

## Northern States Power Company

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October 23, 1990

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10 CFR Part 50 Section 50.73

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

> PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60

Auto-start of No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump While Switching Residual Heat Removal Pumps

The Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached.

This event was reported via the Emergency Notification System in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.72, on September 23, 1990. Please contact us if you require additional information related to this event.

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Thomas M Parker Manager Nuclear Support Services

c: Regional Administrator - Region III, NRC NRR Project Manager, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, NRC MPCA Attn: Dr J W Ferman

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Attachment

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On September 23, 1990 Unit 2 was in cold shutdown for refueling. Decay heat was being removed by use of one train of the residual heat removal system. Control room operators were in the process of switching to the other Residual Heat Removal train for decay heat removal. Both component cooling water pumps were running to support the switchover. After the switchover was completed, the operator tried to stop No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump. The operator held the control switch for No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump in the stop position until discharge pressure had stabilized in accordance with guidance issued after the last event, Unit 1 LER 1-90-009. When the control switch was released, at 1010, No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump restarted automatically. This was a non-ESF actuation of ESF equipment.

System and component testing was done which showed that heat removal capacity was adequate in various equipment configurations, but in certain configurations, an auto-start of a component cooling water pump may result due to discharge pressure fluctuations dropping below the actuation setpoint and not increasing above the reset setpoint. Procedures will be revised to prevent equipment configurations that can result in recurrence of this event.

LICENSEE EVENT P	APPROVES OME NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/82 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IF 530. U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20565, AND TO THE FAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). DFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.							
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### EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 23, 1990 Unit 2 was in cold shutdown for refueling. Decay heat was being removed by use of one train of the residual heat removal system (EIIS System Code: BP). Control room operators were in the process of switching to the other Residual Heat Removal train for decay heat removal. Both component cooling water pumps (EIIS System Code: CC) (EIIS Component Code: P) were running to support the switchover. After the switchover was completed, the operator tried to stop No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump. The operator held the control switch for No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump in the stop position until discharge pressure had stabilized in accordance with guidance issued after the last event, Unit 1 LER 1-90-009. When the control switch (EIIS Component Code: HC) was released, at 1010, No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump restarted automatically. This was a non-ESF actuation of ESF equipment.

## CAUSE OF THE EVENT

Cause of the event was an attempt to stop No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump while an auto-start signal was present.

# ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

Normal discharge pressure with both component cooling water pumps running is about 110 psig. When one of the two pumps is shut down, the discharge pressure sometimes momentarily drops below 65 psig, which is the low pressure actuation setpoint for the pump.

As a result of this event, the discharge pressure switch for No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump was tested. The actuation setpoint was found to be at 65 psig and the reset at 75 psig, which is proper for this switch.

A test was conducted to repeat the conditions leading to the auto-start. It was found that with No. 22 Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger in service, and after stopping No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump, No. 21 Component Cooling Water Pump does not supply adequate pressure to reset the low pressure actuation signal. When No. 22 Component Cooling Water Pump was shut down, pressure momentarily decreased to about 65 psig and leveled off at about 72 psig, which is below the reset setpoint of the pressure switch (EIIS Component Code: PDS). When the control switch was released, the pump restarted automatically because the low pressure auto-start signal was still present.

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As a result of the previous similar event, Unit 1 LER 90-009, guidance was provided the operator that stated that the pump control switch should be held in the stop position until system pressure stabilized since it was believed at the time that pressure oscillations caused pressure switch actuation. The corrective action was not adequate to prevent this event.

During the event, all equipment operated as designed. The automatic start of the standby component cooling water pump ensured that all safety-related components requiring component cooling water were provided with adequate pressure and flow to perform their required functions; health and safety of the public were unaffected. Since this event involved the automatic start of an engineered safety feature component, it is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

## CORRECTIVE ACTION

System and component testing was done as outlined above. The testing showed that heat removal capacity was adequate in each equipment configuration, but in certain configurations, an auto-start of a component cooling water pump may result.

Procedures will be revised to prevent equipment configurations that can result in recurrence of this event.

## FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

None.

#### PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Automatic component cooling water pump starts have been reported as Unit 1 LER's 85-007, 87-020, 89-001 and 90-009; only LER 90-009 had a similar cause.