50-289

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY SUBSIDIARY OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION

POST OFFICE BOX 542 READING, PENNSYLVANIA 19603 TELEPHONE 215 – 929-3601

October 27, 1978
GQL 1732

Mr. B. H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50
Docket No. 50-289

Attached please find an update to Licensee Event Report 78-27/01T-0, as requested by Mr. Haverkamp in a telephone call to Mr. W. E. Potts on September 29, 1978.

Sincerely,

J. G. Herbein

J. G. Herbein
Vice President-Generation

JGH:DGM:tas

Attachment

7811070191

A002
S/1

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | P A T M I 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | | (5)
LICENSEE CODE — LICENSE NUMBER — LICENSE TYPE — CAT

CON'T 01 REPORT SOURCE | L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 9 (7) | 0 9 0 1 7 8 (8) | 1 0 2 7 7 8 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER — EVENT DATE — REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During transmitter calibration, it was noted that the actual level of 12.42 ft. of
03 borated water in the "B" C.F.T. was less than the minimum allowable level of 12.55
04 ft., thus violating T.S. 3.3.1.2.a. It was determined that there was no threat to
05 the health and safety of the public.
06
07
08

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
09	I B (11)	X (12)	Z (13)	I N S T R U (14)	E (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 8	—	0 2 7	/	0 1	T	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	N (25)	B 0 4 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 A level transmitter calibration was being conducted due to different levels
11 indicated on redundant channels. When it was determined that the correct channel
12 showed that the tank was out of specification, borated water was added to bring the
13 tank to within T.S. limits.
14

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
15	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	NA	A (31)	Comparison of redundant channels

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
16	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
17	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
18	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
19	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
20	Y (44)	Weekly News Release

7810050101

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER D. G. Mitchell

PHONE: 215-929-3601 Ext. 169

NARRATIVE TO LER 78-027/1T-1

On September 1, 1978, it was determined that the "B" Core Flood Tank (CFT) contained a volume of borated water less than the minimum allowed. The minimum allowable volume of 1010 ft^3 is equivalent to a level of 12.55 ft. The actual level was 12.42 ft., a violation of Technical Specification 3.3.1.2a and reportable per T.S. 6.9.2.A.2.

The occurrence was noted during a surveillance conducted on the Core Flood Tank pressure transmitters. After the surveillance was performed on the PT3 pressure transmitter and that transmitter valved back into service, the associated level channel, LT3, indicated a level of 12.69 ft., and the alarm actuated. However, LT4 level indicator was indicating a higher level and was believed to be correct, therefore, LT3 was placed out of service.

The lines to the LT3 level transmitter were blown down to clean them and provide a more accurate reading. After this was accomplished, LT3 level indicator read 12.42 ft. This reading was then believed correct and borated water was immediately added to bring the volume in the tank within Technical Specification limits. Level transmitter LT4 was then checked and found to be out of specification. LT4 was recalibrated and returned to service.

The alarm on the level indicator system actuates when the level reaches 12.70 ft. The alarm connected to channel LT3 did actuate at its proper level. However, that channel was thought to be showing an incorrect level, and was taken out of service for calibration.

The alarm from channel LT3 did not sound until the pressure transmitter calibration had been completed. Previous to that test, both channels were indicating a level within the alarm setpoints. Therefore, it was not known how long the tank was out of specification.

The fluid loss from the tank was believed to be caused by the monthly sampling which requires 25-30 gallons of fluid for each test.

At the present time, the procedures require the level to be checked once per day. A review is under way to determine if the transmitter should be replaced. Should the review indicate that the transmitters should be replaced, it is anticipated that this change would take place during the 1979 refueling outage.

It has been determined that the out-of-limit volume for the "B" Core Flood Tank did not constitute a threat to the health and safety of the public, in that all other engineered safety features were operable, and the "A" Core Flood Tank had greater than the minimum required level. Therefore, the combined volumes of the "A" and "B" Core Flood Tankswould have been sufficient to reflood the core.