



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL

Certified By

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 73 AND 54 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-53 AND DPR-69

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318

Introduction

By application dated June 21, 1982, Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2. The changes would allow reactor operation, through several operational modes, with one inoperable control element assembly (CEA) position indicating channel per CEA group. In addition, TS 3.1.3.3, "Position Indicating Channels" is reorganized to improve utilization and interpretation of these requirements.

Discussion

On February 8, 1982 the NRC issued Amendments 66 and 48 to the Operating Licenses for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 with associated Safety Evaluation Report (SER). These amendments changed TS 3.1.3.3 to permit continued power escalation, to full power, with one CEA position indicating channel per CEA group inoperable. This activity was subject to the provision that the CEA group(s) with inoperable position indicating channels could be verified to be fully withdrawn within ten hours. This allowance was based upon the operability of "full-out" reed switch indication. Since the applicability of TS 3.1.3.3 is for Modes 2 and 1 (startup and power operation, respectively) transition between Modes 1 and 2 would be permitted\* while entry from Mode 3 to Mode 2 would be prohibited. By application dated June 21, 1982, BG&E requested a change to TS 3.1.3.3 to allow transition from other operating modes to Mode 2.

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\* Amendments 66 and 48 provided specific permission for this transition.

### Evaluation

As indicated in our Safety Evaluation Report dated February 8, 1982, the startup of the reactor with inoperable CEA position indicating channels is not a greater concern than full power operation with these inoperable channels, which is permitted under TS 3.1.3.3. This provision is based upon the establishment of the CEA with the inoperable channel in the "full-out" position and verification of this position via an operable "full-out" reed switch indication. In the above explanation the phrase "... startup of the reactor ..." is meant to mean the full range of operation from subcritical conditions (Modes 5, 4, and 3) to startup and full power conditions (Modes 2 and 1). Accordingly, the transition between Modes 3 and 2, with regard to TS 3.1.3.3, is within the considerations addressed in the NRC SER dated February 8, 1982. It is therefore appropriate to add the following words to existing T.S. 3.1.3.3b.4.:

"... before entry into MODE 2 or occurs prior to an "all CEAs out" configuration ..."

The above words are intended to reflect the full range of reactor operation and to allow the progression from Mode 3 to Mode 2 within the requirements of TS 3.1.3.3.

In addition to the TS change described above, the action items in TS 3.1.3.3 have been reorganized to clearly segregate the remedial actions to be taken within 6 hours and those actions to be taken within 10 hours, following the determination that CEA position indication channels are inoperable.

### Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, do not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: July 29, 1982

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