BLOCK (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) N'T REPORT 2 1 0 6 0 9 7 8 0 6 3 0 7 8 6 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 60 11 L (6) 015 10 1 01 01 31 SOURCE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) With the reactor in cold shutdown on 6-30-78, Procedure HNP-1-3902, "Safety Relief 12 Valve Functional Test," was attempted unsatisfactorily on B21-F013C and B21-F013L to 13 functional test the solenoids installed per DCR 78-9. The solenoids had not previously 4 been in service, and since the SRV's are not required to be operable while the reactor 15 is in cold shutdown, the SRV solenoids were not required to be operable and there was TC no significance in the failure of the SRV solenoid valves at the time of testing. 7 This is a non-repetitive occurrence. 18 80 COMP VALVE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE | A | (13) SIBI EI PI 9 (12) 1A V 01 X 1 (15 FI 18 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REVISION REFOR REPORT NO CODE LER RO TYPE 14 3 2 10 NUMBER ATTACHMENT PRINE COMP. NPRO-4 METHOD COMPONENT HOURS (22) FORM SUB 18) Z 0 01 Z 0 (25) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Of the eleven Target Rock D. C. actuated solenoid valves tested, only two failed. failed from its plunger being bent out of adjustment and the other failed because its plunger was not properly secured to the stem of the actuating springs. Although nine of the solenoid valves passed the functional test and were found completely operable. seven were found not to have the required locktite on the threads of the (cont. 4 N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) 1010101 GI Functional 15 C (31 Test ACTIVITY CONTENT 45 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) N/A N/A PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 08 DESCRIPTION (39) 01 01 0 N/A 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) 10101 N/A LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 80 DESCRIPTION N/A Z 7812270285 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) N/A Tom Greene, Supt. of Plt. Eng. Serv. (912)367-7781 Ext.121 NAME OF PREPARER PHONE

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Cause Description and Corrective Actions (continued)

solenoid plungers. The failure of the two solenoids and lack of locktite on seven solenoids can be contributed to poor QC control on the part of the solenoid manufacturer. All eleven SRV solenoid valves were removed, disassembled, cleaned, and readjusted or replaced as deemed necessary by the Target Rock factory representative. The SRV solenoid valves were bench-tested, remounted, and retested satisfactorily with no further action required.