

PREPARED BY:

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Region I, NRC 11/13/90

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report Nos. 50-272/90-23
50-311/90-23
50-354/90-19

Docket Nos. 50-272
50-311
50-354

License Nos. DPR-70
DPR-75
NPF-57

Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company
Facility Name: Salem and Hope Creek Generating Station
Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
Inspection Conducted: September 25-28, 1990
Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security

Inspector: Thomas W. Dexter 11/8/90
T. W. Dexter, Physical Security Inspector date

Approved by: R. R. Keimig 11-2-90
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section date
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Inspection Summary: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection
(Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/90-23, 50-311/90-23, 50-354/90-19)

Areas Inspected: Licensee action on previously identified items and follow-up on actions taken in response to the findings of the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) conducted on April 10-14, 1989; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles.

Results: The licensee was in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas inspected. However, potential weaknesses were identified in the areas of Protected Area Detection and Assessment Aids, and Protected Area Lighting.

DETAILS

1.0 Key Personnel Contacted

Licensee and Contractor Personnel

P. A. Moeller, General Manager, Nuclear Services
D. W. Renwick, Manager, Nuclear Security
R. Fisher, Screening Supervisor
B. Weiser, Security Engineering and Planning Staff
M. Iranick, Senior Security Regulatory Coordinator
R. Brown, Licensing, PSE&G
M. Pastra, Licensing, PSE&G
R. Mathews, Project Manager, Wackenhut

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem/Hope Creek

The above personnel were present at the exit interview.

In addition the inspector also interviewed other licensee employees and members of the Wackenhut contract security force.

2.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items

2.1 The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions on the following previously identified item :

2.1.1 (Closed) UNR 50-272/89-22-02, 50-311/89-24-02 and 50-354/89-19-02: On November 13 and 16, 1989, the inspectors determined, by observations, that the licensee's protected area lighting was adequate, but several marginal areas were identified. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee and relevant procedural changes. The inspector found the corrective actions and the procedures to be satisfactory.

3.0 Follow-up on Regulatory Effectiveness Review Findings

On April 10-14, 1989, the NRC conducted a Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) at the Hope Creek Station. The report of the RER findings was transmitted to the licensee on April 26, 1989. On June 19, 1989, the licensee responded to the RER findings by letter and outlined those actions already taken and proposed to correct potential weaknesses that were identified. During the regional security inspection conducted November 13-17, 1989, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions completed to that time. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's action on the items which remained open.

3.1 Following are the results of the inspector's review of several of the licensee's actions that remained open at the conclusion of Combined Inspection Nos. 50-272/89-22, 50-311/89-24 and 50-354/89-19, conducted on November 13-17, 1989.

3.1.1 Section 2.2.1-Finding 5

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This item is open and will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.

In addition, two locations were identified where team members believed the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) could be defeated.

Location 1

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Location 2

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Licensee Action

The licensee is evaluating two types of IDS to determine which one would be most suitable for this particular application. The licensee expects the evaluation to be complete and design of the system to begin January 1, 1991. This item is open and will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.

3.1.2 Section 2.2.5

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3.1.3 Section 2 3 2

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4.0 Management Effectiveness

During the course of the inspection, the inspector interviewed several security force members to determine if there were any concerns that could affect plant safety or security. Several issues not within the NRC's purview were raised. However, of note to the inspector was that members of the security force believed they were not receiving clear messages from first line supervisors when they discussed directions from management. The inspector discussed this perception with licensee security management for feedback to the security contractor. This matter will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

5.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids

- 5.1 Protected Area Barrier - The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the PA barriers on September 25, 1990. The inspector determined, by observation, that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
- 5.2 Protected Area Detection Aids - The inspector observed the PA perimeter detection aids on September 26, 1990, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

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The systems are being aggressively tested each quarter and those concerns that were previously identified have been corrected.

- 5.3 Isolation Zones - The inspector verified that isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier. No discrepancies were noted.
- 5.4 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting - The inspector conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on September 26, 1990. The inspector determined, by observations, that the lighting was very good. Since the last inspection, the licensee has revised the procedures to address compensatory measures for inadequate lighting with more specificity.

However, the inspector found two areas that required additional lighting to supplement the lights already present and one area where bushes reduced the available lighting. The licensee took immediate compensatory actions and committed to correct the deficiencies. This item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

- 5.5 Assessment Aids - The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids and determined that they were generally installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. (See also Section 3.1.5 of this report.)
- 5.6 Vital Area Barriers - The inspector conducted a physical inspection of several VA barriers on September 26 and 27, 1990. The inspector determined, by observation, that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted.
- 5.7 Vital Area Detection Aids - The inspector observed the VA detection aids and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted.
- 5.8 Fill Lines for Plant Diesel Generators Fuel Oil Tanks

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This is an unresolved item and will be reviewed during subsequent inspections. (UNR 50-272/90-23-01, 50-311/90-23-01 and 50-354/90-19-01.)

6.0 Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles

- 6.1 Personnel Access Control - The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:
- 6.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel are properly identified and authorization is checked prior to issuance of badges and key-cards. No discrepancies were noted.
- 6.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee has a program to confirm the trustworthiness and reliability of employees and contractor personnel. No discrepancies were noted.
- 6.1.3 The inspector verified that the licensee has a search program, as committed to in the Plan, for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials. The inspector observed personnel access processing during shift changes, visitor access processing, and interviewed members of the security force and licensee's security staff about personnel access procedures. No discrepancies were noted.

- 6.1.4 The inspector determined, by observations, that individuals in the PA and VAs display their access badges as required. No discrepancies were noted.
- 6.1.5 The inspector verified that the licensee has escort procedures for visitors to the PA and VAs. No discrepancies were noted.
- 6.2 Package and Material Access Control - The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and material that are brought into the PA at the main access portal. The inspector reviewed the package and material control procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector also observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures. The licensee is maintaining a very aggressive package search program at the main access portal to prevent contraband from being brought into the PA. The licensee has a random search program that ensures approximately 35 percent of all packages being hand-carried are physically inspected by a SFM in addition to being processed through the X-ray device. No discrepancies were noted.
- 6.3 Vehicle Access Control - The inspector determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspector verified that vehicles are properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification is verified by the SFM at the vehicle access portal. This procedure is consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspector observed vehicle processing and search, inspected vehicle logs, and interviewed members of the security force and licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures. The inspector also reviewed vehicle search procedures and determined they were consistent with commitments in the Plan.

However, on September 26, 1990, the inspector, accompanied by a security force supervisor and two members of the licensee's security staff, found all of the on-site emergency vehicles with their keys in the ignition and parked in an unsecured garage in the PA. A member of the licensee's security staff immediately removed the keys and gave them to the supervisor of the fire and safety team on duty. The inspector determined that each vehicle was equipped with an immobilization device that would have to have been defeated in order to move a vehicle. However, the licensee committed to change the practice of leaving the keys in the vehicles. The keys will be controlled by fire and safety personnel in the future. In addition, the licensee modified the fire and safety personnel procedure by adding a paragraph to address the security of the vehicle keys.

