

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

6N 38A Lookout Place  
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801  
October 25, 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET  
NO. 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT  
(LER) 50-328/90015

The enclosed LER provides details of an event where a fire watch failed to follow his assigned patrol route resulting in a missed observation and inspection of an inoperable fire barrier penetration in the Unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer room on Elevation 759. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) as a condition prohibited by the plant technical specifications.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



J. R. Bynum, Vice President  
Nuclear Operations

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. J. N. Donohew, Project Manager  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
One White Flint, North  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, Maryland 20852

INPO Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector  
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
2600 Igou Ferry Road  
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

9010310281 901025  
PDR ADDOCK 05000328  
S PDC

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) | PAGE (3)  
| 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3

TITLE (4) Fire watch failed to follow procedures and survey an area on his assigned patrol route with an inoperable fire barrier penetration

EVENT DAY (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	9	2	7	9	0	9	0	0	1	5	0	0	1	0	2	5	9	0	0	5	0	0	0	1	1

OPERATING MODE (9) | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:

(9) | 6 | (Check one or more of the following)(11)

POWER LEVEL (10)	0	0	0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
				<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
				<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in
				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Abstract below and in
				<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	Text, NRC Form 366A)
				<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
<u>C. H. Whittemore, Compliance Licensing</u>	6   1   5   8   4   3   -   7   2   1   0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 27, 1990, at 1430 Eastern daylight time (EDT) with Unit 2 in Mode 6 for a refueling outage, it was discovered that one of the fire watch personnel failed to follow his assigned patrol route and survey an area with an inoperable fire barrier penetration. Breach Permit 10308 was issued September 22, 1990, for the Unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer room on Elevation 759 to permit cable pulling activities. In compliance with the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 action statement, a roving fire watch was established to periodically survey the room for detection and prevention of fire. One of five fire watch personnel assigned the patrol route signed the log sheet without inspecting the Unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer room. The fire watch sign-off log was originally located in the Unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer room. However, the log had been moved and was located on Elevation 734. The cause of this event is the fire watch person failed to follow procedures. The corrective action was to relocate the sign-off log outside the pressurizer heater transformer room on Elevation 759 and appropriately discipline the fire watch employee.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2	0151010131218	910	15	0	0	0	2101013

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On September 27, 1990, at 1430 Eastern daylight time with Unit 2 in Mode 6 for a refueling outage, it was discovered during a Quality Assurance (QA) audit of the fire watch program that one of the fire watch employees failed to follow his assigned patrol route and survey an area with an inoperable fire barrier penetration (EIIS Code PEN). This is a condition prohibited by technical specifications (TSs). Breach Permit 10308 dated September 22, 1990, was issued to permit cable pulling activities in the Unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer room on Elevation 759. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 requires all fire barrier penetrations in fire zone boundaries protecting safety-related areas to be functional at all times. The LCO 3.7.12 action statement states: "With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish a hourly fire watch patrol."

In compliance with LCO 3.7.12 action statement, fire detectors in the area were verified operable, and a roving fire watch was established to periodically survey the room for detection and prevention of fire. Routine fire watches had previously been established as a compensatory measure for identified 10 CFR 50 Appendix R interactions. Access to the room is normally gained by climbing a staircase from Elevation 734. Normally the fire watch sign-off logs are located in or near the area to be inspected to ensure the fire watch route is followed. The fire watch sign-off log for the area in question was originally located inside the room. However, the log had been relocated to Elevation 734 by parties unknown. The fire watch signed the log sheet without inspecting the room with the inoperable fire barrier penetration. Note that prior to this event, the Unit 1 pressurizer heat transformer room (elevation 759) had recently been deleted as a required fire watch area. This may have led to a misunderstanding of the need to continue the inspections on Unit 2. However, investigation and interviews revealed that the fire watch personnel on different shifts properly inspected the Unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer room on Elevation 759, and then signed the log.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause of the event is a fire watch employee failing to follow procedures. A contributing cause may have been the inappropriate location of the sign-off log sheet.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) as an operation prohibited by TSs.

The hourly fire watch patrol was being performed as a compensatory measure for a nonfunctional fire barrier penetration as required by Action Statement a of LCO 3.7.12. Although the Unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer room was not inspected for fires during the one shift, automatic fire detectors and fire suppression systems were in service and operable during this time. Therefore, there was no significant degradation in the overall level of fire protection of the plant.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER				
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2	0500032890	0	1	5	0	0	0	3 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The fire watch employee was appropriately disciplined for failing to follow procedures. The need to follow the assigned patrol routes was reinforced with the other fire watch employees.

Fire Operations has re-established monitoring of the fire watch rounds on a random basis. The sign-off log sheet has been relocated to the immediate area (Elevation 759) where the fire watch is required to survey to reduce the probability of a failure to follow procedures.

COMMITMENTS

None.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Since 1984, there have been 39 LERs written to report problems or noncompliance with the LCO 3.7.12 action statement; one (LER 50-327/88045) was written because fire watch personnel did not follow the assigned patrol route. One of the corrective actions for this LER was to designate specific individuals to perform periodic monitoring of fire watch activities. This monitoring activity was discontinued because the number of deficiencies identified was low. QA continued to monitor these activities on a limited basis.

0950h