

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | A | L | B | R | F | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

0 1 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

0 2 | During normal operation, while performing SI 4.2.B-36 (HPCI Turbine Steam Line Flow) on unit 2, 2-Pdis-73-1B was found inoperable. Pdis-73-1A was also inoperable because its sensing lines are in parallel with Pdis-73-1B. These switches isolate the HPCI system if high steam flow is sensed, indicating a HPCI steam line break. There was no effect on public health and safety because the HPCI space high temperature switches were available and operable.

0 7 | S | F | E | I | N | S | T | R | U | S | Z

17 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | T | 0 | Z | 8 | 2 | B | Z | Z | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | Y | L | D | 2 | B | 2

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1 0 | Dragon model G02-77c-10 3-valve manifold equalizer valve did not seat properly. Pdis-73-1B was valved out immediately. Pdis-73-1A then became operable. Equalizer valve stem was machined to seat properly. SI 4.2.B-36 was completed and the switch returned to service. This is a random event and no recurrence control is required.

1 5 | E | 0 | 6 | 4 | NA | B | Surveillance testing

1 6 | 2 | Z | NA | NA

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | NA

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA

1 9 | Z | NA

2 0 | N | 8208120190 820805 PDR AD0CK 05000260 S PDR

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Tennessee Valley Authority
 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17
 BF 15.2

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260/ 82023 Technical Specification Involved Table 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.(2) * Date Due NRC 8/6/82

Event Narrative:

Units 1, 2, and 3 were operating at 83-percent power, 64-percent power, and 86-percent power, respectively. Unit 2 was the only unit affected by this event, while performing Surveillance Instruction 4.2.B-36 (HPCI Turbine Steam Line High Flow) differential pressure switch 2-Pdis-73-1B would not respond to a pressure calibration input. The equalizer valve on the 2-Pdis-73-1B three-valve block manifold would not completely close. During the subsequent investigation, (and review of instrument drawings), it was recognized that failure of one block valve affected both switches, therefore Pdis-73-1A was also inoperable. Technical Specification Table 3.2.B requires the switches to operate at ≤ 90 psi. Above this trip setting isolates the HPCI system and trips the HPCI turbine. The Dragon Valve Inc. model 602-77C-10 three valve manifold equalizer valve would not seat properly. 2-Pdis-73-1B was valved out immediately. 2-Pdis-73-1A then became operable. The equalizer valve stem was machined so that it would seat properly. S.I. 4.2.B-36 was completed and the switch returned to service. There was no effect on public health and safety because the HPCI space high-temperature switches were available and operable had a HPCI steam line break occurred. This is considered a random event and no further recurrence control is required.

* Previous Similar Events:

NONE

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRR