITAT HABITAT SERV(55) CIRC IN LOSS OF PRO WIR ACCY(73) +1 1/4FS

LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPF(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 ATINC(74)

POLIS-21176 SUPP(23) HABITAT HABITAT SERV(55) CIRC IN LOSS OF PRO WIR ACCY(73) +1 1/4FS

LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPF(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 ATINC(74)

POLIS-21177 SUPP(23) HABITAT HABITAT SERV(55) CIRC IN LOSS OF PRO WIR ACCY(73) +1 1/4FS

LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPF(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 ATINC(74)

GEORGE AERONAUTIC COMPANY
PROPHET SYSTEM

SATellite RELATED TESTED UNTESTED IS
TEST STATUS: 100% TESTED 100% TESTED

08/27/77 C7A111,00 FAULT 49
359/2869,160 26SF100

F013-21178 SUPPORT(23) HAVING 000
SUPPORT(23) HAVING 000
SUPPORT(10) 020
SUPPORT(172) X=93-0-66
-REPORT(01) 812005

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

100 035 0X2 TEST-DIST(10) 020
SUPPORT(172) X=93-0-66
-REPORT(01) 812005

SUPPORT(23) HAVING 000
HAD(20) 000

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

100 035 0X2 TEST-DIST(10) 010
SUPPORT(172) 93-1-528
-REPORT(01) 87507-2 WYL

HAD(20) 000

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

100 035 0X2 TEST-DIST(10) 020
SUPPORT(172) X=93-0-66
-REPORT(01) 812005

HAD(20) 000

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

100 035 0X2 TEST-DIST(10) 010
SUPPORT(172) 93-1-528
-REPORT(01) 87507-2 WYL

HAD(20) 000

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

100 035 0X2 TEST-DIST(10) 020
SUPPORT(172) X=93-0-66
-REPORT(01) 812005

HAD(20) 000

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

100 035 0X2 TEST-DIST(10) 010
SUPPORT(172) 93-1-528
-REPORT(01) 87507-2 WYL

HAD(20) 000

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

100 035 0X2 TEST-DIST(10) 020
SUPPORT(172) X=93-0-66
-REPORT(01) 812005

HAD(20) 000

SUPPORT(55) CIRC 10 LOSS OF RFG WTR
ACLU(73) +1 1/4XFS

INTERNAL ALIMENTIC COMPANY
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM

SAFETY RELIABILITY FACILITY COMPUTER AIDS

REVIEWED BY 21100 21100 PAGE 20

FOR SIGNATURE TO RELEASED IF 79-01H)

359/2*8/9*1/b
26SEP80

21100	SUPP(23) HAVING	HUB(24) 28H	SERV(55) CIRC 10 LUGS OF RPD W/H	ACCV(73) +1 1/4X3
LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPFC(72) 93-1-52H	-REPRINT(41) 57507+2 W/H	AL186(79)

21100	SUPP(23) HASDIE ITAN	HUB(24) 57-20721	SERV(55) CIRC 1A RPD W/H	ACCV(73) N/A
LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPFC(72) X-9301-66F	-REPRINT(41) A12045	AL186(79)

21100	SUPP(23) HASDIE ITAN	HUB(24) 0012	SERV(55) CIRC 1A RPD W/H	ACCV(73) +1 1/2 RGT
LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPFC(72) 95-1-527	-REPRINT(41) 5460-7025-15A11	AL186(79)

21100	SUPP(23) HASDIE ITAN	HUB(24) 57-20721	SERV(55) CIRC 1C RPD W/H	ACCV(73) N/A
LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPFC(72) X-9301-66F	-REPRINT(41) A12045	AL186(79)

21100	SUPP(23) HASDIE ITAN	HUB(24) 0012	SERV(55) CIRC 1C RPD W/H	ACCV(73) +1 1/2 RGT
LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPFC(72) 95-1-527	-REPRINT(41) 5460-7025-15A11	AL186(79)

21100	SUPP(23) HASDIE ITAN	HUB(24) 0012	SERV(55) CIRC 1C RPD W/H	ACCV(73) N/A
LIC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPFC(72) X-9301-66F	-REPRINT(41) A12045	AL186(79)

DATAVIEW, LTD., COMPANY
DATAVIEW, INC. SYSTEM

SATellite RELEASER TESTER UNIT
TESTER UNIT FOR TESTS

434277 22800000 041 81
350/28/01/0 288000

110C 21147	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) +12 SEC
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) 05-1-527	PRINT(?) 5060-7025-18AEL	AC186(70)
110C 21149	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 37-20721	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) X-95-0-6F	PRINT(?) A1204S	AC116(70)
110C 21150	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) +12 SEC
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) 04-1-527	PRINT(?) 5060-7025-18AEL	AC186(70)
110C 21151	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) X-95-0-6F	PRINT(?) A1204S	AC116(70)
110C 21152	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) X-95-0-6F	PRINT(?) A1204S	AC116(70)
110C 21153	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) 04-1-527	PRINT(?) 5060-7025-18AEL	AC186(70)
110C 21154	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) X-95-0-6F	PRINT(?) A1204S	AC116(70)
110C 21155	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) 04-1-527	PRINT(?) 5060-7025-18AEL	AC186(70)
110C 21156	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) X-95-0-6F	PRINT(?) A1204S	AC116(70)
110C 21157	SUPP(?) WASHINGT	HWD(?) 0012	SERV(?) CINCINNATI HEG MIP	ACCV(?) N/A
110C 35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10) 020	SPT(?) X-95-0-6F	PRINT(?) A1204S	AC116(70)

General Utility Functions
Defined by System

Safety Related Components
Defined by System

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359/rh/q, 1/b 28/00

REV2/T - 2/28/00, PAGE 21
359/rh/q, 1/b 28/00

REV 21250	STOP(23) V1A1	HOLD(24) 1=33(76-9/10	SERVICE(55) # CINCSAT# 10 w/o TURBL ACCY(73) N/A	
LIN(35) 0x2	TEST-DIST(10) R25	-SPRT(72) X=0.3=0(-6.6F	-REFRSH(41) A1204S	ALNG(73)

REV 21250	STOP(23) V1A1	HOLD(24) 1=33(76-9/10	SERVICE(55) # CINCSAT# 10 w/o TURBL ACCY(73) N/A	
LIN(35) 0x2	TEST-DIST(10) R25	-SPRT(72) X=0.3=0(-6.6F	-REFRSH(41) A1204S	ALNG(73)

REV 21250	STOP(23) V1A1	HOLD(24) 1=33(76-9/10	SERVICE(55) # CINCSAT# 10 w/o TURBL ACCY(73) N/A	
LIN(35) 0x2	TEST-DIST(10) R25	-SPRT(72) X=0.3=0(-6.6F	-REFRSH(41) A1204S	ALNG(73)

REV 21250	STOP(23) F10000	HOLD(24) 1=300	SERVICE(55) LPT1 ALTN REG STR ACCY(73) 1/2 K_F_S*	
LIN(35) 0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPRT(72) X=0.3=0(-6.6F	-REFRSH(41) A1204S	ALNG(73)

REV 21250	STOP(23) F10000	HOLD(24) 1=100	SERVICE(55) LPT1 ALTN REG STR ACCY(73) 1/2 K_F_S*	
LIN(35) 0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPRT(72) X=0.3=0(-6.6F	-REFRSH(41) S7500-TURBL	ALNG(73)

REV 21250	STOP(23) F10000	HOLD(24) 1=100	SERVICE(55) LPT1 ALTN REG STR ACCY(73) 1/2 K_F_S*	
LIN(35) 0x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPRT(72) X=0.3=0(-6.6F	-REFRSH(41) S7500-TURBL	ALNG(73)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPHOX HY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
RESPONSE TO BULLETIN TE 79-01R

REV 277 22AUG80 PAGE 23
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

PDT- 21285-2 SUPP(23) FOXBORO M00(24) E1100 SERV(53) FIRE B ALUM BRG KTR ACCY(73) 1/2X F,S.

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-568 -REPORT(41) 57500-7HYLE AGING(74)

XEP- 21285-2 SUPP(23) HASONEILAN M00(24) 8005 SERV(53) FIRE B ALUM BRG KTR ACCY(73) +-1% RGE

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R10 -SPEC(72) 93-1-585 -REPORT(41) 57502-3 HYLE AGING(74)

PDT- 21286 SUPP(23) FOXBORO M00(24) E130H SERV(53) LP 2 ALUM BRG KTR ACCY(73) 1/2X F,S.

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12005 AGING(74)

PDT- 21286-1 SUPP(23) FOXBORO M00(24) E1100 SERV(53) FIRE C ALUM BRG KTR ACCY(73) 1/2X F,S.

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-568 -REPORT(41) 57500-7HYLE AGING(74)

XEP- 21286-1 SUPP(23) HASONEILAN M00(24) 8005 SERV(53) FIRE C ALUM BRG KTR ACCY(73) +-1% RGE

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12005 AGING(74)

PDT- 21286-2 SUPP(23) FOXBORO M00(24) E1100 SERV(53) FIRE D ALUM BRG KTR ACCY(73) 1/2X F,S.

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T15 -SPEC(72) 93-1-582 -REPORT(41) 57502-3HYLE AGING(74)

General Electric Computer
Information System

Safety Related Diagnostic
Test Suite Test 1E 79-0161

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359/2,679,1/6 26SPBU

TEST= 21200-2 SUPPORT(3) HASTHAK
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GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REF BOX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 25
359/2,8/9,176 26SEP80

PDTS- 21320 SUPP(23) BARTON HBD(24) 288A SERV(55) CIRC 1C STM TURB TRIP ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDTS- 21321 SUPP(23) BARTON HBD(24) 288A SERV(55) CIRC 1A STM TURB TRIP ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDTS- 21322 SUPP(23) BARTON HBD(24) 288A SERV(55) CIRC 1C STM TURB TRIP ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDTS- 21323 SUPP(23) BARTON HBD(24) 288A SERV(55) CIRC 1A STM TURB TRIP ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDTS- 21324 SUPP(23) BARTON HBD(24) 288A SERV(55) CIRC 1C STM TURB TRIP ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDTS- 21325 SUPP(23) BARTON HBD(24) 288A SERV(55) CIRC 1B STM TURB TRIP ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFRUX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-018)

REV277 22AUG86 PAGE 26
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP86

PDIS- 21326	SUPP(23) PARTON	HUD(24) 288A	SERV(55) CIRC 1D STM TURB TRIP	ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-637 ----- +REPORT(41) 5410-7130-632AET AGING(74) -----				
PDIS- 21327	SUPP(23) PARTON	HUD(24) 288A	SERV(55) CIRC 1B STM TURB TRIP	ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- +SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F ----- +REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				
PDIS- 21328	SUPP(23) PARTON	HUD(24) 288A	SERV(55) CIRC 1D STM TURB TRIP	ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-637 ----- +REPORT(41) 5410-7130-632AET AGING(74) -----				
PDIS- 21329	SUPP(23) PARTON	HUD(24) 288A	SERV(55) CIRC 1B STM TURB TRIP	ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- +SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F ----- +REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				
PDIS- 21330	SUPP(23) PARTON	HUD(24) 288A	SERV(55) CIRC 1D STM TURB TRIP	ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-637 ----- +REPORT(41) 5410-7130-632AET AGING(74) -----				
PDIS- 21395	SUPP(23) PARTON	HUD(24) 288	SERV(55) BACKUP MAKEUP FNG WTR PMP	ACCY(73) +-1% F.S.
LOC(35) RX2 14.81-DIST(10) R20 ----- +SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F ----- +REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPROX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01H)

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359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

PDIS- 21395 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 288A SERV(55) DP ACROSS M21114 ACCY(73) +/-1% F.S.
LUE(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDIS- 21396 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 288A SERV(55) DP ACROSS M21117 ACCY(73) +/-1% F.S.
LUE(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDIS- 21397 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 288A SERV(55) DP ACROSS M21110 ACCY(73) +/-1% F.S.
LUE(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDIS- 21398 SUPP(23) BARTON HOD(24) 288A SERV(55) DP ACROSS M21112 ACCY(73) +/-1% F.S.
LUE(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

PDT- 21411 SUPP(23) ELDORADO HOD(24) E1101 SERV(55) CIRC A BRG WTR DIFF PRESS ACCY(73) 1/2% F.S.
LUE(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-568 -REPORT(41) 57500-78YLE AGING(74)

PDT- 21412 SUPP(23) ELDORADO HOD(24) E1101 SERV(55) CIRC C BRG WTR DIFF PRESS ACCY(73) 1/2% F.S.
LUE(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-568 -REPORT(41) 57500-78YLE AGING(74)

GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIC COMPANY
ATMOSPHERE BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED FAILURE CONDITIONS

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559/24/91/6 26SEP80

REMARKS: RE BULLETIN 179-01B

101 - 21410	Supp(73) F100HII	H10(73) F100H	Serv(55) CINC B BKG W/ DIFF PRESS	ACCV(73) 1/2X F.S.
101 (35) BX2	1151-0151(10) 120	-SP1C(72) 93-1-566	-REPRT(41) 57504-2WLT	ACINT(74)
101 - 21410	Supp(73) F100HII	H10(24) F100H	Serv(55) CINC D BKG W/ DIFF PRESS	ACCV(73) 1/2X F.S.
101 (35) BX2	1151-0151(10) 115	-SP1C(72) 93-1-582	-REPRT(41) 57507-2WLT	ACINT(74)
101 - 21415-1	Supp(73) HASp11AII	H10(73) 4520	Serv(55) LPI ACTIN GAS PRESS VA	ACCV(73) N/A
101 (35) BX2	1151-0151(10) 120	-SP1C(72) 93-1-571	-REPRT(41) 57504-2WLT	ACINT(74)
101 - 21415-1	Supp(73) HIGHSWITCH	H10(24) 4520	Serv(55) LPI ACTIN GAS PNT5 VA	ACCV(73) N/A
101 (35) BX2	1151-0151(10) 120	-SP1C(72) 93-1-544	-REPRT(41) 58084-2WLT	ACINT(74)
101 - 21415-2	Supp(73) HASp11AII	H10(73) 4520	Serv(55) LPI ACTIN W/ PLT1 BKG V	ACCV(73) N/A
101 (35) BX2	1151-0151(10) 120	-SP1C(72) 93-1-571	-REPRT(41) 57504-2WLT	ACINT(74)
101 - 21416-1	Supp(73) FASp11AII	H10(73) 4520	Serv(55) LPI ACTIN GAS PRESS VA	ACCV(73) N/A
101 (35) BX2	1151-0151(10) 120	-SP1C(72) 93-1-571	-REPRT(41) 57504-2WLT	ACINT(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPOBX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN HL 79-01B)

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ZS- 21916-1 SUPP(23) MICROSWITCH HBD(24) FEZB-ZRN SERV(55) LP2 ACCUM GAS PRESS VA ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-544 -REPORT(41) 58084-RHYLE AGING(74)

HV- 21916-2 SUPP(23) BASINEELAN HBD(24) 3620 SERV(55) LP2 ACCUM XTR PURGE BLK V ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-544 -REPORT(41) 57504-THYLE AGING(74)

FT- 21925 SUPP(23) FOXBORO HBD(24) FT30H SERV(55) HP SER FLW 1A ACCY(73) +/-0.5SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FT- 21926 SUPP(23) FOXBORO HBD(24) FT30H SERV(55) HP SER FLW 1C ACCY(73) +/-0.5SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FT- 21927 SUPP(23) FOXBORO HBD(24) FT30H SERV(55) HP SER FLW 1B ACCY(73) +/-0.5SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

FT- 21928 SUPP(23) FOXBORO HBD(24) FT30H SERV(55) HP SER FLW 1D ACCY(73) +/-0.5SF,S.
LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

INTERNAL AUTOMATIC COMPUTATION
REFUSE BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TABLET COMPUTATIONS
REFERENCE TO BULLETIN 1E 79-011

REV277Z 22AUG80 PAGE 30
359-218/416 26SEP80

IV=	2201	Supp(25) RUEKWEIL	RUE(24) 3914.JMVY	STREV(55) Loop 1 fw. Init I	ACCV(73) N/A
	LOC(35) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=93-U-OF	-RTPH(14) A12045	AGING(74)
LS=	2204	Supp(25) RUEKWEIL	RUE(24) 3914.JMVY	STREV(55) Loop 1 fw. Init I	ACCV(73) N/A
	LOC(35) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) 93-U-536	-RTPH(14) SHOR4-T WLT	AGING(74)
IV=	2202	Supp(25) RUEKWEIL	RUE(24) 3914.JMVY	STREV(55) Loop 2 fw. Init I	ACCV(73) N/A
	LOC(35) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=93-U-OF	-RTPH(14) A12045	AGING(74)
LS=	2202	Supp(25) RUEKWEIL	RUE(24) 3914.JMVY	STREV(55) Loop 2 fw. Init I	ACCV(73) N/A
	LOC(35) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) 93-U-536	-RTPH(14) SHOR4-T WLT	AGING(74)
IV=	2203	Supp(25) RUEKWEIL	RUE(24) 3914.JMVY	STREV(55) Loop 1 through fw. Init I	ACCV(73) N/A
	LOC(35) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=93-U-OF	-RTPH(14) A12045	AGING(74)
LS=	2205	Supp(25) RUEKWEIL	RUE(24) 3914.JMVY	STREV(55) Loop 1 through fw. Init I	ACCV(73) N/A
	LOC(35) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) 93-U-536	-RTPH(14) SHOR4-T WLT	AGING(74)

1. 22058 8:00 AM COMPUTER
4. 22058 8:00 AM COMPUTER

Safety Related Unintended Actions
Test Sequence 10-Subcycle 10-20-01B

Flight 22058 C22058-01 FAULT 31
359-288/9-1/b GNDPHU

F1= 22058 STOP(24) FORWARD
100(35) 102 ITST-DIST(10) 120
STOP(24) 391s delay SERVY(55) UNDP 2 FLIGHT FAULT
STOP(172) X=93-U-OF REPORT(41) A12045
ACCY(73) N/A

F1= 22058 STOP(24) FORWARD
100(35) 102 ITST-DIST(10) 120
STOP(24) 391s delay SERVY(55) UNDP 2 FLIGHT FAULT
STOP(172) X=93-U-OF REPORT(41) A12045
ACCY(73) N/A

F1= 22058 STOP(24) FORWARD
100(35) 102 ITST-DIST(10) 120
STOP(24) 391s delay SERVY(55) UNDP 1 FLIGHT FAULT
STOP(172) X=93-U-OF REPORT(41) A12045
ACCY(73) N/A

F1= 22058 STOP(24) FORWARD
100(35) 102 ITST-DIST(10) 120
STOP(24) 391s delay SERVY(55) UNDP 1 FLIGHT FAULT
STOP(172) X=93-U-OF REPORT(41) A12045
ACCY(73) N/A

F1= 22058 STOP(24) FORWARD
100(35) 102 ITST-DIST(10) 120
STOP(24) 391s delay SERVY(55) UNDP 2 FLIGHT FAULT
STOP(172) X=93-U-OF REPORT(41) A12045
ACCY(73) N/A

F1= 22058 STOP(24) FORWARD
100(35) 102 ITST-DIST(10) 120
STOP(24) 391s delay SERVY(55) UNDP 2 FLIGHT FAULT
STOP(172) X=93-U-OF REPORT(41) A12045
ACCY(73) N/A

F1= 22058 STOP(24) FORWARD
100(35) 102 ITST-DIST(10) 120
STOP(24) 391s delay SERVY(55) UNDP 2 FLIGHT FAULT
STOP(172) X=93-U-OF REPORT(41) A12045
ACCY(73) N/A

6400 MAE ELEME (COPARTY
841608 PT SYSTEM

SATISFICATE DOCUMENTATION
40150058 40150071 41 79-010)

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559/2,6/9,1/b
26SEP80

ENV = 2200	SUPP(24) F000001	BLD(24) 3916 JHET	SHR(55) LIMP 2 FW FLW FLW	ACCY(75) n/a
1.0E+353 1b2	1E51-0151(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=9.5+0.0f	-REFPLW(1) A12045	ALNG(74)
.....
ENV = 2204	SUPP(24) F00001	BLD(24) F0170-1110	SHR(55) LIMP 2 FW FLW FLW	ACCY(75) n/a
1.0E+353 1b2	1E51-0151(10) 120	-SPLC(72) 9.5-1-5.56	-REFPLW(1) SHRNGFLW	ALNG(74)
.....
ENV = 2205	SUPP(24) F000001	BLD(24) F1300	SHR(55) LIMP 1 FW FLW FLW	ACCY(75) +0.5%
1.0E+353 1b2	1E51-0151(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=9.5+0.0f	-REFPLW(1) A12045	ALNG(74)
.....
ENV = 2205	SUPP(24) F000001	BLD(24) 51-20121	SHR(55) LIMP 1 FW FLW FLW	ACCY(75) n/a
1.0E+353 1b2	1E51-0151(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=9.5+0.0f	-REFPLW(1) A12045	ALNG(74)
.....
ENV = 2206	SUPP(24) F000001	BLD(24) F1300	SHR(55) LIMP 2 FW FLW FLW	ACCY(75) +0.5%
1.0E+353 1b2	1E51-0151(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=9.5+0.0f	-REFPLW(1) A12045	ALNG(74)
.....
ENV = 2206	SUPP(24) F000001	BLD(24) 51-20121	SHR(55) LIMP 2 FW FLW FLW	ACCY(75) n/a
1.0E+353 1b2	1E51-0151(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X=9.5+0.0f	-REFPLW(1) A12045	ALNG(74)
.....

INTERFAK ALUMINUM COMPANY
DATA BASE SYSTEM

SUPER RELATED TABLED Inputs/TS
for Service To Unit 1 In 1t 79-01B)

REVIT 22AUG80 PAGE 33
359/28/9/1/b 26SEP80

Line#	2218	SupP(23) R000011	Pln(24) 5914 JINY	Strv(55) Limp 1 SIM/WTR DUMP VALVE	ACCV(73) N/A
110	435) 6x2	1tSI-DIST(0)	-SPLT(72) R10	-REPRT(41) A9	ALING(74)
125+	2218	SupP(23) 360C11	Pln(24) F4170-11100	Strv(55) Limp 1 SIM/WTR DUMP VALVE	ACCV(73) N/A
130	435) 6x2	1tSI-DIST(0)	-SPLT(72) R10	-REPRT(41) 575198LT	ALING(74)
145+	2218	SupP(23) R000011	Pln(24) 5914 JINY	Strv(55) Limp 2 SIM/WTR DUMP VALVE	ACCV(73) N/A
150	435) 6x2	1tSI-DIST(0)	-SPLT(72) R10	-REPRT(41) A9	ALING(74)
165+	2218	SupP(23) R000011	Pln(24) F4170-11100	Strv(55) Limp 2 SIM/WTR DUMP VALVE	ACCV(73) N/A
170	435) 6x2	1tSI-DIST(0)	-SPLT(72) R10	-REPRT(41) 575198LT	ALING(74)
185+	2218	SupP(23) R000011	Pln(24) 5914 JINY	Strv(55) Limp 1 SIM/WTR DUMP VALVE	ACCV(73) N/A
190	435) 6x2	1tSI-DIST(0)	-SPLT(72) R10	-REPRT(41) A9	ALING(74)
205+	2217	SupP(23) R000011	Pln(24) F4170-11100	Strv(55) Limp 1 SIM/WTR DUMP VALVE	ACCV(73) N/A
210	435) 6x2	1tSI-DIST(0)	-SPLT(72) R10	-REPRT(41) 575198LT	ALING(74)

GENERAL AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEM
REFUSAL EX. SYSTEM

Safety Related Target Functions

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559/2,5/9,1/b 26StP80

110 -	2218	Support 3) 01000111	Hold(24) 3914 JMWY	STW(55) Loop 2 SH/SH DUMP VALVE	ACCV(13) N/A
		110(35) 0x2	11SI-DIST110	*SPtC(72) Hold	*RPTD(41) A9
					AGING(74)
110 -	2219	Support 3) 01000111	Hold(24) 1A11100	STW(55) 1000 2 SH/SH DUMP VALVE	ACCV(13) N/A
		110(35) 0x2	11SI-DIST110	*SPtC(72) 910	*RPTD(41) S7519WLT
					AGING(74)
110 -	2220	Support 3) 01000111	Hold(24) 0402 0E91JH0Y	SH-KV(55) Loop 1 SH/HDR	ACCV(13) N/A
		110(35) 0x2	11SI-DIST110	*SPtC(72) X-92-U-6F	*RPTD(41) A12045
					AGING(74)
110 -	2221	Support 3) 01000111	Hold(24) 0402 0E91JH0Y	STW(55) Loop 2 SH/HDR	ACCV(13) N/A
		110(35) 0x2	11SI-DIST110	*SPtC(72) X-93-U-6F	*RPTD(41) A12045
					AGING(74)
110 -	2222	Support 3) 01000111	Hold(24) 042075+10000	STW(55) STA G/H H-1 MAIN SH	ACCV(13) 1/2X F.S.
		110(35) 0x2	11SI-DIST110	*SPtC(72) Hold	*RPTD(41) A12
					AGING(74)
110 -	2223	Support 3) 01000111	Hold(24) 042075+10000	STW(55) STA G/H H-2 MAIN SH	ACCV(13) 1/2X F.S.
		110(35) 0x2	11SI-DIST110	*SPtC(72) Hold	*RPTD(41) A12
					AGING(74)

010404A 220100Z

010404A SYSTEM

Safety Related Hardware Components

NETV277 220100Z Valid 35

559/218/91/b 26SEP80

(b) System 11) Built In Ft 79-01B)

.....

Fr = 22251-5 Supp(24) 1/2075-10000 Min(24) 1/2075-10000 Serv(55) STH GEN H-1-5 MAIN SH ACCY(73) 1/22 F.S.

Min(35) 6x2 1151-0151(10) - - - - - Spt(172) minf - - - - - MFTPI(41) A12 - - - - - ALING(74) - - - - -

Fr = 22251-6 Supp(24) 1/2075-10000 Min(24) 1/2075-10000 Serv(55) STH GEN H-1-6 MAIN SH ACCY(73) 1/22 F.S.

Min(35) 6x2 1151-0151(10) - - - - - Spt(172) minf - - - - - MFTPI(41) A12 - - - - - ALING(74) - - - - -

Fr = 22251-5 Supp(24) 1/2075-10000 Min(24) 1/2075-10000 Serv(55) STH GEN H-1-5 MAIN SH ACCY(73) 1/22 F.S.

Min(35) 6x2 1151-0151(10) - - - - - Spt(172) minf - - - - - MFTPI(41) A12 - - - - - ALING(74) - - - - -

Fr = 22251-6 Supp(24) 1/2075-10000 Min(24) 1/2075-10000 Serv(55) STH GEN H-1-6 MAIN SH ACCY(73) 1/22 F.S.

Min(35) 6x2 1151-0151(10) - - - - - Spt(172) minf - - - - - MFTPI(41) A12 - - - - - ALING(74) - - - - -

Fr = 22251-5 Supp(24) 1/2075-10000 Min(24) 1/2075-10000 Serv(55) STH GEN H-2-1 MAIN SH ACCY(73) 1/22 F.S.

Min(35) 6x2 1151-0151(10) - - - - - Spt(172) minf - - - - - MFTPI(41) A12 - - - - - ALING(74) - - - - -

Fr = 22251-6 Supp(24) 1/2075-10000 Min(24) 1/2075-10000 Serv(55) STH GEN H-2-2 MAIN SH ACCY(73) 1/22 F.S.

Min(35) 6x2 1151-0151(10) - - - - - Spt(172) minf - - - - - MFTPI(41) A12 - - - - - ALING(74) - - - - -

GRUMMAN AERONAUTICAL COMPANY
REPORT BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TESTS (continued)

REV 277 22 AUG 80 PAGE 30
REQ(S) TO RELEASE LTC 79-016

559/2,8/4,1/b 26 SEP 80

14 -	22200-3	SUPP(24) F000001	H00(24) 1/2075-10000	SK6V(55) SK6 GFM 0=2-3 MAIN SIM	ACCV(75) 1/22 F,S,
	LIN(35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SP(CT2) Hunt	-HOTPDL(41) A12	AGING(74)
14 -	22200-4	SUPP(24) F000001	H00(24) 1/2075-10000	SK6V(55) SK6 GFM 0=2-4 MAIN SIM	ACCV(73) 1/22 F,S,
	LIN(35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SP(CT2) Hunt	-HOTPDL(41) A12	AGING(74)
14 -	22200-5	SUPP(24) F000001	H00(24) 1/2075-10000	SK6V(55) SK6 GFM 0=2-5 MAIN SIM	ACCV(75) 1/22 F,S,
	LIN(35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SP(CT2) Hunt	-HOTPDL(41) A12	AGING(74)
14 -	22200-6	SUPP(24) F000001	H00(24) 1/2075-10000	SK6V(55) SK6 GFM 0=2-6 MAIN SIM	ACCV(75) 1/22 F,S,
	LIN(35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SP(CT2) Hunt	-HOTPDL(41) A12	AGING(74)
14 -	22200-7	SUPP(24) F000001	H00(24) 1/2075-10000	SK6V(55) SK6 GFM 0=2-7 MAIN SIM	ACCV(75) 1/22 F,S,
	LIN(35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SP(CT2) Hunt	-HOTPDL(41) A12	AGING(74)
14 -	22200-8	SUPP(24) F000001	H00(24) 1/2075-10000	SK6V(55) LINE 1 SK6 DSUBH1	ACCV(73) N/A
	LIN(35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SP(CT2) Hunt	-HOTPDL(41) A12/045	AGING(74)
14 -	22200-9	SUPP(24) F000001	H00(24) 1/2075-10000	SK6V(55) LINE 2 SK6 DSUBH1	ACCV(73) N/A
	LIN(35) 0X2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SP(CT2) Hunt	-HOTPDL(41) A12/05	AGING(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPOX - BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN TE-79-018)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 37
35972,879x1/6 26SEP80

PSI - 2231	SUPP(23) HERCOLD	MUD(24) DA-97023-153R1SS	SERV(55) MAIN STEAM HEADER	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PSI - 2233	SUPP(23) HERCOLD	MUD(24) DA-97023-153R1SS	SERV(55) MAIN STEAM HEADER	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PSI - 2235	SUPP(23) HERCOLD	MUD(24) DA-97023-153R1SS	SERV(55) MAIN STEAM HEADER	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
IVV - 2237	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	MUD(24) 391R JHRY	SERV(55) EM COND TO LOOP 1 SHF	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
IVV - 2238	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	MUD(24) 391R JHRY	SERV(55) EM COND TO LOOP 2 SHF	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
EE - 2239	SUPP(23) FOXBOARD	MUD(24) F13SH	SERV(55) EM COND TO LOOP 1 RHF	ACCY(73) 1/2X F.S.
LOC(35) R22	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

ON-DEMAND REPORT
REPORTS BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPUTERS
TESTING TO DETERMINE IF #9-010)

PV# 22377 22A10,80 P/MAT 39
350/2,8/9,1/6 26STP80

Test	Test ID	Setup (24) (ASSEMBLY)	Build (24) (7-10350-63)	Setup (55) (7-10350-63)	Accv (75) N/A
1.00 (35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X=93-0-6F	-RTPRINT(01) A12045	AGING(74)	
2.00	Setup (24) (ASSEMBLY)	Build (24) 0005	Setup (55) (7-10350-63)	Accv (75) +12 Rcf	
1.00 (35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X=93-0-6F	-RTPRINT(01) A12045	AGING(74)	
1.10	Setup (24) (OPTION)	Build (24) 13011	Setup (55) (7-10350-63)	Accv (75) 1/21 F.S.	
1.00 (35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X=93-0-6F	-RTPRINT(01) A12045	AGING(74)	
1.20	Setup (24) (ASSEMBLY)	Build (24) 0005	Setup (55) (7-10350-63)	Accv (75) N/A	
1.00 (35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X=93-0-6F	-RTPRINT(01) A12045	AGING(74)	
1.30	Setup (24) (ASSEMBLY)	Build (24) 0005	Setup (55) (7-10350-63)	Accv (75) N/A	
1.00 (35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X=93-0-6F	-RTPRINT(01) A12045	AGING(74)	
1.40	Setup (24) (ASSEMBLY)	Build (24) 0005	Setup (55) (7-10350-63)	Accv (75) +12 Rcf	
1.00 (35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X=93-0-6F	-RTPRINT(01) A12045	AGING(74)	
1.50	Setup (24) (ASSEMBLY)	Build (24) 0005	Setup (55) (7-10350-63)	Accv (75) N/A	
1.00 (35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X=93-0-6F	-RTPRINT(01) A12045	AGING(74)	

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFRIG. BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 39
359/2,8/9,1/6 2eSEP80

HV-	2242	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	HID(24) 4016 JHFT	SERV(55) LOOP 2 RHT STM BYPASS	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)					
HV-	2243	SUPP(23) HASBRO ELAN	HID(24) 57-20721	SERV(55) LOOP 3 RHT STM BYPASS	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)					
HV-	2244	SUPP(23) HASBRO ELAN	HID(24) 57-20721	SERV(55) LOOP 2 RHT STM BYPASS	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)					
HV-	2249	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	HID(24) 1014 (INCUB)BY	SERV(55) CIRC 1A STM TURB TRP VALV	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)					
ZS-	2249	SUPP(23) HAFCH	HID(24) EA170-11100	SERV(55) CIRC 1A STM TH TRIP	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R10 -SPEC(72) 93-1-653 -REPORT(41) 57519WYEE AGING(74)					
HV-	2250	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	HID(24) 1014 (INCUB)BY	SERV(55) CIRC 1C STM TURB TRP VALV	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 -SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)					

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFBOX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-018)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 40
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

ZS-	2250	SUPP(23) HANCO	MUD(24) EA170-11100	SERV(55) CIRC 1B STM TB TRIP	ACCY(73) N/A
		LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-1-653	-REPORT(41) 57519WYLE	AGING(74)
		----	----	----	-----
IV-	2251	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	MUD(24) 1814 (RCH)JHRY	SERV(55) CIRC 1B STM TURB TRP VALV	ACCY(73) N/A
		LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
		----	----	----	-----
ZS-	2251	SUPP(23) HANCO	MUD(24) EA170-11100	SERV(55) CIRC 1B STM TB TRIP	ACCY(73) N/A
		LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-1-653	-REPORT(41) 57519WYLE	AGING(74)
		----	----	----	-----
IV-	2252	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	MUD(24) 1814 (RCH)JHRY	SERV(55) CIRC 1D STM TURB TRP VALV	ACCY(73) N/A
		LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
		----	----	----	-----
ZS-	2252	SUPP(23) HANCO	MUD(24) EA170-11100	SERV(55) CIRC 1D STM TB TRIP	ACCY(73) N/A
		LIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-1-653	-REPORT(41) 57519WYLE	AGING(74)
		----	----	----	-----
IV-	2253	SUPP(23) ROCKWELL	MUD(24) 7502 (C-9)JHRY	SERV(55) CIRC 1 HHT STM BLOCK	ACCY(73) N/A
		LIC(35) TX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
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GENERAL ALUMINUM COMPANY
REPOBX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

HEV277 22AUG80 PAGE 91
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

INV#	2254	SUPPL(23) ROCKWELL	HOD(24) 7502 (WEC) JHNY	SERV(55) LOOP 2 RHT STM BLOCK	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) T82 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-667 -REPORT(41) 57504-2WYLE AGING(74)					
INV#	2265	SUPPL(23) VELAN	HOD(24) P-33876-11/21R	SERV(55) 1A RHT STM ACT SAMPLE	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) T82 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-657 -REPORT(41) 57521WYLE AGING(74)					
INV#	2266	SUPPL(23) VELAN	HOD(24) P-33876-11/21R	SERV(55) 1B RHT STM ACT SAMPLE	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) T82 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-657 -REPORT(41) 57521WYLE AGING(74)					
PT#	2267	SUPPL(23) FOXBORO	HOD(24) E116H-SAE2	SERV(55) STM GEN 1A RHT STM H/R	ACCY(73) 1/2% F.S.
EIC(35) T82 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-568 -REPORT(41) 57504-2WYLE AGING(74)					
XEP#	2267	SUPPL(23) DASHIELL	HOD(24) 8005	SERV(55) LOOP 1 RHT STM TO CO	ACCY(73) +/-1% RGE
EIC(35) T82 TEST-DIST(10) T10 -SPEC(72) 93-1-585 -REPORT(41) 57507-3 WYLE AGING(74)					
PT#	2268	SUPPL(23) FOXBORO	HOD(24) E116H-SAE2	SERV(55) STM GEN 1B RHT STM H/R	ACCY(73) 1/2% F.S.
EIC(35) T82 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-568 -REPORT(41) 57504-2WYLE AGING(74)					

GENERAL AUTOMATIC CIRCUITRY
REPORT BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED FAULTED CONDITIONS
ACTUATOR TO BUILT-IN LT P9-016

KEY277 CIRCUIT BOARD PAGE 42
359/2,8/9,1/6 265TP80

AT&T - 2208	Start(24) 1A/5mA	Rin(24) 80Ω	SERV(S5) LAMP 2 HLT SITE TO C1	ACCY(73) +1X Rst
AT&T - 162	1tSI+DIST(10) 110	-SPTC(72) X-93-U-6f	-REPORT(41) 57507-3 MILT	Abln(74)
AT&T - 2209	Stop(24) 1tSI(10)	Rin(24) 1A-97023-153#138	SERV(S5) HLT SITE MODE	ACCY(73) N/A
AT&T - 162	1tSI+DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X-93-U-6f	-REPORT(41) A12045	Abln(74)
AT&T - 2211	Stop(24) 1tSI(10)	Rin(24) 1A-97023-153#135	SERV(S5) HLT SITE MODE	ACCY(73) N/A
AT&T - 162	1tSI+DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X-93-U-6f	-REPORT(41) A12045	Abln(74)
AT&T - 2213	Stop(24) 1tSI(10)	Rin(24) 1A-97023-153#145	SERV(S5) HLT SITE MODE	ACCY(73) N/A
AT&T - 162	1tSI+DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X-93-U-6f	-REPORT(41) A12045	Abln(74)
AT&T - 2214	Stop(24) 1tSI(10)	Rin(24) 1A-97023-153#146	SERV(S5) HLT SITE MODE	ACCY(73) N/A
AT&T - 162	1tSI+DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X-93-U-6f	-REPORT(41) A12045	Abln(74)
AT&T - 2216	Stop(24) 1A/5mA	Rin(24) 9	SERV(S5) 16 LAMP 2 Rst/HK	ACCY(73) N/A
AT&T - 162	1tSI+DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X-93-U-6f	-REPORT(41) A12045	Abln(74)
AT&T - 2240	Stop(24) 1tSI(10)	Rin(24) 9	SERV(S5) 16 LAMP 2 Rst/HK	ACCY(73) N/A
AT&T - 162	1tSI+DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) X-93-U-6f	-REPORT(41) A12045	Abln(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFDOC BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE #3
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

BV- 2291	SUPP(23) VELAN	MOD(24) P-33676-10/13R	SERV(55) EM COND TO LOOP & REHTR	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
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ZS- 2291	SUPP(23) PUTORAK	MOD(24) MODEL 9	SERV(55) EM COND TO LOOP & REHTR	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
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BV- 2292	SUPP(23) RUCKELE	MOD(24) 4414(RCA) JMHY	SERV(55) STM GEN 1B SHT STM BYPASS	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
BV- 2293	SUPP(23) RUCKELE	MOD(24) 4414(RCA) JMHY	SERV(55) STM GEN 1A SHT STM BYPASS	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
ZS- 2245	SUPP(23) MICROSWITCH	MOD(24) OPD-AR	SERV(55) STM/STR DUMP VAL TEST	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-1-653	-REPORT(41) 57519HYLT	AGING(74)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
ZS- 2246	SUPP(23) MICROSWITCH	MOD(24) OPD-AR	SERV(55) STM/STR DUMP VAL TEST	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-1-653	-REPORT(41) 57519HYLT	AGING(74)
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
REFRIG. BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-010)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 44
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

ZS- 22117	SUPP(23) MICROSWITCH	HOB(24) GPD-AH	SERV(55) STW/STW DUMP VAL TEST	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-1-653	-REPORT(41) 57519WYLE	AGING(74)
ZS- 22118	SUPP(23) MICROSWITCH	HOB(24) GPD-AH	SERV(55) STW/STW DUMP VAL TEST	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) R10	-SPEC(72) 93-1-653	-REPORT(41) 57519WYLE	AGING(74)
PV- 22129	SUPP(23) PASIONELAN	HOB(24) 37-20721	SERV(55) LOOP 1 MAIN STW	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
SP- 22129	SUPP(23) PASIONELAN	HOB(24) 80085	SERV(55) LOOP 1 MAIN STEAM	ACCY(73) +1% RGE
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PT- 22129-1	SUPP(23) FOXBORO	HOB(24) F130H	SERV(55) MAIN STW HDR LPT	ACCY(73) 1/2% F.S.
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
SP- 22129-1	SUPP(23) PASIONELAN	HOB(24) 80085	SERV(55) LOOP 1 MAIN STEAM	ACCY(73) +1% RGE
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
REPORTS OF SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED FACILITY CHANGES

40 SPRING 10 BULLETIN LT 79-01A
REV 22150

REV 22150
559-2,0/9,1/c
26SEP80

Rev - 22150	Supp(2) HASHTHAI	HHD(24) 31-20721	Serv(55) Loop 2 Main SH	ACCY(75) N/A
100(35) 102	HSI-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X-93-0-0f	-RTPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

Rev - 22150	Supp(2) HASHTHAI	HHD(24) 0005	Serv(55) Loop 2 Main SH	ACCY(75) +12 HGT
100(35) 102	HSI-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X-93-0-0f	-RTPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

Rev - 22150	Supp(2) HASHTHAI	HHD(24) 0005	Serv(55) MAIN SHR LIP2	ACCY(75) 1/2x f.s.
100(35) 102	HSI-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X-93-0-0f	-RTPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

Rev - 22150-1	Supp(2) HASHTHAI	HHD(24) 0005	Serv(55) Loop 2 Main SH	ACCY(75) +12 HGT
100(35) 102	HSI-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X-93-0-0f	-RTPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

Rev - 22150-1	Supp(2) HASHTHAI	HHD(24) 0005	Serv(55) Loop 1 RSH SHR	ACCY(75) N/A
100(35) 102	HSI-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X-93-0-0f	-RTPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

Rev - 22150	Supp(2) VELA	HHD(24) 1-53876-115	Serv(55) Loop 1 RSH SHR	ACCY(75) N/A
100(35) 102	HSI-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X-93-0-0f	-RTPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

Rev - 22150	Supp(2) VELA	HHD(24) 1-53876-115	Serv(55) Loop 2 RSH SHR	ACCY(75) N/A
100(35) 102	HSI-DIST(10) 120	-SPFC(72) X-93-0-0f	-RTPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

14 SEP 1981
NOFTEK & TECNOL CORP
OF PULL TESTS

TEST PLATE 1 TESTS
OF BULLET 1E 79-01B

REVERE C2A1000 PAGE 16
35928/9/0
26 SEP 80

14 SEP 1981 SUPPORT (23) VELAN
RUD(24) V-33076-12/16 SERV(55) LUMP 1 FOR SIN ATTEMPT ACCY(13) n/a

LUD(35) 162 TEST-D151(10) 120 *SPFC(12) X-95-0-BF REPIR(41) A12045 ALING(74)

14 SEP 1981 SUPPORT (23) VELAN
RUD(24) V-33076-12/16 SERV(55) LUMP 2 FOR SIN ATTEMPT ACCY(13) n/a

LUD(35) 162 TEST-D151(10) 120 *SPFC(12) X-95-0-BF REPIR(41) A12045 ALING(74)

14 SEP 1981 SUPPORT (23) FIXBLIST
RUD(24) V-2075-1100WD SERV(55) LUMP 1 MEHAT STEAM ACCY(13) 1/2A F+S*

LUD(35) 162 TEST-D151(10) *SPFC(12) BENT REPIR(41) A12 ALING(74)

14 SEP 1981 SUPPORT (23) FIXBLIST
RUD(24) V-2075-1100WD SERV(55) LUMP 2 MEHAT STEAM ACCY(13) 1/2A F+S*

LUD(35) 162 TEST-D151(10) *SPFC(12) BENT REPIR(41) A12 ALING(74)

14 SEP 1981 SUPPORT (23) FIXBLIST
RUD(24) V-2075-1100WD SERV(55) LUMP 1 MEHAT STEAM ACCY(13) 1/2A F+S*

LUD(35) 162 TEST-D151(10) *SPFC(12) BENT REPIR(41) A12 ALING(74)

14 SEP 1981 SUPPORT (23) FIXBLIST
RUD(24) V-2075-1100WD SERV(55) LUMP 2 MEHAT STEAM ACCY(13) 1/2A F+S*

LUD(35) 162 TEST-D151(10) *SPFC(12) BENT REPIR(41) A12 ALING(74)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
REFUGUE HY SYSTEM

SATEL RELATED VALIDATED COMPONENTS
REFUGUE HY SYSTEM

REFUGUE 24 BULLETIN 10 79-016
559/24/9,1/b 265TPB0

REFUGUE 24 BULLETIN 10 79-016

REFUGUE 24 BULLETIN 10 79-016

Ref - 22149	Supp(24) F000001	HID(24) 1/2075-10000	SERV(55) Loop 1 RETREAT STREAM	ACCY(13) 1/22 F,S,
100(435) 6x2	1t S1-0151(10)	*SPT(172) 1out	*REFUR(44) A12	AUDIB(74)
Ref - 22140	Supp(24) F000001	HID(24) 1/2075-10000	SERV(55) Loop 2 RET. STREAM	ACCY(13) 1/22 F,S,
100(435) 6x2	1t S1-0151(10)	*SPT(172) 1out	*REFUR(44) A12	AUDIB(74)
Ref - 22142	Supp(24) F000001	HID(24) 1/2075-10000	SERV(55) Loop 2 RET. STREAM	ACCY(13) 1/22 F,S,
100(435) 6x2	1t S1-0151(10)	*SPT(172) 1out	*REFUR(44) A12	AUDIB(74)
Ref - 22143	Supp(24) F000000	HID(24) 1/2075-10000	SERV(55) Loop 1 RETREAT STREAM	ACCY(13) 1/22 F,S,
100(435) 6x2	1t S1-0151(10)	*SPT(172) 1out	*REFUR(44) A12	AUDIB(74)
Ref - 22144	Supp(24) F000001	HID(24) 1/2075-10000	SERV(55) Loop 2 RET. STREAM	ACCY(13) 1/22 F,S,
100(435) 6x2	1t S1-0151(10)	*SPT(172) 1out	*REFUR(44) A12	AUDIB(74)
Ref - 22146	Supp(24) F000001	HID(24) 1/2075-10000	SERV(55) Loop 2 RET. STREAM	ACCY(13) 1/22 F,S,
100(435) 6x2	1t S1-0151(10)	*SPT(172) 1out	*REFUR(44) A12	AUDIB(74)

DATAFILE NUMBER: 00000000000000000000000000000000

SATellite POSITION: 100.000000 100.000000 100.000000

TESTCASE ID: 00000000000000000000000000000000

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPOBX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 49
359/2,679,176 26SEP80

PSH- 22197	SUPP(23) REPCD	MDB(24) DAH-7023-153R12S	SERV(55) RHTR FLUID OVERPRESS	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) 182 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F ----- REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				
PSH- 22198	SUPP(23) REPCD	MDB(24) DAH-7023-153R12S	SERV(55) RHTR FLUID OVERPRESS	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) 182 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F ----- REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				
IV- 22200	SUPP(23) VELAR	MDB(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) LOOP 2 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F ----- REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				
IV- 22201	SUPP(23) VELAR	MDB(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) LOOP 1 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F ----- REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				
IV- 22202	SUPP(23) VELAR	MDB(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) LOOP 2 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F ----- REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				
IV- 22203	SUPP(23) VELAR	MDB(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) LOOP 1 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A
EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20 ----- SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F ----- REPORT(41) A12045 ----- AGING(74) -----				

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFDOC BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 50
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

BV- 22208	SUPP(23) VELAN	MOD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L2 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A

EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20		-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

BV- 22209	SUPP(23) VELAN	MOD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L1 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A

EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20		-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

BV- 22210	SUPP(23) VELAN	MOD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L2 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A

EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20		-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

BV- 22211	SUPP(23) VELAN	MOD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L2 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A

EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20		-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

BV- 22212	SUPP(23) VELAN	MOD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L1 COLD RHT DR	ACCY(73) N/A

EIC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R20		-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

GENERAL ATOMICS COMPANY
REPROX-HY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

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359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

HV- 22210	SOPP(23) VELAN	MUD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L2 COLD RHT DR	ACQY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045
		----	-----	AGING(74)
HV- 22211	SOPP(23) VELAN	MUD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L1 COLD RHT DR	ACQY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045
		----	-----	AGING(74)
HV- 22212	SOPP(23) VELAN	MUD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L2 CIRC BYPASS DR	ACQY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045
		----	-----	AGING(74)
HV- 22213	SOPP(23) VELAN	MUD(24) P-33876-11/14	SERV(55) L1 CIRC BYPASS DR	ACQY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045
		----	-----	AGING(74)
HV- 22221	SOPP(23) HASONEI LAN	MUD(24) 05621	SERV(55) SYS 22 ST TRAP	ACQY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 52504-1STLE
		----	-----	AGING(74)
HV- 22222	SOPP(23) HASONEI LAN	MUD(24) 05621	SERV(55) SYS 22 ST TRAP	ACQY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 52504-1STLE
		----	-----	AGING(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFRUX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED EQUIPMENTS
RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-0183

REV2/T 22A0680 PAGE 52
359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

HW- 22223	SUPP(23) BASONE TEAR	BOD(24) 03621	SERV(55) IS01 LP1	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 57504-1HYLE	AGING(74)
HW- 22224	SUPP(23) BASONE TEAR	BOD(24) 03621	SERV(55) IS01 LP2	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 57504-1HYLE	AGING(74)
HW- 22225	SUPP(23) BASONE TEAR	BOD(24) 03621	SERV(55) IS01 LP1	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 57504-1HYLE	AGING(74)
HW- 22226	SUPP(23) BASONE TEAR	BOD(24) 03621	SERV(55) IS01 LP2	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 57504-1HYLE	AGING(74)
HW- 22227	SUPP(23) BASONE TEAR	BOD(24) 03621	SERV(55) IS01 LP1	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 57504-1HYLE	AGING(74)
HW- 22228	SUPP(23) BASONE TEAR	BOD(24) 03621	SERV(55) IS01 LP2	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) TB2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-571	-REPORT(41) 57504-1HYLE	AGING(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY

REFURB BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS

(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 53

359/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

HV - 2566-1 SUPP(23) VELAN HOD(24) P-33876-4/20 SERV(55) BUFFER HE SUPPLY ACQY(73) N/A

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R9 -SPEC(72) 93-1-674 -REPORT(41) 57527WYLE AGING(74)

HV - 2566-2 SUPP(23) VELAN HOD(24) P-33876-13/23 SERV(55) BUFFER HE SUPPLY ACQY(73) N/A

LOC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) R9 -SPEC(72) 93-1-674 -REPORT(41) 57527WYLE AGING(74)

PSE - 3123 SUPP(23) HERCOLD HOD(24) DSW-7223-153R155 SERV(55) FWRTR TO ECON ACQY(73) N/A

LOC(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 93-1-645 -REPORT(41) 5410-7130-645HAE AGING(74)

PSE - 3124 SUPP(23) HERCOLD HOD(24) DSW-7223-153R155 SERV(55) FWRTR TO ECON ACQY(73) N/A

LOC(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 93-1-645 -REPORT(41) 5410-7130-645HAE AGING(74)

PSE - 3125 SUPP(23) HERCOLD HOD(24) DSW-7223-153R155 SERV(55) FWRTR TO ECON ACQY(73) N/A

LOC(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) 93-1-645 -REPORT(41) 5410-7130-645HAE AGING(74)

HV - 4225 SUPP(23) PRATT HOD(24) 58 11 SERV(55) WTR TO DECAY HE REINV XEH ACQY(73) N/A

LOC(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) 120 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-68 -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)

GENERAL AUTOMATIC COMPUTERS
SERVOS BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TABLED COMPUTERS

(RESPONSE TO HILITE IN IF 79-010)

STAY(73) 220000 FAULT 54
559/2+8/9+1/6 268180

IF = 42517	SUPP(23) FAULT	HIL(24) 18 11	STAY(55) HIL+SS STAY WITH HIL	ACCV(73) N/A
IF(55) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SPTC(72) X-93-0-0f	-REFRIG(4) A12045	A116174)
IF(55) 106	SUPP(24) HIL(10)	HIL(24) X-70 35+15-3+H7	STAY(55) FAIR WITH TO STAY G/H	ACCV(73) N/A
IF(55) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SPTC(72) X-93-0-0f	-REFRIG(4) A12045	A116174)
IFSV= 42606	SUPP(24) ASCI(1)	HIL(24) X-50-21-26-01	STAY(55) FAIR WITH TO STAY G/H	ACCV(73) N/A
IF(55) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SPTC(72) X-93-0-0f	-REFRIG(4) A12045	A116174)
IF = 42615	SUPP(23) FAULT	HIL(24) X-20-75+10-00-01	STAY(55) FCN BAKEL CHUG 10111	ACCV(73) 1/2X F,S.
IF(55) 102	TEST-DIST(10)	SPTC(72) Fair	-REFRIG(4) A9	A116174)
IF = 42616	SUPP(23) FAULT	HIL(24) X-20-75+10-00-00	STAY(55) FCN BAKEL CHUG 10111	ACCV(73) 1/2X F,S.
IF(55) 102	TEST-DIST(10)	SPTC(72) Fair	-REFRIG(4) A9	A116174)
IF = 42617	SUPP(23) FAULT	HIL(24) X-20-75+10-00-01	STAY(55) FAIR WITH FAIR	ACCV(73) N/A
IF(55) 102	TEST-DIST(10) 120	SPTC(72) X-93-0-0f	-REFRIG(4) A12045	A116174)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
STRUCTURE HY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS

REV 27 2/24/80 PAGE 55
559/28/81/6 26Str80

REF ID: 015114

REF ID: 015114

L =	Ref 1-3	Supp(25) Gated K=10VR	H01(24) 12x9 REC	Serv(55) INST AIR COMP 1A	ACCV(73) n/a
L =	Ref 1-3	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPT(12) X-95-1-6F	-REFRIT(41) A12045	A1,11n,(74)
C =	Ref 8	Supp(25) Gated K=10VR	H01(24) 12x9 REC	Serv(55) INST AIR COMP 1C	ACCV(73) n/a
C =	Ref 8	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPT(12) X-95-1-6F	-REFRIT(41) A12045	A1,11n,(74)
P5 =	Ref 7	Supp(25) GRC04	H01(24) 12x9 REC	Serv(55) INST AIR RECF1UP 1A	ACCV(73) n/a
P5 =	Ref 7	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPT(12) X-95-1-6F	-REFRIT(41) A12045	A1,11n,(74)
P5 =	Ref 8	Supp(25) Gated 0	H01(24) 9012	Serv(55) INST AIR COMP 1A 01L	ACCV(73) n/a
P5 =	Ref 8	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPT(12) 95-1-530	-REFRIT(41) S8080-2 MFL	A1,11n,(74)
F5 =	Ref 8	Supp(25) Gated 0	H01(24) 9025	Serv(55) INST AIR COMP 1A 01L	ACCV(73) n/a
F5 =	Ref 8	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPT(12) 95-1-530	-REFRIT(41) S7500-10MFL	A1,11n,(74)
F5 =	Ref 9	Supp(25) Gated 0	H01(24) 9012	Serv(55) INST AIR COMP 1B 01L	ACCV(73) n/a
F5 =	Ref 9	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPT(12) 95-1-530	-REFRIT(41) S8080-2 MFL	A1,11n,(74)

GRIMM AIRPORT COMPANY
SERVEX BY SYSTEMS

SAFETY RELATED FAULTED COMMUNICATIS
THE SOURCE TO BULLITT 79-01H

RIV217 220000 PAGE 56
359/28/91/0 28SEP80

Line	8219	SUPP(23) Surface D	HHD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 18 min	ACCV(73) n/a
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) 95-1-530	-REPINT(41) 57504-1081E	ABING(74)
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	HHD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 1A DISTN	ACCV(73) n/a
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) 95-1-530	-REPINT(41) 57504-1081E	ABING(74)
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	HHD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 1A DISTN	ACCV(73) n/a
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) 95-1-530	-REPINT(41) 57504-1081E	ABING(74)
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	HHD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 1A DISTN	ACCV(73) n/a
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) 95-1-530	-REPINT(41) 57504-1081E	ABING(74)
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	HHD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 1A DISTN	ACCV(73) n/a
	LIN(435) 162	INST-DIST(10) 120	-SPTC(72) 95-1-530	-REPINT(41) 57504-1081E	ABING(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPROX HY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TARGETED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 57
359/2,879-1/6 26SEP80

PS#	8222	SUPP(23) SQUARE D	HOD(24) 9012	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 16 DISCH	ACCY(73) N/A
EQUIP(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-530 -REPORT(41) 58084-2 HYLE AGING(74)					
TS#	8236	SUPP(23) SQUARE D	HOD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 16 COOL WTR	ACCY(73) N/A
EQUIP(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-530 -REPORT(41) 57504-1 HYLE AGING(74)					
TS#	8237	SUPP(23) SQUARE D	HOD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 16 COOL WTR	ACCY(73) N/A
EQUIP(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-530 -REPORT(41) 57504-1 HYLE AGING(74)					
PS#	8244	SUPP(23) HERCRED	HOD(24) 0AK-7033-8046	SERV(55) INST AIR RECEIVER 1C	ACCY(73) N/A
EQUIP(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F -REPORT(41) A12045 AGING(74)					
TS#	8245	SUPP(23) SQUARE D	HOD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 16 COOL WTR	ACCY(73) N/A
EQUIP(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-530 -REPORT(41) 57504-1 HYLE AGING(74)					
TS#	8246	SUPP(23) SQUARE D	HOD(24) 9025	SERV(55) INST AIR COMP 16 DEL	ACCY(73) N/A
EQUIP(35) TB2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 -SPEC(72) 93-1-530 -REPORT(41) 57504-1 HYLE AGING(74)					

GENERAL AIRLINE COMPANY
REFRIGERANT SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED FACILITY EQUIPMENTS
THESE ARE TO BE KEPT IN IF T9-01H)

RTV277 220000 FAULT 58
559/2*8/9/1/6 26SF80

F3-	R247	SUPPLY SIDE ISOLATE D	HLD(24) 9012	SERV(S5) FIRST AIR COMP IC UNIT	ACCY(73) N/A
	100(35) 162	1ST-01S1(10) 120	SPU U172) 93-1-530	NET PUMP(41) 58084-2 N/A	AL106(74)
F3-	R248	SUPPLY SIDE ISOLATE D	HLD(24) 9012	SERV(S5) FIRST AIR COMP IC DISTN	ACCY(73) N/A
	100(35) 162	1ST-01S1(10) 120	SPU U172) 93-1-530	NET PUMP(41) 58084-2 N/A	AL106(74)
F3-	R249	SUPPLY SIDE ISOLATE D	HLD(24) 9025	SERV(S5) FIRST AIR COMP IC DISTN	ACCY(73) N/A
	100(35) 162	1ST-01S1(10) 120	SPU U172) 93-1-530	NET PUMP(41) 57500-10001	AL106(74)
F3-	R250	SUPPLY SIDE ELECTRIC	HLD(24) 142940	SERV(S5) HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP 1A	ACCY(73) N/A
	100(35) 162	1ST-01S1(10) 120	SPU U172) 8-93-01-66	NET PUMP(41) A12045	AL106(74)
F4-	R101-8	SUPPLY SIDE ISOLATE	HLD(24) 14906-007-541-04	SERV(S5) HYDRO POWER SUPPLY PUMP	ACCY(73) N/A
	100(35) 162	1ST-01S1(10) 120	SPU U172) 8-93-01-66	NET PUMP(41) A12045	AL106(74)
F4-	R101-8	SUPPLY SIDE ISOLATE	HLD(24) 14906-007-541-04	SERV(S5) HYDRO POWER SUPPLY PUMP	ACCY(73) N/A
	100(35) 162	1ST-01S1(10) 120	SPU U172) 8-93-01-66	NET PUMP(41) A12045	AL106(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFRIG. BY SYSTEM

SAFETY-RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-01B)

REV277 22AUG86 PAGE 59
359/223/9176 24SEP86

BS- 9102-2	SUPP(23) GENERALELECTRIC	MUD(24) 082940	SERV(55) HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP 1E	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
P- 9102-8	SUPP(23) DENISON	MUD(24) 1806-007-51L-04	SERV(55) HYDR PWR SUPPLY PUMP	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) I20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
P- 9102-5X	SUPP(23) DENISON	MUD(24) 1806-007-51L-04	SERV(55) HYDR PWR SUPPLY PUMP	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) I20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
BS- 9103-2	SUPP(23) GENERALELECTRIC	MUD(24) 082940	SERV(55) HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP 1B	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
BS- 9104-2	SUPP(23) GENERALELECTRIC	MUD(24) 082940	SERV(55) HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP 1D	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
BS- 9105	SUPP(23) GENERALELECTRIC	MUD(24) 082940	SERV(55) HYDR PUMP 1E	ACCY(73) N/A
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-U-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

GENERAL & LOCAL Components

POWER SYSTEM

P = 9105-x SUPPLY(25) 08N150H P100(24) 0906-007-511-94 SERV(55) HYD PARK SUPPLY P100P ALLY(73) N/A
TEST-TEST(10) 120 -SP1C(172) X=93-11-67 -NET POINT(41) A12045 ALING(74)

P = 9106 SUPPLY(25) 08N150H P100(24) 092940 SERV(55) HYD PARK ALLY(73) N/A
TEST-TEST(10) 120 -SP1C(172) X=93-11-67 -NET POINT(41) A12045 ALING(74)

P = 9106-x SUPPLY(25) 08N150H P100(24) 0906-007-511-94 SERV(55) HYD PARK SUPPLY P100P ALLY(73) N/A
TEST-TEST(10) 120 -SP1C(172) X=93-11-67 -NET POINT(41) A12045 ALING(74)

C = 151 = 91101 SUPPLY(25) 08N150H P100(24) 0911H SERV(55) LPI OFF AT SERVOIR ALLY(73) N/A
TEST-TEST(10) 120 -SP1C(172) 93-1-571 -NET POINT(41) S7504-08FLT ALING(74)

C = 151 = 91108 SUPPLY(25) 08N150H P100(24) 0911H SERV(55) LPI OFF AT SERVOIR ALLY(73) N/A
TEST-TEST(10) 120 -SP1C(172) 93-1-571 -NET POINT(41) S7504-08FLT ALING(74)

C = 151 = 92008 SUPPLY(25) 08N150H P100(24) 0911H SERV(55) LPI OFF AT SERVOIR ALLY(73) N/A
TEST-TEST(10) 120 -SP1C(172) 93-1-571 -NET POINT(41) S7504-08FLT ALING(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REPROD BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IE 79-018)

REV277 22AUG80 PAGE 61
559/2,8/9,1/6 26SEP80

NU 9219	SUPP(23) ITE IMPERL	HOD(24) 85C68155	SERV(55) TURB PLANT HCC-1	ACCY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) R82 TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-540	-REPORT(41) 57501-1HYLE	AGING(74)
NU 9220	SUPP(23) ITE IMPERL	HOD(24) 85C68155	SERV(55) TURB PLANT HCC-2	ACCY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) R82 TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-540	-REPORT(41) 57501-1HYLE	AGING(74)
NU 9231	SUPP(23) ITE IMPERL	HOD(24) 85C68155	SERV(55) REACTOR PLANT HCC-3	ACCY(73) N/A
	LOC(35) R82 TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-540	-REPORT(41) 57501-1HYLE	AGING(74)
PUSH 93129	SUPP(23) BARTON	HOD(24) 288	SERV(55) BLDG PRESS UNDER PCHY L1	ACCY(73) +1% F.S.
	LOC(35) R82 TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PUSH 93150	SUPP(23) BARTON	HOD(24) 288	SERV(55) BLDG PRESS UNDER EUDP DIV	ACCY(73) +1% F.S.
	LOC(35) R82 TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PUSH 93151	SUPP(23) BARTON	HOD(24) 288	SERV(55) BLDG PRESS UNDER PCHY L2	ACCY(73) +1% F.S.
	LOC(35) R82 TEST-DIST(10) R20	-SPEC(72) X-93-0-6F	-REPORT(41) A12045	AGING(74)

GENERAL ATLANTIC COMPANY
REFUGEE SYSTEM

Safety Related Test(1) Components
(Response to Highlights It 79-01b)

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PL301w 93132	Supp(25) 04110	PLD(24) 208	StkV(55) HLOG PHSS OUT PCRY 1.1	ACCV(73) +1X F.S.
L01(155) 682	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X-93-0-0F	-RIPRINT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PL301w 93133	Supp(25) 04110	PLD(24) 208	StkV(55) HLOG PHSS OUT DIV 1.1	ACCV(73) +1X F.S.
L01(155) 682	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X-93-0-0F	-RIPRINT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PL301w 93134	Supp(25) 04110	PLD(24) 208	StkV(55) HLOG PHSS OUT DIV 1.2	ACCV(73) +1X F.S.
L01(155) 682	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X-93-0-0F	-RIPRINT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PL301w 93140	Supp(25) 04110	PLD(24) 208	StkV(55) HLOG PHSS OUT DIV 1.2	ACCV(73) +1X F.S.
L01(155) 682	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) X-93-0-0F	-RIPRINT(41) A12045	AGING(74)
PL301w 93148	Supp(25) 04110 E1111C	PLD(24) 1200-5A5	StkV(55) Iter* Unit# PFLW	ACCV(73) +1X F.S.
L01(155) 682	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) 93-1-23B	-RIPRINT(41) 580044-9 WLT	AGING(74)
PL301w 93149	Supp(25) 04110 E1111C	PLD(24) 1200-5A5	StkV(55) Iter# Unite# PCW	ACCV(73) +1X F.S.
L01(155) 682	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) 93-1-23B	-RIPRINT(41) 580044-9 WLT	AGING(74)
PL301w 93150	Supp(25) 04110 E1111C	PLD(24) 1200-5A5	StkV(55) Iter# Unite# PCW	ACCV(73) +1X F.S.
L01(155) 682	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLC(72) 93-1-23B	-RIPRINT(41) 580044-9 WLT	AGING(74)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS

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REPOX BY SYSTEM

RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IF 79-0183

55972,8/9,1/86 26SEP80

TSR- 93451 SUPP(23) UNITED ELECTRIC MOD(24) 1200-SAS SERV(55) REACTOR BLDG TEMP ACCY(73) +/-1% F.S.

EDC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-538 +REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE AGING(74) -----

TSR- 93452 SUPP(23) UNITED ELECTRIC MOD(24) 1200-SAS SERV(55) REACTOR BLDG TEMP ACCY(73) +/-1% F.S.

EDC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-538 +REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE AGING(74) -----

TSR- 93453 SUPP(23) UNITED ELECTRIC MOD(24) 1200-SAS SERV(55) REACTOR BLDG TEMP ACCY(73) +/-1% F.S.

EDC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-538 +REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE AGING(74) -----

XE- 93454-A SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS MOD(24) 18020A SERV(55) PIPE RUPTURE ND, WALL L2 ACCY(73) 3DB5/N

EDC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-539 +REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE AGING(74) -----

XE- 93454-B SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS MOD(24) 18020A SERV(55) PIPE RUPTURE ND, WALL L2 ACCY(73) 3DB5/N

EDC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-539 +REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE AGING(74) -----

XE- 93454-C SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS MOD(24) 18020A SERV(55) PIPE RRP NORTH WALL L2 ACCY(73) 3DB5/N

EDC(35) RX2 TEST-DIST(10) T20 ----- +SPEC(72) 93-1-539 +REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE AGING(74) -----

GRANITE & TOPIC CONTINUE
HEDWIG HY SYSTEM

SATIN ELELCTRONICS
TEST SITE TO BUILD IN 1479-018

REF ID: C2400-80 PART 69
559/CB/916 26SEP80

RFID #	Supp(23) GA ELECTRONICS	RFID(24) 18020A	RFID(55) PIPT KOP TURT S. WALL L1	ACCV(13) 50mS/H
110(135) 6x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLIT(12) 93-1-539	-REFLECT(4) 58084-6 MYL	AGING(74)
RFID #	Supp(23) GA ELECTRONICS	RFID(24) 18020A	RFID(55) PIPT KOP TURT RUL. WALL L1	ACCV(13) 50mS/H
110(135) 6x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLIT(12) 93-1-539	-REFLECT(4) 58084-6 MYL	AGING(74)
RFID #	Supp(23) GA ELECTRONICS	RFID(24) 18020A	RFID(55) PIPT KOP MUTH WALL L1	ACCV(13) 50mS/H
110(135) 6x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLIT(12) 93-1-539	-REFLECT(4) 58084-6 MYL	AGING(74)
RFID #	Supp(23) GA ELECTRONICS	RFID(24) 18020A	RFID(55) PIPT KOP TURT S. WALL L2	ACCV(13) 50mS/H
110(135) 6x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLIT(12) 93-1-539	-REFLECT(4) 58084-6 MYL	AGING(74)
RFID #	Supp(23) GA ELECTRONICS	RFID(24) 18020A	RFID(55) PIPT KOP TURT S. WALL L2	ACCV(13) 50mS/H
110(135) 6x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLIT(12) 93-1-539	-REFLECT(4) 58084-6 MYL	AGING(74)
RFID #	Supp(23) GA ELECTRONICS	RFID(24) 18020A	RFID(55) PIPT KOP SOUTH WALL L2	ACCV(13) 50mS/H
110(135) 6x2	TEST-DIST(10) 120	-SPLIT(12) 93-1-539	-REFLECT(4) 58084-6 MYL	AGING(74)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
HF PROBE HF SYSTEM

Safety Relays (Table 1) Components
HF System to Bulletin H 79-01B)

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559/28/916 265PH0

x1 = 93457-A	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HnU(24) 18020A	SEHv(55) PIPT Rupture S1. WALL L1	ACCV(73) 50BS/N
LIN(35) RX2	HFST-DIST(10) 120	-SPtC(72) 93-1-539	-REP(141) 58084-6 MYL	AG16G(74)
x1 = 93457-B	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HnU(24) 18020A	SEHv(55) PIPT Rupture S1. WALL L1	ACCV(73) 50BS/N
LIN(35) RX2	HFST-DIST(10) 120	-SPtC(72) 93-1-539	-REP(141) 58084-6 MYL	AG16G(74)
x1 = 93457-C	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HnU(24) 18020A	SEHv(55) PIPT Rupture S1. WALL L1	ACCV(73) 50BS/N
LIN(35) RX2	HFST-DIST(10) 120	-SPtC(72) 93-1-539	-REP(141) 58084-6 MYL	AG16G(74)
x1 = 93470-A	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HnU(24) 18020A	SEHv(55) PIPT Rupture Under PLVRL2	ACCV(73) 50BS/N
LIN(35) RX2	HFST-DIST(10) 120	-SPtC(72) 93-1-539	-REP(141) 58084-6 MYL	AG16G(74)
x1 = 93470-B	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HnU(24) 18020A	SEHv(55) PIPT Rupture Under PLVRL2	ACCV(73) 50BS/N
LIN(35) RX2	HFST-DIST(10) 120	-SPtC(72) 93-1-539	-REP(141) 58084-6 MYL	AG16G(74)
x1 = 93470-C	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HnU(24) 18020A	SEHv(55) PIPT Rupture Under PLVRL2	ACCV(73) 50BS/N
LIN(35) RX2	HFST-DIST(10) 120	-SPtC(72) 93-1-539	-REP(141) 58084-6 MYL	AG16G(74)

GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
REFBOX BY SYSTEM

SAFETY RELATED TAGGED COMPONENTS
(RESPONSE TO BULLETIN JE 79-018)

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XE - 93071-A	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HOD(24) 18020A	SERV(55) PIPE RUPTURE UNDER PURVLE	ACCY(73) 30HS/N
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-539	-REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE	AGING(74)

XE - 93071-B	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HOD(24) 18020A	SERV(55) PIPE RUPTURE UNDER PURVLE	ACCY(73) 30HS/N
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-539	-REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE	AGING(74)

XE - 93071-C	SUPP(23) GA ELECTRONICS	HOD(24) 18020A	SERV(55) PIPE RUPTURE UNDER PURVLE	ACCY(73) 30HS/N
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10) T20	-SPEC(72) 93-1-539	-REPORT(41) 58084-6 RYLE	AGING(74)

TE - 93072	SUPP(23) CMAX	HOD(24) F55186T8MK187A12	SERV(55) HI REACTOR BLDG TEMP CH,A	ACCY(73) +-50EG F
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SPEC(72) NONE	-REPORT(41) A12	AGING(74)

TE - 93073	SUPP(23) CMAX	HOD(24) F55186T8MK187A12	SERV(55) HI REACTOR BLDG TEMP CH,B	ACCY(73) +-50EG F
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SPEC(72) NONE	-REPORT(41) A12	AGING(74)

TE - 93074	SUPP(23) CMAX	HOD(24) F55186T8MK187A12	SERV(55) HI REACTOR BLDG TEMP CH,C	ACCY(73) +-50EG F
LOC(35) RX2	TEST-DIST(10)	-SPEC(72) NONE	-REPORT(41) A12	AGING(74)

OPTIONAL FORMS OF CONTRACTUAL COMPLIANCE

HYPNOTIC SYSTEM

STABILISATION TESTS: Components
TESTING: 11.01.116 11.19.016
359/28/916 26SEP89

TESTS: 27.01.016 28.01.016
359/28/916 26SEP89

At = 0.547±0.8	SUPP(23) GA EJECTOR(S) 1.00±0.02	800(24) 18020A 120	STRUCT(12) 93-1-539 -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT
At = 0.547±0.8	SUPP(23) GA EJECTOR(S) 1.00±0.02	800(24) 18020A 120	STRUCT(12) 93-1-539 -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT
At = 0.547±0.8	SUPP(23) GA EJECTOR(S) 1.00±0.02	800(24) 18020A 120	STRUCT(12) 93-1-539 -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT
At = 0.547±0.8	SUPP(23) GA EJECTOR(S) 1.00±0.02	800(24) 18020A 120	STRUCT(12) 93-1-539 -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT	STRUCT(55) FIFT Rupture Under P.H.V.L ACCY(73) SHS/N -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT -SUPPI(41) 58084-6 NYLT