



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775
AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346-8851

October 30, 1990
RBG- 33923
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-028 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell
Manager-Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

Handwritten initials: L/E, PDG, DEJ, DCH, LW, pg, NW

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050004581 OF 033 PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) Reactor Protection System Actuation on High Level in the Scram Discharge Volume due to Operator Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
09	30	90	90	028	00	10	03	09			050000
											050000

OPERATING MODE (9) 4

POWER LEVEL (10) 10

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.408(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.403(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.403(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.403(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.403(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.403(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/>		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensing TELEPHONE NUMBER 5104381-4145

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO X

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 0427 on 09/30/90 with the unit in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown), the reactor protection system (RPS) actuated on high water level in the scram discharge volume (SDV). All control rods were inserted previously and no additional rod motion occurred due to the RPS actuation. The root cause of the RPS actuation was the failure of the operator to bypass the scram discharge volume (SDV) high level trip. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation.

All licensed operators will receive on-shift training on this event. In addition, a "CAUTION" will be added to Abnormal Operating Procedure, AOP-0001 (Reactor Scram) to remind the operators that the scram discharge volume will take longer to fill and thus reach the high level trip when the plant is at reduced pressure and/or there is no control rod motion.

The control rods were fully inserted prior to this event. No additional rod motion occurred as a result of the unplanned RPS actuation, and the RPS system responded as designed. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 0	0 2 8	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

At approximately 0427 on 09/30/90 with the unit in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown), the reactor protection system (RPS) (*JE*) actuated on high water level in the scram discharge volume (SDV). All control rods were inserted previously and no additional rod motion occurred due to the RPS actuation. The root cause of the RPS actuation was the failure of the operator to bypass the SDV high level trip. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation.

INVESTIGATION

On September 30, 1990, the reactor mode switch was in the "refuel" position to allow surveillance testing of the nuclear instruments. With the surveillance testing completed, the reactor mode switch was required to be placed in the "shutdown" position. At 0426 the at-the-controls (ATC) operator placed the mode switch in the "shutdown" position, which in turn caused a reactor protection system (RPS) actuation. This RPS actuation was expected in response to the preplanned placement of the mode switch in the "shutdown" position and thus is not reportable; however, a later RPS actuation occurred due to the failure of the ATC operator to bypass the SDV high level trip. This RPS actuation is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Following the expected RPS actuation, the ATC operator verified that the scram pilot solenoid valve status lights (*IL*) had de-energized, but failed to review Abnormal Operating Procedure, AOP-0001 ("Reactor Scram") for subsequent operator actions. The ATC operator then noticed that the "CRD Scram Disch Vol High Water Level" alarm (*LA*) did not actuate. When the plant is shutdown, the SDV requires more time to fill up than it does following control rod movement at normal operating pressure. At this point, without placing the "CRD Scram Disch Vol High Water Level Bypass" switches in the "bypass" position, he reset the RPS actuation. At approximately 0427 the SDV high water level trip occurred and caused the second RPS actuation. This actuation was not a part of a preplanned activity and thus is reportable under 10CFR50.73 as an ESF actuation. At the direction of the Shift Supervisor, the ATC operator reviewed AOP-0001 and properly reset the RPS actuation.

A review of previously submitted LERs revealed a similar event reported in LER 85-002. In LER 85-002, three RPS actuations are described. The first and third RPS actuations were due to inadvertent noise spikes during an inspection of the main steam line radiation monitors which tripped RPS channel B coupled with RPS channel A being in a manually tripped condition to perform the calibration. The second actuation was due to high level in the SDV.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 10	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			- 0 2 8	- 0 0	0 3	OF

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

After the RPS actuation was reset, the Shift Supervisor stopped all work in the main control room and briefed all on-shift licensed operators on this event. He emphasized the need to maintain control and the use of procedures regardless of the current Operational Condition. Once he was satisfied that all of the operators present understood the severity of the situation he authorized the restart of work activities.

As further corrective action a "CAUTION" will be added to AOP-0001, "Reactor Scram". The "CAUTION" will be used to remind the operators that at reduced reactor pressure and/or with no control rod motion that the SDV will take longer to fill and reach the high level trip. In addition, all licensed operators will receive on-shift training on this event by November 6, 1990.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The control rods were fully inserted prior to this event. No additional rod motion occurred as a result of the unplanned RPS actuation, and the RPS system responded as designed. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).