

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

2301 MARKET STREET
P.O. BOX 8699
PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101
(215) 841-4000

July 16, 1982

Mr. E. C. Haynes, Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
621 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Dear Mr. Haynes:

The following related occurrences were reported to Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on July 6, 1982 and July 12, 1982.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-277
Report No.:	2-82-15/1m and 2-82-16/1m
Event Dates:	July 3, 1982 and July 9, 1982
Report Date:	July 16, 1982
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD #1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 3.2.A states that "When primary containment integrity is required, the limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that initiates primary containment isolation are given in Table 3.2.A." Technical Specification Table 3.2.A requires that there shall be a minimum number of two operable instrument channels per trip system for the main steam line high flow trip.

8208050317 820716
PDR ADCK 05000277
S PDR

IER2

Description of the Event

During the startup of Unit 2 on July 3, 1982, with the unit at approximately 34% power, the operator observed that there was no steam flow indication on the 'D' main steam line. Investigation found that the 'D' main steam line flow transmitter (FT-51D) and one of the four 'D' main steam line high flow trip transmitters (DPIS-116C) had open instrument equalizing valves.

Later, during a daily Surveillance Test on July 9, 1982, with Unit 2 at approximately 90% power, the operator performing the test observed a discrepancy between the indication of one of the four 'A' main steam line high flow trip transmitters (DPIS-116B) and the other three. Investigation found that the instrument had an open instrument equalizing valve.

Probable Consequences of the Event

Instrument FT-51D has no nuclear safety function. It supplies the 'D' main steam line flow input to a control room indicator and to the feedwater control system.

Instruments DPIS-116B and DPIS-116C are part of a one out of two twice trip logic which provides Group I valve isolation as part of the Primary Containment Isolation System upon detection of high steam flow ($> 140\%$ of normal full power steam flow) on the 'A' main steam line and the 'D' main steam line respectively. With open equalizing valves, these instruments were inoperable. However, all redundant instrument channels on each steam line were operable, and for this reason this event is of minimal safety significance.

Cause of the Event

The cause of these events was personnel error. Investigation indicated that the equalizing valves had been left open as a result of periodic instrument work that had been performed during the refueling outage. Prior to reactor startup following the refueling outage, a formal instrument valve position checkoff list was completed which documented that all of these valves had

been properly positioned. The instrument technicians performing this check-off list apparently failed to detect the improper position of the equalizing valves.

Corrective Action

In each case, upon detection of the open equalizing valves, they were immediately placed in the proper position returning the instruments to service. Immediate steps were also taken to verify the proper valving of nuclear safety related instruments by performing the instrument valve position verification.

Management and supervisory personnel have met with the instrument technicians and engineers involved in the event and have stressed the importance of guaranteeing that instrument valving is performed accurately.

Very truly yours,



J. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Generation Division/Nuclear

cc: Director, NRC
Office of Inspection &
Enforcement

Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC
Office of Management &
Program Analysis

C. J. Cowgill, Site Inspector