

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | A | L | B | R | F | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 9

REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During a normal startup, valve 1-FCV-77-2A (drywell sump pump discharge to radwaste)

0 3 | failed to close on initial operation from the control room on 6/25/82 and 7/2/82.

0 4 | On 6/25/82 subsequent attempts to close the valve were successful. On 7/9/82

0 5 | the outboard valve 1-FCV-77-2B was closed and repairs made to FCV-77-2A. There

0 6 | was no effect on public health and safety as FCV-77-2B was operable and redundant

0 7 | methods were available for monitoring drywell leakage. (T.S. 3.7.D.2 and 3.6.C.2)

0 8 |

0 9 | M | A | 11 | E | 12 | B | 13 | V | A | L | V | E | X | 14 | X | 15 | E | 16

SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 COMPONENT CODE 13 COMP. SUBCODE 14 VALVE SUBCODE 15

17 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 3 | L | 0

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 25 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 28 REPORT TYPE 30 31 REVISION NO. 32

ACTION TAKEN 33 FUTURE ACTION 34 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 HOURS 37 38 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 40 41 NPRO-4 FORM SUB. 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44 45 46 47

A 18 C 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 Y 24 L 25 V 0 9 5 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The Versa, VSG-3521, 3-way, 115V solenoid air routing valve was replaced with

1 1 | another manufacturer's valve on 7/9/82. Cause of failure of the solenoid valve

1 2 | is undetermined. During future unit outages the Versa solenoid valves will be

1 3 | replaced.

1 4 |

1 5 | C | 28 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 29 | NA | 30 | B | 31 | Routine cycle tests

FACILITY STATUS 8 9 % POWER 10 11 OTHER STATUS 12 13 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 14 15 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 16 17

1 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36

ACTIVITY CONTENT 18 19 RELEASED OF RELEASE 20 21 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 22 23 LOCATION OF RELEASE 24 25

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 40 41 TYPE 42 43 DESCRIPTION 44 45

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41

PERSONNEL INJURIES 42 43 DESCRIPTION 44 45

1 9 | Z | 42 | NA | 43

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 44 45 TYPE 46 47 DESCRIPTION 48 49

2 0 | N | 44 | NA | 45

PUBLICITY 46 47 ISSUED 48 49 DESCRIPTION 50 51

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARED Williams A. Roberts, Jr.

8208050457 820729
PDR ADCK 05000259
S PDR

PHONE: (205) 729-0788

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 82044 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.D.1 and 3.7.D.2

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) * Date Due NRC 8/7/82

Event Narrative:

Unit 2 was operating at 72-percent power and unit 3 was operating at 97-percent power. Unit 1 was starting up normally following an outage. Only unit 1 was affected by this event. On June 25, 1982 during the periodic valve actuation test initiated as corrective action for Licensee Event Report 50-259/82040, valve 1-FCV-77-2A (drywell sump pump discharge to radwaste) failed to close from initial control room actuation. The valve was subsequently cycled and operated satisfactorily. On July 9, 1982 during the periodic actuation test, the valve failed to close. Outboard containment isolation valve 1-FCV-77-2B was immediately closed to ensure primary containment (T.S. 3.7.D.2) and no further attempt made to cycle 1-FCV-77-2A. The Versa, VSG-3521, 3-way, 115V solenoid air routing valve was replaced with a valve made by another manufacturer. The valve was tested satisfactorily. Corrective action will be the replacement of Versa solenoid valves on drywell sump pump discharge isolation valves on other units during future outages. There was no effect on public health and safety as the outboard containment isolation valve was closed during repairs (T.S. 3.7.D.2) and redundant methods were available for monitoring drywell leakage. Repairs were completed in approximately 8 hours (T.S. 3.6.C.2).

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/82040, 73051W

50-260/74014W, 77013

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP