NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: N C B E P 1 (2) LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) CAT: (5)
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6) DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 5 (7) EVENT DATE: 0 6 2 0 8 2 (8) REPORT DATE: 0 8 0 4 8 2 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While reviewing documentation of the most recently completed Unit No. 1 LLRT, the
0 3 resident inspector determined that 67 primary containment penetrations had exceeded
0 4 the two-year requirement for type C testing. A plant staff review of this documentation
0 5 revealed that 36 of the penetrations had been tested in February 1980 and the remainder
0 6 in May and June 1980. All LLRT is performed in accordance with the procedure outlined
0 7 in PT-20.3. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.
0 8 Technical Specifications 3.6.1.2, 6.9.1.8f

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S D (11)	A (12)	X (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 2	—	0 7 5	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 This event occurred because of improper scheduling. PT-20.3 was started in February
1 1 1980; however, it was not completed until June 1981. Personnel responsible for
1 2 scheduling the next performance used the PT completion date. All the subject pene-
1 3 trations will be tested prior to startup. In the future, PT-20.3 will be performed in
1 4 its entirety within the specified two year time frame from the first component test.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	G (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	C (31)	Resident Inspector Review

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

8208120022 820804
PDR ADOCK 05000325
S PDR

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER M. J. PASTVA, JR. PHONE 919-457-9521

GPO 917-426

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-82-75

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1 Event Date: June 20, 1982

While reviewing documentation of the most recently completed Unit No. 1 primary local leak rate test (LLRT), the resident NRC inspector determined that penetrations had exceeded the two-year requirement for type C testing. A review of this documentation by plant staff personnel determined that 36 electrical penetrations satisfactorily underwent LLRT in February 1980, and 31 penetrations, with primary containment isolation valves, satisfactorily underwent testing in May through June 1980.

This event occurred as a result of personnel error in scheduling the next required Unit No. 1 LLRT. Plant LLRT is performed in accordance with the procedure outlined in PT-20.3. The PT was scheduled for performance during the 1980 Unit No. 1 refueling outage of May through June 1980. While in the refueling outage, it was determined that the PT would not be completed during that time, and completion of the PT was rescheduled for a maintenance outage planned for the fall of 1980. The planned Unit No. 1 fall maintenance outage was postponed until April 1981, at which time PT-20.3 was satisfactorily completed. At that time, the next required LLRT was scheduled for performance in April 1983, two years from the time of the previous test completion, rather than two years from the outset of the previous performance.

Due to the discovery of this fault in surveillance scheduling, the subject penetrations will be tested prior to startup of the unit. The plant is also reviewing its scheduling methods to prevent future events of this nature.