	CONTROL SLOCK:
0 1	S C N E E 3 2 000 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 3 4 1 3 UCENSE TYPE 40 57 CAT 54
0 1	SOURCE 1 6 0 5 0 0 0 10 2 8 7 0 0 7 3 1 7 8 8 12 0 8 7 8 9
0 2	RPS Channel A, RC Flow Indication began reading high on July 29, 1978 and
0 3	was valved out-of-service on July 31. Personnel determined that the anomalous
0 4	readings were caused by a leak on the impulse line and it was decided to
0 5	leave the channel bypassed until the next available outage. The remaining
0 6	channels were all operable and would have tripped on 2-out-of-3 logic. The
0 7	[RPS was capable of performing its function, thus the incident did not adversely
0 8	effect public health or safety.
0 9	COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
	TO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
	ACTION ACTION ACTION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. B (8) E (9) E (2) [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10	The high RC flow readings were as a result of a leak on the impulse line
11	to the pressure transmitter which supplies the input for the flow indication.
1 7	The fittings which were leaking have been repaired.
1 3	
7 4	
1 5	STATUS OF CONCERN CONCERN CONSCIONARY DESCRIPTION (32) E (38) 0 8 8 (39) NA
	LOCATION OF RELEASE TO NA
7 .	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
7 7	O O O O O E O NA
1 B	PERSONNEL INJURIES NAMEER DESCRIPTION 41
1 9	TYPE DESCRIPTION NA NA
20	NAC USE ONLY NA I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
	NAME OF PREPARER K. R. Wilson PHONE: (704) 373-8197

DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: R0-287/78-15

Report Date: December 8, 1978

Occurrence Date: July 31, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: RPS Channel A RC Flow Indication Non-Conservative

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 88% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

On July 29, 1978 during the performance of the Instrument Surveillance Check (PT/0/A/0600/1) on Unit 3, it was determined that the reactor coolant flow indication on RPS Channel A was reading approximately 17 x 10⁶ lb/hr higher than channels B, C, and D. On July 31, 1978, it was noted by operators that the channel was reading 33 x 10⁶ lb/hr high. The channel was placed in manual bypass at 0825 on July 31. Personnel investigating the anomalous readings entered the Reactor Building and found a leak on the instrument's impulse line. Attempts to temporarily repair the line were not successful. On August 1, 1978 the leaking fittings were replaced, but the channel was left in bypass to prevent a spurious trip of the remaining RPS channels which could accompany attempts to valve Channel A back into service. On November 7, 1978, the channel was returned to service during a unit outage and during a review of the shift supervisor's log, it was determined that this incident was reportable pursuant to Oconee Technical Specifications 6.6.2.1.b(1).

Cause of Occurrence:

The anomalous RC flow indication of RPS Channel A was caused by leakage from the impulse line.

Analysis of Occurrence:

RPS Channels B, C, and D were operable throughout the occurrence. The RPS would have tripped on 2-out-of-3 logic which assures the functional capability of the RPS. This incident did not reduce the effectiveness of the RPS, and there were no adverse effects on public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

On August 1, 1978 the leaking fittings were replaced. On November 7, 1978 the transmitter was calibrated and placed into service. A procedural change was written on October 26, 1978 which specifies actions to be taken in specific cases of RPS and ES channel inoperability depending on the number of redundant channels available.