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the southern electric system

W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Operations

October 15, 1990

ELV-02158
0322

Docket No. 50-425


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
PERSONNEL ERRORS LEAD TO CONTAINMENT
SPRAY PUMPS' DEACTIVATION**

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which occurred on September 16, 1990.

Sincerely,



W. G. Hairston, III

WGH, III/NJS/gm

Enclosure: LER 50-425/1990-012

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. C. K. McCoy
Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
Mr. P. D. Rushton
Mr. R. M. Odom
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebner, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000425	PAGE (3) 1 OF 4
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TITLE (4)
PERSONNEL ERRORS LEAD TO CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS' DEACTIVATION

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
09	16	90	90	012	00	10	15	90		05000
										05000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 4	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(f)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME R. M. ODOM, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE	TELEPHONE NUMBER 404 826-3201
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (16)

On 9-16-90, while in Mode 4, the Shift Supervisor (SS) inadvertently issued a Mode 5 clearance to remove the Train A and Train B Containment Spray System (CSS) pumps from service for maintenance. The Reactor Operator (RO) hung clearance tags on the actuation handswitches and placed the handswitches in the "Pull-to-Lock" position at 0440 CDT. The Shift Superintendent saw these tags and realized that the unit was out of compliance with the Technical Specifications, which require both pumps to be operable.

Since the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statement addresses only one CSS being inoperable, the unit had entered TS 3.0.3 because it was in a condition where no other LCO action statement was applicable.

Control room operators restored the CSS pump handswitches to the "Automatic" position at 0447 CDT. This action restored the Train B CSS, but the Train A pump motor breaker was being racked out at the time. Plant Equipment Operators were notified and the Train A pump motor breaker was racked in. The Train A pump was started to verify proper breaker operation and Train A was returned to service at 0602 CDT.

The causes of this event were cognitive personnel errors on the part of the SS and the RO. Both have been counseled.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2	05000425	90	012	00	2	OF 4

TEXT

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit operated in a condition outside of Technical Specification (TS) action statements and entered TS 3.0.3 when both Containment Spray System pumps were taken out of service. A report is also required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D) because this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the Containment Spray System, which is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event on 9-16-90, Unit 2 had just entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) at 0% rated thermal power. There was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 9-16-90, while in Mode 4, the Shift Supervisor (SS) inadvertently issued a Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) clearance to remove the Train A and Train B Containment Spray System (CSS) pumps from service for maintenance. The Reactor Operator (RO) hung clearance tags on the actuation handswitches and the handswitches were taken to their "Pull-to-Lock" position at 0440 CDT. The Shift Superintendent saw these tags and realized that, while the unit was in Mode 4, it was out of compliance with TS 3.6.2.1 which reads:

"Two independent Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE with each Spray System capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment emergency sump."

Since the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statement addresses only one CSS being inoperable, the unit had entered TS 3.0.3 because it was in a condition where no other LCO action statement was applicable.

Control room operators restored the CSS pump handswitches to the "Automatic" position at 0447 CDT. This action restored the Train B CSS, but the Train A pump motor breaker was being racked out at the time. The unit had therefore exited the TS 3.0.3 LCO and entered the TS 3.6.2.1 LCO, the action statement for which reads:

"With one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours."

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2	05000425	90	012	00	3	OF 4

TEXT

Plant Equipment Operators were notified and the Train A pump motor breaker was racked in. The Train A pump was started to verify proper breaker operation and the TS LCO was exited at 0602 CDT. The NRC Operations Center was notified of this event at 1120 CDT. This incident was not immediately recognized as reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 and a notification was not made within four hours.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The causes of this event were cognitive personnel errors on the part of:

1. The SS, while issuing required clearances upon entry into Mode 4, inadvertently authorized a Mode 5 clearance, which allowed both CSS pumps to be removed from service simultaneously, and
2. The RO, for not maintaining a questioning attitude when given directions which resulted in a condition prohibited by the TS.

These errors were not the result of any unusual characteristics of the work location.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Although the CSS is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the system was not required to perform its design function during the seven minutes involved. Additionally, the safety risk imposed by this out of service condition is considered small due to the relatively short period of time involved. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or public health and safety as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. The SS who approved the clearance to remove the pumps from service has been counseled regarding the importance of accuracy in reviewing clearances related to equipment required to be operable per the TS.
2. The Reactor Operator has been counseled regarding the importance of maintaining a questioning attitude in the performance of his duties.
3. A copy of this LER will be included in the Operations Reading Book for review by licensed operators.
4. This specific incident and requirements for immediate notification will be reviewed during the next requalification cycle to enhance compliance with reporting requirements.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
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TEXT

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components:

None

2. Previous Similar Events:

LER 50-425/1989-003, dated 4-10-89.
LER 50-424/1989-003, dated 2-17-89.

These previous LER's represent incidents of TS 3.0.3 entry due to both trains of safety-related components being removed from service as a result of Shift Supervisors' personnel errors. Corrective actions included personnel counseling and advising other personnel of the incidents and their ramifications.

3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:

Containment Spray System - BE