



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-369/82-25

Licensee: Duke Power Company
 422 South Church Street
 Charlotte, NC 28242

Facility Name: McGuire

Docket No. 50-369

License No. NPF-9

Inspection at McGuire site near Charlotte, North Carolina

Inspector: *J. Blake*
 for W. P. Kleinsorge

7/23/82
 Date Signed

Approved by: *N. Economos*
 N. Economos, Acting Section Chief
 Engineering Inspection Branch
 Division of Engineering and Technical Programs

7/23/82
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on July 8-9, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 15 inspector-hours on site in the areas of missing thermal sleeve, personnel air lock (PAL) door seals and eddy current examination of steam generator tubing.

Results

No violations or deviations were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *M. D. McIntosh, Station Manager
- *D. B. Lampke, Licensing Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 9, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspection findings listed below were discussed in detail. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

(Open) Unresolved Item 369/82-25-01: "Drawing Control" - paragraph 5

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.

5. Missing Thermal Sleeve

Preliminary Notification PNO-V-82-28 (dated 6/17/82) reported that all four thermal sleeves originally located in the reactor coolant loop cold leg safety injection branch connection nozzles at the Trojan plant had come loose and apparently traveled into the reactor vessel. In response to this report, Duke Power Company checked similarly located thermal sleeves in piping systems and found that the thermal sleeve in the 10-inch safety injection line of reactor coolant loop B was missing. The licensee reported this matter to Region II on July 5, 1982. The licensee's determination was made by radiography and confirmed with the use of an underwater TV camera. Subsequently the licensee determined by reviewing a construction radiograph, that the 10-inch B loop sleeve was in place during construction. Moreover, the licensee determined that a total of seven similar thermal sleeves

existed in the following lines: four in the 10-inch safety injection to reactor coolant loop penetrations A, B, C, and D; two in the three inch charging line nozzles in loops A and D; and one in the 14-inch pressurizer surge line in loop B nozzle.

The licensee has radiographed all seven sleeve locations and determined that the remaining six sleeves were in place. The inspector reviewed the related radiographs and noted that all the retaining welds appeared to be sound with no indications in the welds or in the adjacent base material. All radiographs with the exception of those for the 14-inch pressurizer penetration met the ASME B and PV Code Section V requirements. The 14-inch pressurizer line contained water that could not be drained; therefore, a sensitivity of 2-4T vice 2-2T was the best achievable.

The inspector viewed a video tape of a television inspection of the B loop safety injection nozzle confirming the 10-inch sleeve was missing.

At the time of this inspection the licensee had not located the missing sleeve.

With regard to the above mentioned radiographic review, the inspector noted, that there were four retaining welds on the three inch charging line sleeves. The applicable drawing for the three inch sleeves, drawing MCM 1201.01-107, required only two retaining welds. In response to the inspector's questions the licensee located Westinghouse Field Deficiency Disposition DAP 10108, which amended the above drawing to require four retaining welds. At the time of this inspection there appeared to be no direct traceability from the drawing to the Field Deficiency Disposition. Therefore, the possibility may exist that drawings could be issued without amending documentation. The licensee indicated that they would look further into the matter. The inspector stated that the above would be identified as unresolved item 369/82-25-01: "Drawing Control".

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Personnel Air Lock (PAL) Door Seals

On June 29, 1981, Presray reported, in accordance with 10 CFR 21, the failure of a Presray inflatable seal located on a W. J. Woolley PAL at McGuire. On April 14, 1982, Presray notified IE:HQ that they (Presray) had instructed W. J. Woolley Company to advise McGuire that some of their airlock door seals may present a potential safety problem, and not to use any of these seals after start-up without a recertification by Presray. In addition Presray stated: "The seals would be recertified after adequate test and inspection to verify that problems do not exist. If an approved test and inspection procedure cannot be developed, the original seals will be replaced with the new design which has been qualified by cycle testing, installed in the configuration of use, followed by destructive examination."

The licensee informed the inspector that the PAL door seals, installed at the time of this inspection, were manufactured by Seal Master and not Presray. The Presray seals that the licensee had on hand at the time of the Part 21 report are stored in a "Non Stock" area of the warehouse to prevent their issue. The licensee further informed the inspector that some newly received Presray PAL seals are in the receiving inspection area pending receiving inspection and review of the accompanying inspection test and certification data.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

7. Eddy Current Examination of Steam Generator Tubing,(73755B)

The inspector reviewed steam generator eddy current inservice inspection records to determine whether the records were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The applicable code for inservice inspection is the ASME Section XI, 1977 Edition through summer 1978, as implemented by the Duke QA Program.

The records for the following tubes were reviewed in the areas of results and data records, equipment data, calibration data sheets, evaluation data, extent of examination, deviation from program, disposition of findings, and re-examination data.

<u>Generator</u>	<u>Row No.</u>	<u>No. Tubes Inspected</u>
A	46,47,48,49	231
B	47,48,49	172
C	47,48,49	172
D	47,48,49	172

Within the areas examined no violations or deviations were identified.